

H573



[\[Home\]](#) [\[Databases\]](#) [\[World Law\]](#) [\[Multidatabase Search\]](#) [\[Help\]](#) [\[Feedback\]](#)

# High Court of Ireland Decisions

**You are here:** [BAILII](#) >> [Databases](#) >> [High Court of Ireland Decisions](#) >> R -v- R [2015] IEHC 573 (31 July 2015)

URL: <http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2015/H573.html>

Cite as: [2015] IEHC 573

[\[New search\]](#) [\[Help\]](#)

## Judgment

**Title:** R -v- R

**Neutral Citation:** [2015] IEHC 573

**High Court Record Number:** 2015 9 HLC

**Date of Delivery:** 31/07/2015

**Court:** High Court

**Judgment by:** Abbott J.

**Status:** Approved

==

**THE HIGH COURT**

**FAMILY LAW**

**IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILD ABDUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF CUSTODY OF  
AND IN THE MATTER OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL  
AND IN THE MATTER OF COUNCIL REGULATION 2201/2003  
IN THE MATTER OF B.L.R. AND V.A.R. (MINORS)**

**BETWEEN**

**R.**

**AND**

**R.**

**EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Henry Abbott delivered on the 31st day of July, 2015.**

1. This is an application by the applicant, a German national, married to the respondent, a Polish national, Germany. They have two children, B.L.R. aged five and V.A.R. aged three. The complaint in the case is that the respondent mother of the two children removed them from Germany to Ireland and kept them at a destination notified through herself and the Irish police authorities to the applicant, where they have remained, subject to accommodation since that time. The onus is on the applicant to prove first that the children had habitual residence in Germany and there is not much difficulty in determining that because the parties are not seriously contesting residence in Germany on the date of the removal and there has been a legal process in Germany in which the children after they had been taken to Ireland in February. The results of these proceedings were that the applicant won at the first instance; however, she was represented legally in the appeal. This Court would be very reluctant to find that the habitual residence of the children was Germany at the date of the removal.

2. The further onus on the applicant is to prove that he had, either solely or jointly with the respondent, parental responsibility. I have considered the affidavits I consider that, notwithstanding the frequent and detailed criticism by the respondent of the applicant and his behaviour, on the respondent's account of matters, amounting to abusive behaviour; on the affidavit evidence, the only conclusion this Court may make is that, at the time of the removal of the children by the respondent, the applicant had parental responsibility, had custody and was exercising his rightful custody rights. The court is given comfort in that regard by the fact that the German Courts have decided in favour of the applicant by me, that the applicant had rights of custody and was exercising them, and I ignore, for the time being, the fact that the respondent had, in fact, awarded him sole custody in Germany. I think it is not relevant to the considerations of this Court what the respondent did after she was done after the removal of the child, on the 8th of December, and also on the basis that, if the children were returned to Germany, then the German court will be in a position to consider that aspect again. The question of the respondent's behaviour, which should distract this Court at all. In practical terms, both parents had, at the time of the taking of the children, the same parental responsibility.

3. A further question to be answered on a preliminary basis is to decide whether the removal of the children was wrongful within the meaning and for the purposes of Article 3 of the Hague Convention. I refer to Article 3 and quote:

"The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where:-

(a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, whether or not acting in the place of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention;

(b) at the time of removal or retention, those rights were actually exercised either jointly or by one of the persons, institutions, bodies or other persons, in the place of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention."

4. The remainder of Article 3 is not altogether relevant, except it may relate to the further action of the German Courts. I will not dwell on that aspect. I have described and referred to the reasons why I should not do so. Having regard to the facts in relation to habitual residence, the rights of custody and actual exercise of same, I find that, within the definition of wrongful removal of the two children, B.L.R. and V.A.R., by the respondent to Ireland and that there was no justification for the removal. These matters, while considered and debated very ably by the respondent, who was represented throughout the proceedings, did not constitute the foremost aspects of her case.

