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Judgment

Title: Ford & anor -v- The Minister for Justice and Equality

Neutral Citation: [2015] IEHC 720

High Court Record Number: 2014 416JR

Date of Delivery: 19/11/2015

Court: High Court

Judgment by: Eagar J.

Status: Approved

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

BETWEEN

ALISON FORD AND DAVID NWOKE

AND

THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY

JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Eagar delivered on the 19th day of November, 2015

letter is exhibited, and I will revert to the letter in due course.

9. The first named applicant said she was surprised by this letter as it says that it was disregarding the presence of the applicant in Nigeria and found that she could visit Nigeria instead.

10. By way of comment in her affidavit, she said that she finds it remarkable that the respondent has concluded that a life of separation that can seemingly exist perfectly without the parties being together. She says this is not her understanding of marriage and her intention to live with her husband, share her home with him, to have children with him, and to live what she would know and describe as normal married life.

11. She says this cannot be done over the phone, on the internet or on the basis of occasional visits. She says the respondent has not behaved in a reasonable way.

12. The respondent's statement of opposition was verified by the affidavit of Jackie Hannon, Higher Executive Officer, Department of Justice and Equality. Ms. Hannon says that the respondent did not make a decision communicated by letter to the second applicant "to refuse the said application for a review" as averred by the first applicant at para. 7 of her affidavit. She said that the letter dated 17th June, 2014, comprised the notification of the outcome of the second applicant's appeal (made by letter dated 29th May, 2014) and that the said appeal was fully considered and that a full consideration and decision was made. She states that the respondent took all relevant matters into account upon the second applicant's application for a visa, and upon appeal, which was determined and notified by letter dated 17th June, 2014, she noted that the respondent's consideration and assessment of the second applicant's application for a visa and subsequent appeal that the respondent considered the pertinent issues in this case". She said there appears to be no dispute arising on the facts as pleaded save that the respondent necessarily accept the characterisation of those facts as averred by the first applicant in her affidavit, and that the matter is one for legal submissions.

The first decision on the application for a visa

13. This document was dated 11th April, 2014 and signed by the Visa Office, Embassy of Ireland, Abuja, Nigeria. It states that "under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights" and it states that "the application has been refused in accordance with the Policy Document on Non-EEA Family Reunification ("the Policy Document") published by the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, which is effective as of the 1st January, 2014. The policy document has been prepared in observance of the best interests of the parties and society in general". The letter states that it is accepted that to refuse the Join Spouse (non-EEA) visa application in respect of the second named applicant will engage the right to respect for family life under Article 8 (1) of the ECHR. Refusing the Join Spouse (non EEA / Irish national) visa application in pursuance of lawful immigration control does not engage the right to respect for his private life under Article 8 (1) of the ECHR.

14. The letter of notification and the examination of the application on behalf of the Minister reads:-

"Dear Sir/Madam,

I regret to inform you that your application for an Irish Visa has been refused by the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service for the following reasons:

FM:- There is no automatic right for non-EEA nationals who are (extended) family members to enter Ireland on a long term basis to Ireland

ID:- Insufficient documentation submitted in support of the application:- Additional documentation has not been provided, namely:

- Official marriage certificate. Please note that the current copy marriage certificate is not a standard FRN civil marriage certificate & does not contain required information such as a certificate of no impediment.*
- The visa reference must also provide evidence that she has not been married before (i.e.) may also be called "Certificate de Coutume" or "Certificate of Nulla Osta"_.*

PF:- The granting of the visa may result in a cost to public funds.

PR:- The granting of the visa may result in a cost to public resources.

An assessment under A8 of ECHR has been completed and is attached for your information.

This decision can be appealed within 2 months of the date of this letter. An appeal must be supported by all the reasons for refusal to the Visa Appeals Officer to the address shown.

Appeals received by email or fax will not be processed.

All additional supporting documents should be submitted with your appeal. If you require an appointment please also include a photocopy of any such document.

Please quote your Visa Reference Number on your appeal.

Yours sincerely,

Visa Section

Abuja

Visa Application Reference Number:

Visa Application: 15196602

Visa Applicant: Mr David NWOKE (19/02/1975)

Sponsor: "The first named applicant" (Irish National)

Consideration under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)

The application has been examined in accordance with the Policy Document on Non-EEA Family Reunification issued by the Minister and which is effective as of 1 January 2014. The Policy Document has been prepared to ensure the ECHR rights of the parties and society in general.

Background

Ms. Ford is an Irish National who appears to have resided in Ireland her entire life. Mr. Nwoke is a Nigerian who has resided in Nigeria his entire life. They married in Nigeria on 07 October 2013. Mr. Nwoke is a Nigerian citizen.

Ms. Ford has three children from previous relationships, two of whom are under the age of 18. Mr. Nwoke has one child from a previous relationship. Mr. Nwoke's child has not applied for a visa.

Private Life

It is accepted that to refuse the Join Spouse (non-EEA/Irish National) visa applications in respect of Ms. Ford would engage the right to respect for family life under Article 8(1) of the ECHR.

It is submitted that refusing the Join Spouse (non-EEA/Irish National) visa applications in respect of Ms. Ford would engage the right to respect for family life under Article 8(1) of the ECHR.

Balancing Rights

The application has been examined in accordance with the Policy Document on Non-EEA Family Members issued by the Minister and which is effective as of 1 January 2014. The Policy Document has been prepared in accordance with the ECHR rights of the parties and society in general.

I have considered the individual family circumstances in this case, and the rights arising. It is submitted that the couple should be treated together as a family unit. Mr. Nwoke has met with Ms. Ford on just two occasions. There is no evidence of support from the reference to the applicant or from the applicant to the reference. The applicant has not met Ms. Ford at a time when he did not have any entitlement nor could not have had any expectation of doing so. It is submitted that Mr. Nwoke should not reside in the State with Ms. Ford. Both the applicant and his spouse would reasonably have expected that they entered into the marriage.

*I have considered if there are any insurmountable obstacles to the couple establishing family life in the State. It is acknowledged Ms. Ford is not a Nigerian citizen and would probably experience some difficulties in the State. In Nigeria, no information has been submitted to show these obstacles are insurmountable. In *Onuora v. Nigeria*, the applicant previously attained a Nigerian Visa and travelled to visit Mr. Nwoke in October 2012. In *Onuora v. Nigeria* (No. 265.07), the court found that while the reference may experience some difficulties in Nigeria, these obstacles were not insurmountable. The court further noted "In any event, no substantial obstacles exist to third applicants from coming to visit the first applicant for periods in Nigeria."*

I have considered the Rights of Ms. Ford's minor Irish citizen children - "S" Ford Ashafa, DOB 04/07/08. No evidence has been provided to indicate Mr. Nwoke has ever met with these children or if he plays any part in their lives. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the applicant's decision to refuse the children's best interests would be adversely affected by a decision to refuse his visa application.

According to the European Court of Human Rights, as a matter of well established international law, a State has the right to control the entry of non-nationals into its territory. The State has the right to exercise immigration control and to ensure the economic well-being of the country. In this regard, control of the entry of non-nationals has an impact of granting visas to Mr. Nwoke on the health and welfare systems in the State. Also as a matter of public policy, the Minister, Ms. Ford has not demonstrated sufficient funds to support the visa applicant with his family. Although each case is considered on its individual merits, having regard to the rights of all third parties, it is submitted that given to how a decision to grant visas to Mr. Nwoke may impact on the decisions in other cases.

Having considered the overall facts of this case, it is submitted that the factors relating to the rights of the individual family are less important than those factors relating to the rights of the individual family. In weighing the rights of Mr. Nwoke against the rights of the State, it is submitted that a decision to refuse the visa applications in respect of Mr. Nwoke is justified as the State has the right to uphold the integrity of the State and to control the entry, presence and residence of non-citizens subject to international agreements and to ensure the economic well being of the State.

This therefore exists as a substantial reason, associate with the common good which requires the refusal of the visa application in respect of Mr. David Nwoke.

V06

Visa Office

Embassy of Ireland

Abuja, Nigeria

11/04/2014

15. Messrs. Trayers & Company, solicitors, requested an appeal against the decision to refuse the second application in the State. Enclosed with the solicitors letter was a personal letter from the first applicant: -

"Dear Sirs,

We are instructed to appeal your decision of the 11th April, 2014, refusing Mr. Nwoke a visa (Ford) in the State. We note that the decision sets out the following reasons for refusal:

1. FM: - No automatic right for non-EEA nationals who are (extended) family members of Irish citizens on a basis to Ireland.

2. ID: - Insufficient Documentation - No official marriage certificate and no evidence that reference is a genuine spouse.

3. PF: - the granting of the visa may result in a cost to public funds;

4. PR: - the granting of the visa may result in a cost to public resources;

1. FM: - No automatic right for non-EEA nationals who are (extended) family members of Irish citizens on a basis to Ireland.

The applicant and reference are married and as such cannot be described as extended family members. The applicant is the sole care and custody of her 2 minor children. The visa decision maker has erred in fact and in law in refusing the visa on insurmountable obstacles to the reference relocating to Nigeria. It is submitted that it is unfair to require the reference's minor children who are in full time education here or to abandon her children and move on her own.

It is submitted that the matter ought to be considered having regard to the reference's right to family life, her reference to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and the principle of proportionality.

Rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR):

1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except where such interference is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health and morals, or for the protection of the freedoms of others.

In *AG (Eritrea) v Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2007] EWCA Civ 801 the court found that while the threshold for Article 8 to be engaged requires the interference with the right to family life to be real, it is not otherwise an especially high threshold.

It is respectfully submitted that the reference is an Irish citizen, and that she is therefore a long term resident of a European Union Member State, and the effect of denying her husband a permission to reside in Ireland would be to prevent her from being able to order to maintain her family life. This is something that it is not possible for her to do. She is the sole care and custody of her 2 Children who are in full-time education. It is arguable therefore that a refusal to permit the reference to reside in Ireland is in breach of the principles laid down in the *Zambrano* judgment (in so far as this judgment applies to citizen children but extend to residents of EU Member States) in so far as it would preclude the reference from being able to live in Ireland, and therefore has the potential effect of depriving the reference of the genuine enjoyment of the rights attaching to her status as a long term resident of an European Member State.

While it is acknowledged that some consideration has been given to the Reference's Article 8 rights under the Constitution, appropriate consideration has not been given to the fact that the Reference cannot live in Nigeria. Ireland is not a residence of choice but a residence of necessity.

2. ID: - Insufficient Documentation - No official marriage certificate and no evidence that reference is a genuine spouse.

Please find enclosed original marriage documentation including original certificate together with

she has never previously been married. We would be obliged for the return of original documents.

3. PF: - the granting of the visa may result in a cost to public funds;

4. PR: - the granting of the visa may result in a cost to public resources;

The Applicant and Reference have confirmed that the Applicant is satisfied to accept Stamp 3 conditions dependent of the Reference on stamp 3 conditions. If granted, he could not be a burden on the State and he would not be entitled to same.

We wish to point out that the reference is a worker in this State. Although she is presently in Ireland, her husband will have no entitlements should he be granted Stamp 3. Please find enclosed copy of evidence from reference.

The reference has sent money to her husband in Nigeria. This has been done through moneygrams either directly to Mr. Awoke or through his friends (as he was not in possession of his national ID card). All details regard are enclosed herewith together with copy moneygram transfers.

Please note that although the parties have been in a relationship since January 2011, it has not been a family unit. They have been in constant communication by way of telephone calls and text messages. Telephone bills as evidence of same. Mr. Nwoke has met Ms. Ford's daughter in the UK and a copy of the meeting is herewith. Further personal photographs are enclosed and we could be grateful for the return of same.

Please let us know if you require any further documentation or information in order to determine the case for the client or, if there are any other outstanding matters of concern, we would be obliged if you would be reached.

Thank you for your assistance.

Yours faithfully,

Trayers & Company

Solicitors

20th May 2014

To Whom It May Concern

My name is Alison Ford and I'm an Irish Citizen and I'm appealing the decision to deny my visa in Ireland. As previously stated, I met David through a mutual friend of ours and after talking to him. After 3 months of communicating, he flew over to the UK where I met him along with a friend from the UK and living here in Ireland along with my daughter Carly Ford who at the time was 10 years old. I was being taken for a ride or not.

I can bore you with loads of stories about how we met and all but what I want you to understand is that I fell in love and being taken for a ride. Firstly, let me tell you a bit of myself. I'm 41 years old and 3 years old which I had to an Irish man, The rest of my kids I had to a Nigerian man who took 10 years and I broke up with him after finding out he was cheating on me.

First off, my kids know my husband a lot because they speak on the phone on a daily basis and my younger daughter asked everyday when Daddy David coming and get upset about it. She can't wait for him to come.

Chief. My young boy needs a role model in his as their dad is unable to such. He needs a man as well as his football and boxing. Denying me as well as my children the chance of happiness with my lives and feelings as of no concern to you which as of now; I'm beginning to feel is what you

Part of the reason I fell in love with him is the fact that he was the only man who has been here in the UK proved a lot to me. I have never had a man spend his money and time to travel across a country for weeks. This was one of the best times of life.

Let me counter a few points you made in the refusal letter. You said the forms were incomplete and easily been sorted out by me. Sometimes, I have to wait for my husband to send me documents and the fact that you said some documents wasn't translated. I'm sure Nigeria is an English speaking country and need to translate the English language.