5. What follows then is to examine the case from the point of view of the Hague Convention and the Brussels Convention. The situation arising from a wrongful removal of children from one Member State of the E.U. to the other is governed by the Convention. The respondent has to the application of the applicant for an order pursuant to the Hague Convention and Brussels Convention. The children in these summary proceedings. The first substantial defence upon which the respondent relies is that the respondent's acquiescence of the applicant in the children remaining in Ireland and she refers throughout her affidavits to the fact that the respondent's acquiescence constitute acquiescence. She has referred the court to a helpful case of the matter *Warren Dean Smith v. I*

Court of Appeals of South Africa, case number 112/2010 wherein the jurisprudence, considered by the English Court of Appeal in *Mr Finn B.L.*, on behalf of the applicant, referred the court to a number of Irish authorities, which again drew attention to the courts which have been very exercised in relation to the analysis of the factual and legal ingredients of the case in the context of the Hague Convention.

6. In relation to the examination of that factual matrix, the court has considered all the circumstances of the case, having regard to the facts which she set out in great detail in an email of December from the applicant to her mother (which is the Polish for December which the respondent referred to, in her submissions, as December). The court did not translate the date but it is accepted fully that it is the 12th of December. She has furnished two copies of the original email and a form of a translation but I prefer to read out of the original email. After a number of reflections generated by the applicant set out in the first paragraph, the applicant set out his stall so to speak by saying at the end of it:

“Well, two or three possible possibilities/ways I could imagine for our future in the moment.. the best option is to move to Ireland in the summer (earliest from the 1st July)! Up to now still my favourite option.

(a) Would mean that my parents will probably not see their only grandchildren any more because of the condition of Heubach would be about at least one day (so too much) and because of their health condition.

(b) I would have to give up finally our nice flat and sell everything which I won't be able or don't want to sell like our bikes and our ski sets (your two brand new cross-country sets included) for example, because it would take my crazy much energy and time to sell our oak furniture, whole kitchen, our bike, our car, our mountain bike probably.

(c) I would quit my job. Then my parents would kill me. Such job with such great conditions and salary. Today my personal chief told me that there is small chance for break (unpaid holiday) for certain period without quitting. So I could come back to my workplace in S.I.B. if it wouldn't work out in Ireland for our health or wellbeing or both our nights in this green island.

(d) Healthcare or condition of B. is not sure yet in Ireland. Maybe we have to pay much own money for treatment, medicine, take credit for operations, et cetera.

(e) Our kids will speak no German in daily life any more which makes Skype chats with my parents difficult.

(f) In Ireland, is just one season; rain all the time, no real summer and winter, no snow which is not good for our kids.

(g) Because of high salary in Ireland, we would be able to raise our live quality, to travel more often to Germany or Finland or Spain or Poland or..

(h) You could have your dream job as art therapist there and I could try/have to do something in Ireland like eBay power seller. Maybe we could even afford an old castle or old house without ghosts but we could never pay in Germany.

Two, you coming back to Chemnitz (some time next year, maybe summer, earlier or later) after starting your Ph.D. in Ireland.

(a) I would keep my nice job which is normally giving all of us enough money for our normal life in expensive countries like Norway, Canada, New Zealand.

(b) After your Ph.D. degree you could have maybe better job offers also in here.

(c) Our kids could go back to their nice *Kita-Spielhaus*, enjoying their friends, familiar environment.

(d) A.O.K. PLUS would give us insurance for free next year hopefully. Health and insurance services in Ireland we have found already nice doctors for everything.

(e) My parents could still see their own grandchildren daily on Skype and talk in German to them and we also then after couple therapy where we both learn how to live, respect and love each other.

months.

(f) Here we have really four seasons, real summer and normally also snow so we could go st

(g) We/at least you have still many friends here like V., J., M., T. and me, M. and U..

(h) You could try start off with V. when not finding better job alternative with your new title,

(i) We could still try to go to Iceland in two, three years.

Three, War of Roses. Nobody wants I'm sure.

(a) It's not me or you, just your sisters and mum maybe. Okay, bad joke I know." [sic]

7. The letter continues to refer to matters which are not entirely relevant, referring to the local environment behind the lovely tiger cats and continues on in a more telling note at the end in the second-last paragraph

"I am even more tired now and hope that we will find a solution for all of us which will be the treasure. Few more important questions, please answer them as fast as possible; when should we move to *spielhaus*, before Christmas or in January? Of course I don't want to pay when you don't contribute. I don't really want to pay just for these one five days. Two, what about your fitness centre? Did you leave it? Three, what about *Arbeitsamt* and AOK PLUS insurance? How should I deal with the fact that you need or will probably need next year or is medicine cheaper on your island? I told you that I will try to sell lots of toys, board games, B's new bike, bike seat for V., your bike, my race bike, my Christmas gift, you want to have some of your/our boys clothes, shoes, toys? Well, I would not mind that. Seven, what else you and your sons could need from Germany/our flat?" [sic]

8. That is the letter on which the respondent primarily relies to set up acquiescence. She does rely on the fact that she has been living with the children in B. and his concern and a further meeting in B. with teachers of a school in relation to the children following the initial indication of acquiescence which the respondent claims arises from this very central email which is quoted. The court should first ascertain whether this email does indicate the type of clear acquiescence that is required in this area. I confirm that I have read the submissions of both the respondent and the applicant. I am making this factual determination having regard to the standard that I gleaned from these various authorities. The reasons why I find that this email, on its own, does not constitute an indication of acquiescence or is not a clear indication of acquiescence for the following reasons; first, if one takes the first line which I quoted, which is at the end of the email again so to place it in the context of my reason:-

"Well, two or three possible possibilities/ways I could imagine for our future in the moment."

I take from that initial opening statement an indication by the applicant not to acquiesce in something but to negotiate, such as one would find in relation to the opening up of a negotiation between parties seeking to resolve an issue. It could be lay people or lawyers. I find that that one sentence to be an indication to the parties to explore possibilities for settlement, possibly with a view to making further decisions, but certainly it opens up a whole conditional area which should be construed.

9. Then if I take the statement of "me coming to Ireland next summer or earliest 1st of July" up to "still many options (a)-(h), I find that if there is acquiescence to be found in the letter, it is primarily to be found in the respondent's interpretation of it. But I am far from convinced from a reading of that option number one statement of an intention at all or if it even means what the writer said, that it was his favourite option. If one reads and read the various ingredients and considerations for the favourite option, there is at least a large degree of sarcasm, and reference to an almost fairytale stereotype location in Ireland which is bordering on the derogatory. That as a clear statement of agreement to these so-called aspects which are not accepted as advantages. I find that it is an assertion of an aspect of the option number one but there is an accompanying discount of the aspect

10. For instance, what's put forward as one of the reasons why it's a preferred option, in (e), is probably only a partial benefit. The statement: "Our kids will speak no German in daily life any more which makes Skype chats with my parents possible." [sic] How that could be an advantage is beyond me. The next one, "In Ireland, just one season." That is either a partial benefit or may be some element of it in the expressions of all our frustrations with the lack of a distinctive summer but it is not the statement that there is no sun which both himself and B. would miss a lot. That is the qualifying discount of the benefit in one season, if one has that point of view, one could go through the whole gamut of these reasons for the discounting description of a so-called advantage. I have to conclude that that is, as I said, irony or perhaps

explanation would be to use it as a sort of a subtle means of persuading or lobbying the respondent to change under the guise of saying that, at the top of the paragraph, that it was his favourite option. So it is ambiguous and the applicant wants to make a concession or give a consent.

11. My conclusion in relation to that aspect of option number one is reinforced when I come to what must, in my view, be the less favoured option: number two. Without going into the detail, if one goes through the reasons, they are straightforward, positive reasons why the respondent and the children could come back to Germany, with no discounts that I can find, and with great positive praise for the options. That provides a contextual, temperate and balanced statements and has led me into further firmness in my view that the first options were not concessions. That they took them as such.

12. The third option was described as the "War of Roses", such being pure sarcasm and not very helpful. Within the context of the parties, it does put into context, again, the comments in number one where there was a slightly mocking letter, coupled, I might say, with a general intention to seek that the parties would continue to live together. The reference to "couples therapy where we both learn how to live and respect and love each other in a much better way." That would infer that they were to live together as a couple, not as a separated couple. That is the conclusion.

13. My view that the letter, so far, did not constitute a consent or a document of acquiescence is reinforced when the few more important questions are asked, one to seven, where the applicant says:-

"I am even more tired now and hope that we will find the solution for all of us that will be better than this treasure."

That clearly indicates a negotiating mentality rather than a concessionary one: an invitation to negotiate. Within the context of the important questions generally, in relation to cancelling the *Kita* places, possibly cancelling the fitness centre, the disposal of toy board games and dealing in relation to Christmas gifts. These are questions that could be construed as being in favour of a consent unless there was a clear intention as to what was being asked and have them unambiguously referable to a permanent stay and retention of the two children in Ireland.