On the issue of finance, I know for a fact that I make enough to take care of myself and my children more than 21 years and it hasn't been a problem. My husband is not coming here to be a burden but a hardworking man. He may not be employed at the moment but I know for a fact that when he gets gainful employment. My question now would be: would I not be entitled to be happy because I left the country and I have never been financially unstable. I think I am entitled to my own happiness and families. It's the least I ask for as an Irish Citizen.

Your letter also states that there were no reference in Ireland and no clear links to reference in the UK you a reference. I am married to him I think that's reference enough. And regarding letter of invitation I don't see how it could be expired. And I also sent photographs of proof that we were together during the time limit of courtship before a relationship can be deemed legit. I like to think love conquers all and that would not just marry somebody on a whim if I didn't think we would be together happily.

I cannot relocate to Nigeria at this time because my kids are still in school. My son Sean is with me and a member of the Home Farm football club. He has a lot of potential to progress further than me and be fair to uproot him from his current home in a new country and culture. He is also a boxer and lives in the UK.

I also have daughter in her first year in primary school and I cannot just take her out of school because especially families like my parents and her Aunts and Uncles. Also their father would not allow them to go they know and understand. He would always be in their lives and he understands that my husband loves the kids and he's in support of me getting married as well.

Also I have been to Nigeria and I understand that at this time, it is not a very stable country with attacks and kidnappings going on now especially girls getting kidnapped over their rights to education and kids who would be mixed race in Nigeria would be a good idea mainly because they might get a better education.

My husband has numerous friends here in Ireland and he would definitely have no problems finding employment in Ireland. Also that would be helpful for him in finding employment.

I would just like my husband to join me and my family who are so looking forward to his arrival in Ireland and he would not seek anything of the state. So please just take into my consideration my happiness and my family.

I hope this appeal comes through successfully for if not, this is an issue I am ready to give up on and I will be happy and I am going to fight tooth and nail to make it a reality.

During a meeting with my lawyer recently, he informed me that a new directive was put in place regarding family reunification and a certain amount needs to be earned to be able to bring a spouse to Ireland considering the fact that people from other EU countries do not have to go through this process and it has no place in New Ireland. I have informed my lawyers that I'm willing to challenge this directive known to man. I believe this directive to infringe on my personal human rights regarding my family.

not established that he is dependent on Ms Ford; that at the time when Ms Ford and Mr Nwoke did not have any entitlement nor could he have had any expectation of any entitlement to enter Nigeria.

In addition, the Article 8 consideration refers to the case of Darren Omoregie v. Norway where the applicant was granted a visa to visit his mother in Norway.

In any event, nothing should prevent the second and third applicants from coming to visit their mother in Nigeria.

3

In this regard, it is apparent that the fact that Ms. Ford has visited Mr. Nwoke in the past was noted in the Article 8 consideration: 'Ms. Ford previously attained a Nigerian Visa and travelled to Nigeria in 2013'. The Appeals Officer is satisfied that it is the case Ms Ford has visited Mr Nwoke in the past as established, either on the basis of the information submitted with the original application or on the basis of information possible in the future. As such, the Appeals Officer is satisfied that Ms Ford will, in the future, visit Mr Nwoke during her periods in Nigeria.

In the circumstances of this case the Appeals Officer notes that it is in the interest of the country for the State to maintain control of its own borders and operate a regulated system for the control, entry and stay of non-national persons in the State. It is consistent with the Minister's obligations to impose those controls in order to meet domestic and international legal obligations and in pursuit of the legitimate aims specific to those obligations, namely:

- the interests of economic well-being of the country; and*
- for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.*

Taking into account the reasons as set out above (including the particular circumstances of this case that Ms Ford has in the past visited Nigeria, and may do so again in the future) and weighing those against the interests of the country (as set out in the Article 8 consideration) the Appeals Officer is satisfied that the Article 8 considerations justify the interference is justified and that a refusal of this application would not constitute a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR.

I note that Trayers & Co. Solicitors submit that:

The Applicant and Reference have confirmed that the Applicant is satisfied to accept Stamp 3 conditions dependent on the Reference on stamp 3 conditions. If granted, he could not be burdened on the Reference as he would not be entitled to same.

I have reviewed the information concerning the income and financial resources available to Ms Ford and I am have a very reasonable concern that without State support Mr Nwoke's presence in the State would be a burden on Ms Ford's family's financial resources and could respect therefore impact on Ms Ford's ability to meet the needs of her children. In this respect it is a relevant consideration that Ms Ford's family could not meet the needs of her children. The Appeals Officer is not satisfied that such a situation, if it were to arise, would be in the best interests of the country regardless of Mr Nwoke's status were such a situation to arise it is the case that, on the basis of the information provided, were no longer being met, a cost to public funds and public resources could arise (if not directly but then indirectly). In addition, not all State benefits require the habitual residence conditions but some do, namely Needs Payment and Urgent Needs Payment, which are payments under the Supplementary Benefits Act 1972.

Having re-examined your application and having taken all documentation and information provided into account, I have decided that the original decision to refuse the visa should be upheld for the following reasons:

PF:- The granting of the visa may result in a cost to public funds;

PR: - The granting of the visa may result in a cost to public resources;

The Article 8 Consideration notified to the applicant on 11th April, 2014 has been set aside on the basis of an 'insurmountable obstacles' test. The remainder of the reasoning and the conclusion of the decision are hereby confirmed.

it finds that a refusal of this application is justified in light of Article 8 ECHR and is also in accordance with the Convention. The decision has been upheld.

Only one appeal per application is permitted.

Yours sincerely,

VO9

Visa Section

Abuja

17 June 2014"

Submissions on behalf of the applicants

17. Colm O'Dwyer S.C., with Ian Whelan B.L., appeared on behalf of the applicants and made the following submissions:

a. The decision of the respondent essentially dictates that the marriage may exist from afar between a first named applicant visiting her husband in Nigeria. The respondent accepts that the first named applicant is married to a second named applicant in Nigeria but refuses to allow the second named applicant to come to Ireland and live with his wife.

b. Counsel cited the decision of Hogan J., in *X.A. (An infant suing by her mother and next friend v. Minister for Justice Equality & Law Reform, Ireland and The Attorney General)*, where the Minister refused to revoke a deportation order which had been made in relation to an applicant who had entered Ireland in March, 2009 and made an application for asylum. The application for asylum was refused and the decision was upheld by the Refugee Appeals Tribunal. An application for subsidiary protection was also refused. The applicant originally made in October, 2010. J.P.A is an Irish citizen who has resided most of her life in Ireland. At the time of the judgment was aged about three years. She was the result of another relationship between Mr. A and Ms. A. Mr. A was aware that Ms. A was pregnant and that Mr. A. was the father of the child. Mr. A. had failed to register with the Immigration Bureau and was deported on 7th February 2011. A number of issues were examined by the court in relation to the unborn child, and then the Court dealt with the rights of Ms. A under Article 41.

c. In this regard, Hogan J. said:-

"There can be no suggestion that the family rights protected by Article 41 are in some way a mere formality and that the rights thereby conferred cannot be regarded as being purely theoretical, the essence and substance of the rights are to be enjoyed at all times."