14. I have considered the further aspects advanced by the respondent in relation to the whole aspect of the children staying in Ireland and I find that the applicant did have an involvement, seeing the children, albeit subject to the Court, which I hold to be an order that was made entirely under the proper jurisdiction insofar as the Brussels IIa protective measures to be taken by courts dealing in matters of parental responsibility, regardless of where the Hague proceedings and under the main proceedings determined in accordance with the alternative tests set out in the Convention. Participation and continuing contact with the children in Ireland is something which is to be praised and it is the policy for the court to hold that that level of participation in the children's lives would amount to acquiescence which is very destructive of the children's interests in the context of this type of litigation to allow that type of consent in these cases. I hold, for those reasons, that there was, in fact, no acquiescence.

15. I do not have to consider a change of mind. There was no change of mind after that. The position had been set by the applicant. Proceedings were commenced in April and there had been demands before that for the return of the children taken in relation to the police authorities in Germany, although the applicant does refer to the fact that his children, were more responsible for that, but there was a very strong countervailing set of actions by the applicant and the children which would contraindicate consent or acquiescence. I do not have to go into the very detailed and complex authorities put forward on the basis that I have decided there has been no consent in any conceivable definition. It is then to the further defence, on which the onus lies on the respondent to prove that there would be a grave risk to the children by the Hague Convention, if they were returned.

16. I accept the submissions of the applicant that the standard of grave risk is a high one and the submissions of the respondent. The *Finn B.L.* deal with the standard involved. I suppose the highest level of proof is presented by the U.S. case of *Wallerstein v. Wallerstein* which I will not detail amongst the parties, and it remains for me to examine whether, in fact, there is a grave risk to the children to Germany as a result of a summary order of this Court. Again, looking at the height of the risk, the respondent has drawn the attention of the court to the fact that there was at least one kick given by the applicant and the children had, before the removal to Ireland, a very serious operation for a cancerous brain tumour and had recovered from anything that could be condoned in the context of what in Ireland would be called "reasonable chastisement". The defence of reasonable chastisement in relation to corporal punishment of children in the home is very much frowned upon in terms of social activity and I note that there are proposals for its abolition by the present Government.

stand in the same place as practically every European country in having corporal punishment outlawed. The correspondence and affidavit, admitted to a kick, although he seeks to minimise it, but he has not minimised me in a position where I must or I can ignore it. It is to be deplored that he would have kicked the child.

17. There also is admitted evidence that, from time to time, he would have been guilty of old-fashioned, physical punishment, and he admits to having a difference with the applicant in that approach and refers to the activities of his father in relation to that type of corporal punishment which would be mere reaction, corrective reaction, rather than a punishment. It would be the type of justification which people in Ireland could seek to rely on, but which would not be tolerated in Ireland and Ireland has moved on in the most formal way. Germany has moved on, I accept from looking at the general approach in relation to corporal punishment, both in schools and the home, that corporal punishment is to be frowned upon. The court should give very serious attention to. I do, but nevertheless it has to be considered in the context of the evidence. B.L., on behalf of the applicant, that the abuse, such as occurred, was not in the higher end of the scale; it was certainly the kick was grave, and it would be, in itself, a grave risk if it were to be part of a pattern. But he has not, at all times, a continued involvement with the children by the father, even to the point of involvement in, a District Court order and that that indicated that the proof of the pudding was in the eating, to use an Irish idiom, there was grave danger, then it was not manifest in the manner in which activities occurred between the father and the children, removal of the children to Ireland.

18. The narrative of the respondent in relation to this aspect is exemplified by the report of the psychologist, in her report of the 23rd of February in relation to consultations between her and the respondent. It says as follows:

"Mrs. R., J.S., born on the 29th of June 1985, has been taking advantage of psychological counselling from the 20th of November 2014 to the 25th of November 2014, with the aim to seek psychotherapy. The subject of our consultation is her history with family problems, or rather marriage discords, being the burden thereof. In that context, she has at times to be under a lot of strain and fear because of verbal arguments with her husband. The applicant has used various methods of education for children. The patient reported also impulsive outbursts and verbal abuse towards other family members, with insults and attacks from his side. The patient also mentioned that her son B. with a kick..." [sic]