Hogan J. then quoted the decision of Cooke J. in *Ugbelese* [2010] 4 I.R. 233, 241:-

"In other words, the personal and Convention rights of the child and of the family are not absolute and may be restricted or be subordinated to, the public interest of the State in the common good in controlling its immigration. In the course of investigation and consideration, a reasonable and proportionate decision is made that there is no conflict between the rights with those rights."

Hogan J. then proceeded to consider the relevant factors which must be weighed in the balance to ensure that the decision is "reasonable and proportionate":-

i. It was said that Mr. A's links with Ireland were weak. He was born in Nigeria and lived there until he came to Ireland in early 2009 in order to seek asylum. When his asylum application was rejected he would be permitted to remain here. Measured against that, however, is the fact that he is married to the mother of the child and the father of an Irish citizen.

ii. He also pointed out that Mr. A. got married in September 2010 in circumstances where his wife was pregnant. This is a factor which he and his wife must have been aware of.

iii. His wife's links with Nigeria were particularly weak.

iv. He also made the point that a deportation order is in principle permanent in its effects, said the Minister in the exercise of her discretion under s. 3 (11) of the Immigration Act, 1999, and that the Minister's decision must always respect the essence and substance of the right of the marriage.

v. He concluded:-

"A decision which, in practice, compels the couple to live more or less permanently apart is, in itself, an interference by the State with a core principle valued and protected by Article 41. Such a decision requires compelling justification..."

... While the necessity to uphold the common good and the integrity of the asylum system may be nonetheless imperative that the respective rights of the applicants and the interests of the State are to be considered by the Minister."

d. He applied these principles to the facts of the case, and said:-

"All of this is to underscore the reality of what is currently proposed, namely, that the A. family will live more or less permanently apart. As this very application exemplifies, it is true, of course, that Mr. A. can apply for a deportation order to be revoked under s. 3(11) of the 1999 Act. Nevertheless, as things stand, it is not clear to me how the couple can have any real inter-personal contact or how their marriage could actually survive what may be a long period. It is sobering to reflect that the couple's daughter - who was admittedly born several months ago - will never actually get to see her father during her childhood. Again, this is somewhat different from the case of the Court of Human Rights in Omoregie, where the deportation order in question lasted a maximum of 12 months."

e. He then went on to quote from Clark J. in *U. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform* whose facts were not dissimilar to the present one. Here Clark J. observed:-

"The choice the wife now faces is whether to remain in Ireland and raise her son here without seeing her husband, or to go with him and raise their son together there. This is a choice faced by many couples who come from different parts of large countries. Married inter-racial or inter-religious couples often face choices which require sacrifices in relation to their choice of residence, standards or beliefs. Adults who marry must do so without seeking the answers in constitutional rights which are neither guarantees nor immunities. The Court is satisfied that the applicants have not established that the Minister's decision shows insufficient regard to the wife's constitutional rights when deciding not to revoke the deportation order of her husband."

f. Hogan J. took a different view in *X.A.* and said:-

"It is a pure fiction to say that Ms. A. has a choice worth speaking of. ... Yet the matter here is at the heart of our system of constitutional protection that, absent a binding Supreme Court decision, the Minister cannot regard myself as bound by the views expressed by Clark J. in U."

g. He continued that:

"The essential point here is that the Constitution protects the fundamentals of marriage and the essence of that relationship. It is not indifferent to the plight of those who have been forcibly separated. Adapting freely the language of a famous Bach chorale, it sees to it that these rights are available at the hours of deepest need. That is the very reason why these rights are deemed to be fundamental. It is the duty of government to ensure that these constitutional rights are taken seriously so that, in the words of the Attorney General [1950] IR 67, 81, they are given "life and reality".

Hogan J. quashed the decision of the Minister.

h. Counsel on behalf of the applicants accepted that this involved a deportation order but submitted that the Minister had not given appropriate regard to the constitutional rights involved, and has not given appropriate regard to the rights of the applicants. He stated that the decision challenged is the one which upholds the findings of the first instance that the Minister's decision was in violation of Article 8 rights on the family rights involved but sets aside the "insurmountable obstacles" test employed by the Minister. He submitted that the decision is prima facie irrational as the entirety of the decision at first instance is predicated on there being no insurmountable obstacles to the applicant living in Nigeria. He submitted that the severance of this finding required the undertaking of a new finding of fact and a new affirmation of the findings reached on foot of the old one where such a fundamental severance has been done. He submitted that the decision of Hogan J., *E.A. and P.A (an infant suing by his father and next friend E.A.) v. Minister for Justice and Attorney General* [2012] IEHC 371. The facts of this case related to an asylum application by a man who had

Sudan (but was actually from Nigeria), and when this was found to be untrue, he said that his father was also a Nigerian national. An application for subsidiary protection was rejected. He was deported from the State and entered on the 5th December, 2010. Hogan J. identified that one consideration was that Mr. A. had engaged the Minister and his officials and his outrageous conduct might have mainly disintitiled him to any prospective employment. The Minister must shut its eyes to his illegal and deceitful conduct in the higher interest of protecting the welfare and in

"While the preservation of the integrity of the asylum system and, indeed, the integrity of the system of international law, in matters of this kind the court must, where possible, give primacy to the consistency and company of his parents in the manner envisaged by Article 42.1 of the Constitution."

He then went on to consider the arguments based on *Ruiz-Zambrano* [2011] E.C.R. I-000. This involved a case where a child's case was taken against Belgium. He then dealt with the constitutional rights of the child. Having reviewed the case law, Hogan J. referred his own judgment in *I. v. Minister for Justice Equality & Law Reform* [2011] IEHC 66

"Turning to the substantive issue, it is clear that the constitutional rights of the family are not directly affected by the Supreme Court in AO and DL v. Minister for Justice [2003] 1 I.R. 1. Yet it is also clear from the fact that the parents in that case had indicated that they would take the young dependents with them that the parents were deported or, at least, that the Minister had assumed that they would do so."

... Yet it seems equally plain that AO and DL does not directly concern a case of the present kind. The fact that the deportation of his father to Nigeria would be to deprive an Irish citizen child of the opportunity to live with his father, not least in circumstances where his mother has been given refugee status in Ireland, is not unrealistic to expect her to travel to Nigeria."

i. He quoted then from a decision of Clark J, in *O. S. And T. S. (A minor, suing by his mother and next friend) v. Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform* [2011] 10 JIC 1303].] where Clark J. quashed the Minister's decision. In that case the child was a child who had married in the state in early 2003. The wife had received status by virtue of the fact that she had married an Irish citizen. The husband, who had entered the state illegally and had unsuccessfully applied for asylum was suddenly deported. The marriage even though the wife was pregnant again. In 2009 the couple applied to have the deportation order revoked to revoke the deportation order and Clark J. quashed the Minister's decision, saying:-

"The Court is driven to the conclusion that the identification of the constitutional rights involved in the present circumstances was not followed by a true examination of those circumstances nor did that examination take into account the requirements restated by Denham J. (as she then was,) in Oguekwe v. the Minister for Justice [2003] 1 I.R. 1. The obligation to " weigh the factors and principles in a fair and just manner to achieve a reasonable result. A fair and just consideration would have included an assessment of the length of time the father had been in the State, whether the children were at school here. While those facts are not determinative of rights of the child, they are to be considered when balancing the constitutional rights of a citizen child with those of the State. The court is to interpret of such rights and to arrive at a proportionate decision. In the language of the court, the court is to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole."

Again this involved the issue of a citizen child and a deportation order.

j. Finally counsel for the applicant referred to the decision of MacEochaidh J. in *Gorry & Anor. v. Minister for Justice* decision given on the 30th January, 2014. The facts of this case were that the first-named applicant, a Nigerian national, had obtained asylum in Ireland and in respect of whom a deportation order was made in June 2005. In 2006 she met the second-named applicant, an Irish citizen and they decided to marry. The applicants said in that case that they received advice from the Minister that they should marry in Nigeria and then apply for a visa for the second-named applicant to enter the State. They did so on the 15th September, 2009 and were married on the 19th September, 2009. The first-named applicant applied for a revocation of the deportation order in December, 2009. This was refused on the 13th February, 2010. The second-named applicant went to Nigeria to visit his wife. He found the visit very difficult because of his health condition. He returned to Ireland on the 20th March, and on the 23rd March the second-named applicant suffered a heart attack. He contacted his local T.D. to seek help and advice. The T.D. contacted the respondent's office, and it was indicated that the first-named Applicant to make a further application for the revocation of the deportation based on the new medical evidence. The first-named Applicant stated that the second-named Applicant could not come and live in Nigeria because of his health condition. Immigration Services informed the first-named applicant that the Minister had refused to revoke the deportation order.

k. MacEochaidh J. then quoted from Article 8 on the European Convention on Human Rights and reviewed

had been part of the decision. He then reviewed the authorities and stated:-

"I fully agree with the decisions of the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in the contest between State rights and family rights, and in particular, to decide whether a non-Irish national should join his or her partner in a third country is not assessed by reference to an individual's rights rather by applying the age-old and most reliable of legal standards in administrative law: is it reasonable to join the removed or excluded spouse in his or her country of residence?"

He then cited Article 41 of the Constitution, and said:-

"Numerous decisions have indicated that an Irish and non-Irish married couple do not have a right to reside in Ireland simply by virtue of marriage and that the State is not obliged to respect the residence rights of such a couple. A.A. v. The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2005] 4 I.R. 564 at p.570: "It is clear that applicants do not have an absolute right to reside in this jurisdiction as a family, notwithstanding their family rights which they hold as a married couple" per Clarke J.)."

He also quoted from *Cirpaci v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform* [2005] IESC 42

decision was given by Fennelly J. Again this involved a deportation order being sought to be quashed to enter the State. The marital couple were an Irish citizen wife and a Romanian citizen husband who had married in Romania. The deportation of the husband. Fennelly J. stated:-

"At one extreme an Irish citizen might contract a marriage, valid under the laws of a remote foreign country. Could such a person, within days of the marriage, insist, to the point of demanding that the State should be irrelevant, that his or her new spouse be granted a visa admitting him or her to reside in the State? If he be an Irish citizen, who had lived abroad for many years, perhaps for his or her entire working life, he would be an Irish citizen, an undoubted right to return to reside in Ireland on retirement or earlier. It is not necessary to question whether that person would have the right to be accompanied by his or her foreign spouse. In this part, I have no doubt that such a right exists. It would not, of course, be absolute. The foreign spouse would be a criminal. It is enough to say that, in the most benign of such circumstances, the Minister would be obliged, in exercising the statutory powers applicable to such situations, to give favourable consideration to the applicant permitted to be accompanied by his or her spouse."

18. MacEochaidh J. stated that it was clear from these judgments that the Courts have ruled in favour of the right of residency to non Irish persons married to its citizens. It is also clear from the jurisprudence that marriage may engage the rights of residence in the State which could only be denied for contravening proper purposes previously of Hogan J. in *S(P) and E(B) v Minister for Justice and Equality*.

19. MacEochaidh J. then referred to *Pok Sun Shum v Ireland* [1986] ILRM 593 which he described as "a case where the father of a Chinese family was required to leave the State and his wife sought a declaration that she was "a citizen of the State" within the State".

20. MacEochaidh J. then stated:

"Having reviewed all of these decisions, my view is that an Irish national married to a non-Irish national has a right to reside in Ireland with that other person, subject to lawful regulation. The right is not absolute. The State has a discretion in each case to accept the country of residence chosen by such a couple. Though I believe such a discretion will be exercised in such circumstances will engage the right. The couple who marry on a whim in a drive-in church in the middle of the evening, may well find that their circumstances do not trigger the respect for marriage reflected in Article 41 of the Constitution and a consequential right to reside in the State."

21. MacEochaidh J. also stated:

"The starting point in any consideration where a mixed Irish and non-Irish nationality couple are concerned is that they have a prima facie right to do so by virtue of Article 41 of the Constitution. It is recalled that the State has a duty to guard with special care the institution of marriage. The circumstances of the marriage will influence the exercise of that duty. If engaged, the State is entitled to supervise the right by requiring an entry visa for the non-Irish spouse."

He continued that:-

"Insofar as the consideration of the couple's Article 41 rights were made referable to the corresponding rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, I have already indicated that the inclusion of those rights and therefore that error is infused into the consideration of the couple's constitutional rights."

In those circumstances he made an order quashing the decision of the respondent to affirm the deportation order against the applicant.

Submissions by counsel for the respondent

22. Counsel for the respondent produced a booklet of authorities which included the cases of J.) and *Osheku v Ireland* 1986 IR 733 (Gannon J.)