That word, I think, is described as *fierzein* in German. It is not clear what exactly it means, but it's the German word for to kick his son. The report continues as follows:-

"Because of his ways of behaviour, he seemed unpredictable and it frightened the patient. The patient was very nervous about separation and stressed many times that she would like to give that relation a chance. The applicant would have considered their staying together. Based on her further contact, as her son B. at the time, the applicant's impression of good and stable mother-child relationship. The mother was considerate and protective. The applicant conducted our conversation twice in English in order to protect her son from particular types of abuse in the family conflict. Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me." [sic]

My view of that letter is that, if there was a grave risk of danger to the child, it would have been canvassed with the applicant, isolated incident of the serving of a kick to their son, B.. There is no narrative of any recourse to police authorities or social workers whatever, to seek redress in relation to dangers to her children and I consider that, while that letter does not show there was a professional corroboration of a complaint about the kick to B., it does not assist the respondent's case. It is that there was no standard reaction, prior to the removal of the child, towards the presence of grave risk. The indication of the proceedings, evidenced by photographs of play on the applicant's affidavit, that there had been a separation between the parents and the children, exemplified, however, by a different parenting approach by the two parents, which is not the parenting, in a lot of cases, where the mother is nurturing and protective; sometimes, in the eyes of the husband, the welfare of the children, whereas the husband, in his interaction with them, would be more boisterous and assertive. The independent disposition and frame of mind. That type of ongoing difference and negotiation of roles and responsibilities is almost all families in this jurisdiction, although there can be reversal and moderation of roles from the two parents. However, it is extremely far from reality to say that that type of activity, as described by both parties in the letter, the lack of recourse to anti-child abuse authorities, where police, courts, teachers or anything else, is indicative of a family.

19. Such is very far from presenting a grave risk to the children, but instead is providing them, in its own way, a safe environment which could be improved by changing habits in the parent, or a separation of the parents, or a separation of the children from the multitude of services of the German Courts in terms of looking after custody issues and parenting issues. The issue has to be considered in that context.

20. There is no danger, in the event, of the child being returned to Germany, in either B's or V's case, and from the fact that the German Courts have embarked upon a procedure of examining the custody issues. A have given sole custody of the children to the applicant, as a default position, it seems to me, pending return judgment of the Dresdener Appeal court, that it is envisaged that there be a reconsideration of the matter returning in the context not of a household where there would be two fractious parents, but in the context be afforded the space of having a relationship with both parents without the infringement of the type of da psychologist, Lanenburg.

21. The fact that the psychologist's report noted that, "I had the impression of a good and stable mother-c B. was showing no signs of special disturbance or what might be described as clinginess or showing insecurity family presenting grave risk towards his father. These are my conclusions in relation to grave risk. There are relation to grave risk arising from the transitional arrangements which might arise in the event of an order Germany, insofar as it's always difficult to predict whether they will have some place to stay and the chance whom allegations of abuse and presentation of grave risk arise. It is of considerable importance, in relation risk, to consider that there is an undertaking given to this Court for the applicant to vacate the apartment free for the respondent to take occupation with their two children pending the determination (which I have the German Court) in relation to custody, access, parenting and counselling if any issues arising. Such dea

22. The respondent has further raised the question of the defence of the children having settled down and residence in Ireland. That is a defence which is only available after the expiration of twelve months from the yet twelve months, it is well within the time, therefore the defence does not formally arise. I do accept that settling in, such as the approval for domiciliary care allowance, which was recommended by the reviewing monitoring of his tumour operation and indeed the fact that there has been a degree of medical care provided fact of fairly satisfactory school arrangements, or satisfactory school arrangements have been made for B. which I give credit to the respondent for drawing to the attention of the court and it is a very good outcome attended to and that the children were well looked after. I pay tribute to the respondent for taking these steps in the face of scarce resources and difficulty in allocating resources in these areas, to have provided for the Nevertheless, I must have regard to the fact that the Convention does not allow the defence to arise unless months. Even then it is a discretionary matter for the court to allow that defence to operate. It would seem existing connection of children to Germany, it would be difficult to exercise the discretion, even after twelve