23. Counsel for the respondent Ms. Helen Callanan S.C., submitted that it was apparent from the applicant's principal complaint of the applicants which can be said to apply to the ground advanced in the statement of law does not assess the application before her with due regard to the constitutional rights involved and the law's weight to the rights of the applicants." Counsel submitted that this contention is fundamentally flawed while the considerations under Article 8 of the ECHR and Article 41 of the Constitution were based, was identified at first instance decisions and subsequently the appeal decision as being the primary basis upon which a consideration of constitutional rights were assessed. She quoted the decision of the Supreme Court in *Meadows v The Minister for Justice and Equality* [2010] IESC 3 where Murray C.J., stated that:

"an administrative decision affecting the rights and obligations of persons should at least disclose the rationale which the decision is taken. That rationale should be patent from the terms of the decision or its context. Unless that is so then the constitutional right to access to the Courts in relation to an administrative decision judicially reviewed could be rendered either pointless or so circumscribed as to be ineffective."

24. Counsel for the respondent quoted Article 41 and said that there was no express statement in Article 41 that married persons have a prima facie right to reside together (whether in the State or otherwise) and a special right which is relied upon stems from the jurisprudence of the Superior Courts. Counsel quoted Fennelly J. in *McDonnell v Minister for Justice and Equality* in relation to a challenge to a deportation order but it was submitted the same principles apply to a consideration of the question of the State with any Article 41 family life rights of the non national and an Irish citizen are proportionate to the circumstances. Counsel also pointed to the notice of appeal from the second named applicant where the rights under Article 8 of the ECHR were underlined and that there was no suggestion that Article 41 had greater rights.

25. Counsel also submitted that the second named applicant has confirmed that he is satisfied to accept a dependant of the first named applicant. A stamp 3 is a permission for the person to remain in Ireland on condition of employment, does not engage in any business or profession and does not remain later than a specified date.

Responses by counsel for the applicant

26. Counsel for the applicant indicated that the second applicant was a qualified welder although this was not a skill which had been supplied to the Minister. The application at first instance had been refused on two grounds:

1. The insurmountable obstacle,
2. That the granting of the visa may result in a cost to public funds and a cost to public resources.

The decision on appeal held that the granting of the visa may result in a cost to public funds and a cost to public resources. Counsel argued that the reason on which the application was refused for the applicant. Counsel argued that the decision of the applicant was a proportionate exercise of the balancing that must be carried out by the respondent. Counsel argued that the applicant's circumstances were considerably weaker than the circumstances of the applicants in the *Gorry* decision in that the applicant's partner might be described as an "appreciable time" either before or after the marriage. The evidence before the Court was that the applicant had not lived together at all and she submitted that the circumstances of the applicants' were at the first point of time rather than the latter end.

Discussion

27. Unlike the system in United Kingdom of statutory instruments and immigration rules, the Irish government exercises its power without legislation. This requires the courts to intervene and interpret the decision of the legislature.

28. It is clear that the policy document on Non EEA Family Reunification was just a policy document. It was argued that a refusal to grant a Join Spouse (Non EEA - Irish National) visa application in respect of the second applicant will engage Article 8(1) of the ECHR. It further submits that in refusing the Join Spouse (Non EEA - Irish National) visa application, the exercise of lawful immigration control did not constitute a breach of the right to respect for his private life under Article 8(1). Under the heading "Family Life" it was submitted that Article 8 does not oblige the Minister to respect the choice of residence. On account must also be taken of the circumstances of any family separation and the actual relationship between the parties.

the relevant point that a family member who has been long separated from a person resident in Ireland or never lived together may have a weaker claim on reunification than one where the parties have until recently lived together. The visa officer then indicates that the applicants state that they have been involved in a relationship since January 2011, on just two occasions for a total of 25 days. They have never resided together as a family unit and the second named applicant's minor children.

29. With regard to financial support, the visa officer stated that the first applicant has provided two money orders for the second applicant and the second is for €158. The second transfer was sent to the second applicant's sister as his partner. The visa officer says that even if these forms are both accepted as evidence of transfers they do not demonstrate regular financial support from the first applicant or that the second applicant is financial dependent upon the first applicant.

30. The officer also stated that it was further noted that the second applicant entered marriage with the first applicant. The second applicant did not have any entitlement nor could have had any expectation of any entitlement to enter into marriage with the first applicant. Both applicants would reasonably have been aware of this at the time they entered into marriage. Having considered all of the factors above it is submitted there is no breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights or the same principles apply in respect of Article 41 of the Constitution.

31. Economic well being of the State

The visa officer quotes from the policy document:

"An Irish citizen in order to sponsor an immediate family member, must not have been totally dependent on public monies from the Irish State for a continuous period in excess of two years immediately prior to the application. The applicant and his spouse for a three year period prior to this application have earned a cumulative gross income over and above €40,000.00."

32. The officer goes on to note that the first applicant's 2013 P60 demonstrates earnings of €6643.00. As she has not worked for 2011 and 2012 it has not been possible to establish her total earnings for the three year period prior to the application. The first named applicant currently earns €169.54 per week, her income is supplemented by Loan Allowance. The first named applicant states that she is applying to amend this to a Family Income Supplement Payment. The visa officer contends that the first applicant had failed to demonstrate that she is not totally or predominantly reliant on public monies for a continuous period in excess of two years immediately prior to the application. It also fails to demonstrate that she has earned less than €40,000 in the three year period prior to the application. Given the first named applicant's level of income it is submitted that she has not demonstrated the ability to provide for another adult without recourse to public monies and that she is financially dependent on public monies.

33. Balancing rights

The visa officer at first instance indicated that the application has been examined in accordance with the principles of the observance of constitutional and ECHR Rights of the parties and society in general. The officer noted;

1. The family have never lived together as a family unit.
2. The first applicant had met with the second applicant on two occasions.
3. There is no evidence of regular financial support from the first applicant to the second applicant or that the second applicant is financially dependent on the first applicant.
4. The second applicant entered into marriage with first applicant at a time when he did not have any expectation of any entitlement to enter into and reside in the State with the first applicant.
5. Both the second applicant and his spouse would reasonably have been aware of this at the time they entered into marriage.

34. He then dealt with the issue of insurmountable obstacles to the couple establishing family life in Nigeria. He referred to the case of *Norway, Appl. No. 265/07, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 31 July 2008*, where the European Court of Human Rights held that while the reference may experience some difficulty in developing life in Nigeria these obstacles were not insurmountable.

funds as he would not be entitled to same.

7. The letter also notes that although the parties have been in a relationship since January, 2014, the couple to reside as a family unit. Also the enclosed were a substantial number of telephone calls and communication by phone.

41. Attached to the notice of appeal was a letter from the first applicant. She asserts in this letter that she is a "naïve little girl." She has three children one of whom is twenty-one years old. She asserts that her children speak on the phone on a daily basis and also use Skype. She also asserts that her young son needs a role model and is unable to be such. She says that on the issue of finance she knows that she has made enough to take care of her children being doing this for more than twenty-one years. She says that the second applicant is not coming here to work as a hard working man although he is not employed at the moment. She also says that she is entitled to her own money for her families. She also states that she cannot relocate to Nigeria at this time because her kids are still in school. The first applicant is a footballer and a member of Home Farm Football Club and could have the potential to progress further to professional level who has represented Ireland in the United Kingdom. She confirms that she has been to Nigeria and says that she is aware that girls have been kidnapped over the right of education. She asked the Minister to take into consideration the best interests of the children to be happy.

42. The decision at first instances of the refusal of the visa application was examined by the appeals officer by letter dated the 17th June, 2014. Again the appeals officer indicates that the application was assessed in the respect of rights under the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom and under the

43. The appeals officer says that he is satisfied that the refusal of the visa application constitutes an interference with the ECHR. He is also satisfied that the original decision recognises this and that the Article 8 consideration of the interference could be justified by reference to the second paragraph of Article 8. He is also satisfied that the refusal is in the best interests of the minor children, as made known to the visa officer.

44. The details in relation to the minor children were communicated to the appeals officer by way of a letter from Messrs. Trayers & Co and the visa officer had not got the benefit of the statement of the first named applicant and her minor children's contact via social media with the second name applicant.

45. The appeals officer said that he did not find that the refusal of the visa application could be justified on the grounds that the applicant may relocate to Nigeria and then says that the Article 8 consideration takes into account the particular circumstances in existence between the applicants. The Article 8 consideration refers to the fact that the applicants have a relationship and the applicant had not established that he is dependent on the first applicant and that at the time when the first applicant and the second applicant were married the second applicant did not have any entitlement or nor could he have any expectation of any entitlement to the State. He also refers to the case Omoregie. The appeals officer is satisfied that the first applicant will in the future be able to visit the applicant for periods in Nigeria. The appeals officer notes that it is in the interests of the common good to maintain control of its own borders and operate a regulated system for the control processing and monitoring of entry to the State. It is consistent with the Minister's obligations to impose those controls and is in conformity with all the obligations and in pursuance of the legitimate aims specific to the facts of this case, namely in the interests of the State, the country and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

46. The appeals officer notes that taking into account the reasons as set out above including (the particular circumstances of the case and the fact that the first named applicant has in the past visited Nigeria and may do so again in the future) the right of the State (as set out in Article 8 consideration) the appeals officer was satisfied that the Article 8 consideration of the interference is justified and a refusal of this application would not constitute a violation of Article 8.

Issues

47. He further notes that Trayers & Company, solicitors submit that the second applicant is satisfied to act as a dependent. He has reviewed the information concerning the financial resources available to the first named applicant in Ireland. He has a reasonable concern that without state support the second applicant's presence in the State may impact on the first named applicant's family financial resources and could therefore impact on the first applicant's ability to care for her children. It is a relevant consideration that the first applicant family contains two minor children. He notes that as the granting of the visa may result in a cost to public funds and the granting of the visa may result in a

48. This Court notes that having regard to the State's membership of the European Union there exists the movement of workers is a fundamental principle of EU law, enshrined in Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. An EU national can gain employment in another EU Member State, can work there without needing a permit to reside there, even after the employment is finished and enjoy equal treatments with nationals and access to employment opportunities, other social and tax advantages. Further when an EU national is working abroad in another EU country, family members can reside and work in that country regardless of their nationality. These rights apply to EU citizens who in the past were workers, and subject to some exceptions, it is clear that the first applicant could, if she obtained employment in another EU country, be entitled to seek to have her husband, the second applicant join her in that EU country (other than Ireland).

The Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956 (as amended) provides for both acquisition of citizenship upon marriage and by declaration (as amended) provides that;

"(1) A person who is an alien at the date of that person's marriage to a person who is, or who has become, an Irish citizen (otherwise than by naturalisation or by virtue of this section or section 12) shall become an Irish citizen by virtue of the marriage, but may do so by lodging, not earlier than three years from the date of the marriage, a declaration in the prescribed manner with the Minister, or with any Irish diplomatic mission or consular office, in respect of nuptial citizenship: provided that—

(a) the marriage is subsisting at the date of lodgment of the declaration, and

(b) the couple are living together as husband and wife and the spouse who is an Irish citizen has been living with the other spouse when the declaration is being lodged."

49. It is clear that the requirement of living together for a three year period prior to acquiring Irish citizenship is a condition of the Act.

The first applicant's letter to the appeals officer

50. As mentioned above, the notice of appeal by Messrs. Trayers and Company, solicitors was accompanied by a letter from the first applicant. She describes the daily telephone calls between her and the second named applicant, and this was supported by phone bills. This included phone calls, Facebook contact and in particular Skype contact. Skype contact also included contact with the younger children and the first applicant in her letter describes the relationship which was developing between her and the second applicant. This letter and these issues do not appear to have been considered in the appeals officer's decision. The communication is far different from the image identified in Gorry. That is an image, proffered by MacEochagáin and the first applicant in Vegas having met each other the day before. In my view there was an onus and an obligation on the appeals officer to consider the letter of appeal from the solicitors but also and in particular the letter written by the first applicant and compare it with the image.

No immigration rules

51. In the absence of legislation and statutory instruments the courts are left with the policy documents and the common law of immigration jurisprudence.

The jurisprudence of the Superior Courts

52. Some of the earliest judgments of the Court were:

1. *Pok Sun Shum v. Ireland* and
2. *Osheku v. Ireland*.

53. Costello J. in *Pok Sun Shum v. Ireland* said:

"It is accepted on the plaintiff's behalf that the court cannot act in any way as a court of appeal. It is also accepted by the defendant that the discretion given by the section is not an unfettered one; it is a discretion to be exercised by the Minister in accordance with the powers granted on him by the Oireachtas and in a manner which is fair and reasonable in accordance with the principles of natural justice."

54. In *Osheku & Ors v. Ireland* Gannon J. stated that the interests and good of the State necessitates that the entry of aliens, their departure, their activities and their duration of stay within the State. The protection of the State's interests permits restrictions on the exercise of an individual's personal rights and consequently such rights are not absolute.

independently of the overall provisions of the Constitution. Accordingly the State's fundamental rights could not be overridden by the Constitutional rights of the members of a family. (emphasis added). In each case the issue was one of deportation and was considered by the Supreme Court in *Cirpaci*. Judgment of the Supreme Court was delivered by Fennelly J. The Court as follows:

"The legitimate interest of the State in the control of immigration frequently conflicts with claims for family reunification. This has been recognised for more than twenty years by the European Court of Human Rights."