23. Having considered the matter overall, as I have done, the conclusion I reach is that there is no defence the order for the return of the children made, having established the prior proofs on his side, as I have des children that they would be returned to Germany, in the context of the interests of the child under the Hague This is not a welfare test, but it is a recognition that the structure of the Hague Convention and the Brussels with it, are such that the return of the child is, in general terms and in the interests of all the children, des There are no factors such as the type of outrageous delay, such as occurred in the case of 41615/07 (ECtHR, 6 July 2010) where the delay in the Swiss Courts led the Court of Human Rights to use matter which could frustrate what were, on their face, proper Hague orders made by the Swiss Courts, altho delays. Although the Circuit Court has the *Neulinger* decision as criticised as entirely undermining the Hague that it does lead us to hearken to the realities of the situation, and the very structure of the Hague Convento defence of the child having settled in his new jurisdiction to which he has been removed after the lapse of intervening factors of a major strategic nature, such as the serious lapse of time would be something the o overall consideration for. It is in that context of an overarching view in relation to having consideration to a impinge on the decision of the court to make it, as it were, a nonsense in the context of reality in the situa court could, on a mental or intellectual basis rationalise its decision, as I hope I have rationalised the decis the jurisprudence of the *Neulinger* decision, criticised though it may be, would indicate to the court that it at the whole vista of decision making and ask, is this what should be done in this case in the interests of th that the Hague Convention system is a very strong and almost automatic system of jurisprudence?

24. I find on that test that, in the interests of the children, no such consideration arises and that, in fact, th to order the return of the children, which the court does in this case, is in the interests of the children.

25. That being so, I will address the claims made. First of all the court will make a declaration that there w Referring to the summons initiating the proceedings, I make orders in respect of some such claims. do not make yet, but they will have to be produced sometime in the structure of return. So I address that

12 of the Hague Convention for the return of the children, B.L.R. and V.A.R., to their place of habitual residence in Germany for the purpose of enforcing the applicants' rights of custody with respect to the said children. The respondent wrongfully removed the said children from the jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of Germany, in breach of the Hague Convention. I make a declaration that the respondent wrongfully retained the said children from the jurisdiction of Germany in breach of the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention. I further order that the respondent take all steps and do all things necessary for the summary return of the children to the jurisdiction of Germany, and I will ask the parties to address the court at this moment, on the particular arrangements that would facilitate that. I note that the applicant has indicated, in his affidavit, that he would come to the airport in Dublin to collect the children, but that is a matter for the court to be decided. I will stay the proceedings of the District Court under the Domestic Violence Act yet, but stay them upon the condition that the applicant not want to create any unnecessary applications hither and thither. That is as a matter of efficiency, rather than as a matter of principle.

26. I am not making any order in relation to the children being heard in relation to the matter, but during the course of the case the court did express a view that perhaps on a factual basis B. might be regarded as having sufficient maturity at this stage in relation to the return, and for that purpose admitted, despite Mr Finn's protestations, a report from the German Court of Appeal which did show that B. had expressed a preference for staying in Ireland. I accept Mr Finn's view that that report should be given no consideration of the views of the child such as might be given any weight, because B. did not express a clear preference for Germany. In any event, I take comfort in the fact that the German Court of Appeal has indicated that perhaps B. is not sufficiently mature to express a view, and further that he indicated that his views would be taken into consideration in relation to his return.

27. I am not making any order that the views of the child will be heard on the basis that there has been a general jurisprudence of the Irish courts, it would not be required but I have decided that, having regard to the maturity of B. and the history of B. as a child who had possibly got the education through talking to his superiors in the family, he would be more articulate than the normal child of his age.

28. Unless I am requested, I am not going to make any order restraining the respondent from removing the children from the court. I could be addressed upon that but I am very anxious that this Court would not be making orders that would be indicated that this was dealt with by way of an undertaking given by the respondent on the 15th April, 2015, and that would continue. And similarly with the whereabouts of the children and in terms of informing the Garda Commissioner, that information will continue until the children leave the country.

29. In relation to the respondent paying costs and expenses, I do not think that it is appropriate in this case to order costs in favour of the applicant, who is in employment in Germany, and I should have said, during the degree of risk that the respondent's responsible employment is another factor pointing to the fact that he is not at grave risk or at risk of his mental health, burnout or his accident. He seems to be back working and he should not be subsidised by the respondent. I will order costs without penalising her with costs which the applicant is better able to discharge. Similarly I will not make an order for accommodation expenses and I will await the submissions of the parties in relation to costs issue in this case. I will order the children back in the time in which they should be dispatched.