Again the case of *Cirpaci* involved the refusal to revoke a deportation order. In the course of his judgment Fennelly J. said:

"Turning then to the major arguments in the case, I do not think there is an unbridgeable gap between the views of the respective counsel regarding the basic considerations affecting the exercise of the Minister's discretion and the legitimate interest of the State in giving effect to its immigration policy and respect for family rights under the Constitution or the European Convention."

Later, Fennelly J. says

"It is legitimate for the Minister to have regard to the duration of the marriage relationship and the interests of the family rights in question. In the course of argument, a number of hypothetical cases were examined. One hypothetical citizen might contract a marriage, valid under the laws of a remote jurisdiction, while on holiday in the State. Within days of the marriage, insist, to the point of demanding that the brevity of the marital relationship should require her new spouse be granted a visa admitting him or her to reside in the State?" (This Court's judgment at para. 100)

For the other extreme Fennelly J. continued:

"At the other extreme would be an Irish citizen, who had lived abroad for many years, perhaps in a foreign country. Such a person has, as a citizen, an undoubted right to return to reside in Ireland on retirement. It would pose the constitutional question whether that person would have the right to be accompanied by his or her spouse for many years. For my own part, I have no doubt that such a right exists. It would not, of course, be exercisable if the person might be a notorious criminal."

Fennelly J. referred to the balancing the competing considerations summarised by Lord Phillips in a passage in *Secretary of State v. M. (Iranian Refugee)* [2001] 1 WLR at p. 840 in which Lord Phillips stated

"(1) A state has a right under international law to control the entry of non-nationals into its territory in accordance with its obligations."

(2) Article 8 does not impose on a state any general obligation to respect the choice of residence of a family member."

(3) Removal or exclusion of one family member from a state where other members of the family remain in the state necessarily infringe article 8 provided that there are no insurmountable obstacles to the family remaining in the origin of the family member excluded, even where this involves a degree of hardship for some of the family."

(4) Article 8 is likely to be violated by the expulsion of a member of a family that has been lawfully resident in the state if the circumstances are such that it is not reasonable to expect the other members of the family to accept the expulsion."

(5) Knowledge on the part of one spouse at the time of marriage that rights of residence of the other spouse are subject to a finding that an order excluding the latter spouse violates article 8."

(6) Whether interference with family rights is justified in the interests of controlling immigration depends on:

(i) the facts of the particular case and

(ii) the circumstances prevailing in the state whose action is impugned."

The judgment of Fennelly J. in *Cirpaci* sums up the jurisprudence of the courts in relation to immigration matters.

Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

55. Complaint is made by counsel for the applicant that the decisions of the respondent were based almost entirely on the provisions of Article 41 of the Constitution and I now propose to consider the provisions of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

56. The Constitution is the fundamental law of Ireland. It guarantees certain fundamental rights. Articles 40-42 deal with the family. Article 41 is headed "The Family".

Article 41

"1.1 The State recognises the Family as the natural primary and fundamental unit group of Society possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law."

1.2: The State, therefore, guarantees to protect the Family in its constitution and authority, and as indispensable to the welfare of the Nation and the State."

The European Convention on Human Rights, as amended by number of Protocols, considers that this declaration is essential for the recognition and observance of the rights therein. In considering that one of the aims of the Convention is to create a greater unity between its members and that one of the methods by which that aim is to be pursued is the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

57. Article 8 provides:-

"Right to respect of private and family life"

1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence."

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except where such interference is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."

58. The European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 represents the interpretive model of incorporation of Article 8 of the Convention into the interpretation of laws under the interpretation of laws provides:-

"2.—(1) In interpreting and applying any statutory provision or rule of law, a court shall, in so far as it is possible to do so, apply the rules of law relating to such interpretation and application, do so in a manner compatible with the Convention provisions."

Section 3 provides:-

"3.—(1) Subject to any statutory provision (other than this Act) or rule of law, every organ of the State shall act in a manner compatible with the State's obligations under the Convention provisions."

It appears to this Court that in balancing the rights of the State with the rights of the applicants, the respondent must consider both Article 41 of the Constitution and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It appears to me that the respondent should consider one only. Whilst mention is made briefly of the constitutional rights of the Constitution in both provisions of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It is interesting that the notice of appeal filed by the appellants' solicitors, also deals with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

59. The judicial review proceedings in this case are particularly novel as almost all the decisions in this area have been made by the respondent. Clearly the second named respondent is not in the same position as a person who has entered the State as an "over-stayer".

60. However in considering the task of the Minister in balancing potential competing interests in a proportionate manner, the provision of the most recent decisions of this Court in *Gorry, X. A. (a minor) & Ors v and EA and PA (as friends BA)*. In each of these cases the Judges of the High Court have emphasised the family rights protected by Article 41. Hogan J. has emphasised that the rights thereby conferred under Article 41 cannot be regarded as being of such a substance of which must be respected at all times. And in particular Hogan J. in *X.A* states that:

*"the Minister's decision must always respect the essence and substance of the right of the marriage which, in practice, compels the couple to live more or less permanently apart is, by its nature, a right which is not subject to interference by the State with a core principle valued and protected by Article 41. Such a decision requires compelling justification: see, e.g., my own judgment in *S. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform*, [2005] 1 I.R. 321, [2005] 1 ILTR 192. While the necessity to uphold the common good and the integrity of the asylum system is nonetheless imperative that the respective rights of the applicants and the interests of the State are to be balanced, it is the duty of the Minister."*

It appears to me that in this case the appeals officer did not pay sufficient attention to, or consider appropr

Decision

61. The appeals officer:

1. Failed to have regard to the letter from the first applicant setting out the contact between named applicant particularly with regard to the most recent developments of social media
2. The appeals officer did not consider appropriately the provisions of Article 41 of the Const definition compelled the couple to live more or less permanently apart and which is a very si with the core principle valued and protected by Article 41.

62. In these circumstances the Court will grant an order of certiorari quashing the decision of the appeals applicant and direct that the application be considered anew by the appeals officer.

63. It is of course better for the applicants to consider what submissions need to be made to the appeals application for a visa.

1 This matter has considered several times, including by the UK Court of Appeal in R (Mahmood) v. Home Court of Human Rights in Appl. No. 54273/00 Boulif v. Switzerland 2nd August 2001

2 In this regard it is relevant to note that the couple could not have been aware of the precarious nature of status if he were to apply for a visa and/or some right of residence and that on no occasion were the couple Nwoke would be granted a visa or any right of residence in Ireland.

3 Appl. No. 265/07 Darren Omeregje v. Norway, 31st July, 2008

4 Citizens Information, Exceptional and urgent needs payments, available at:
http://www.citizeninformation.ie/en/social_welfare_payments/supplementary_welfare_schemes/exceptional_payments
(17th June, 2014)