



House of Commons
Home Affairs Committee

Migration Crisis

Seventh Report of Session 2016–17



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*Report, together with formal minutes
relating to the report*

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Home Affairs Committee

The Home Affairs Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Home Office and its associated public bodies.

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Publication

Committee reports are published on the Committee's website at www.parliament.uk/homeaffairscom and in print by Order of the House.

Evidence relating to this report is published on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

Committee staff

The current staff of the Committee are Carol Oxborough (Clerk), Phil Jones (Second Clerk), Harriet Deane (Committee Specialist), Adrian Hitchins (Committee Specialist), Kunal Mundul (Committee Specialist), Andy Boyd (Senior Committee Assistant), Mandy Sullivan (Committee Assistant) and Jessica Bridges-Palmer (Committee Media Officer).

Contacts

All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Home Affairs Committee, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 2049; the Committee's email address is homeaffcom@parliament.uk

Contents

Key Facts	3
1 Introduction	4
Rapid growth in numbers of refugees and migrants	4
The EU and UK responses	5
Our inquiry and this report	6
2 Calais and the Channel ports	7
Juxtaposed border controls	7
Increased attempts to cross the Channel in summer 2015	8
Steps to tackle illegal migrants crossing the Channel	9
Coastal security	10
3 Numbers and origin of refugees and migrants	13
Refugees and asylum seekers	13
Migration routes through the Mediterranean	14
4 Addressing the causes of mass migration	18
Support to source countries	18
Resettlement of Syrian refugees	19
Costs of asylum provision	21
Safe and legal routes into Europe	21
5 Protecting the EU's external and maritime borders	23
Migrant smuggling	23
Frontex—the EU border agency	24
Mediterranean crossings: search and rescue	25
Tackling migrant smuggling across sea borders	26
6 Processing and treatment of migrants	28
Dublin regulations	28
Fingerprinting	29
Hotspots	30
Relocation from EU countries of arrival	31
Returns	32
Schengen	33
Increasing security at EU borders	33
EU border security and terrorist attacks	34

7	The EU Agreement with Turkey	36
8	Protecting vulnerable groups	38
	Women and children	38
	Missing child migrants	40
	Conclusions and recommendations	42
	Annex 1	50
	Annex 2	51
	Annex 3	61
	Formal Minutes	71
	Witnesses	73
	Published written evidence	74
	List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament	76

Key Facts

- An estimated 227,316 migrants had entered Europe by sea in 2016 up to the beginning of July, arriving in Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Spain, with Libya as the main departure point, followed by Egypt. 2,920 deaths of migrants were recorded in the same period.¹
- According to the UNHCR, over 65 million people were forcibly displaced from their homes by conflict and persecution at the end of 2015, including 21 million refugees outside their countries of origin. 86% of refugees under UNHCR's mandate in 2015 were in low and middle income countries close to situations of conflict.²
- There were 1,255,640 first time applications for asylum in EU member states in 2015, up from 562,680 in 2014.³
- The top three countries of citizenship of asylum applicants in the EU in 2015 were Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, who together comprised more than half of all applications.⁴
- In 2015, there were 38,370 first time asylum applications in the UK, amounting to 3.1% of the EU total.⁵
- In January 2016, 55% of the irregular migrants arriving in the EU were women and minors, an increase of 34% compared to 2015.⁶

1 IOM [Mediterranean Migrant Arrivals in 2016](#), 7 July 2016

2 UNHCR press release, [20 June 2016](#), "With 1 human in every 113 affected, forced displacement hits record high"

3 Eurostat News Release, [4 March 2016](#), Asylum in the EU Members States

4 Eurostat News Release, [4 March 2016](#), Asylum in the EU Members States

5 Eurostat News Release, [4 March 2016](#), Asylum in the EU Members States

6 Europol, [Migrant smuggling in the EU](#), February 2016

1 Introduction

Rapid growth in numbers of refugees and migrants

1. Europe, including the UK, is facing a huge challenge arising from the number of refugees and migrants reaching levels not seen since the Second World War. In addition to people fleeing war and insecurity as refugees, there are large numbers of migrants attempting to come to Europe to seek a better life for themselves and their families. There are many different nationalities in the migrant flows trying to enter Europe to improve their standard of living and many countries, including the UK, place controls on the number of economic migrants they are willing to accept. It is difficult to know exactly how many migrants and refugees have entered Europe in the recent past, and from which countries, not least because many are able to cross borders without being registered and processed. However, it is obvious that managing large numbers of people moving across international borders requires local and regional cooperation between states.⁷

2. A refugee is defined in the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees as someone who:

[...] owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country”.⁸

Signatories to the 1951 Convention are bound by international law not to turn refugees away. In 2014, the number of refugees worldwide was estimated at 19.5 million, representing about 8% of all migrants. More than half of these refugees came from just three countries: Syria (3.9 million), Afghanistan (2.6 million) and Somalia (1.1 million). Before the Syrian war started in 2011, the country had a population of 22 million. By 2016, more than four million Syrians were registered as refugees outside Syria, including almost two million in Turkey alone, making it the largest refugee-hosting country in the world.⁹

3. In terms of overall movement, over 600,000 people are believed to have passed through Greece in 2015, although the number of first-time asylum applications there was only 11,370.¹⁰ German authorities have suggested that the total number of migrants entering Europe is higher than previously thought. Its system for recording people entering Germany who intend to apply for asylum showed 1,091,894 entries for 2015—more than double the number of asylum applications actually made in Germany in 2015 (441,800).¹¹

4. For the UK, the latest ONS Migration Statistics Quarterly Report (published in May 2016) showed that net long-term international migration was 333,000 in the year ending December 2015, an increase of 20,000 from December 2014. Of this, non-EU net migration

7 Written evidence submitted by Dr Vicki Squire, Dr Dallal Stevens, and Professor Nick Vaughan-Williams (University of Warwick), with Dr Angeliki Dimitriadi (ELIAMEP, Athens), Dr Maria Pisani (University of Malta), Skerlida Agolli, and Dr Emanuela dal Zotto (University of Milan) (MIG0050)

8 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951 – see [UNHCR website](#) [accessed 11 April 2016]

9 UNHCR, [Syrian Regional Refugee Response](#), accessed 16 March 2016 and the [UN International Migration Report 2015](#). Estimates are based on national statistics, mainly from population censuses. The UN uses the definition that an international migrant is a person who is living in a country other than his or her country of birth

10 Oral evidence taken on [24 November 2015](#), Q175

11 IOM, [Migration, asylum and refugees in Germany: Understanding the data](#), January 2016

was estimated to be 188,000 (very little changed from the previous year) and overall immigration of non-EU citizens decreased from 287,000 to 277,000. There were 41,563 asylum applications (including dependants) in the year ending March 2016, an increase of 30% compared with the previous year (32,036). This was the fifth successive year in which asylum applications rose (although the number of applications was described as “low” relative to the peak of 103,081 in 2002).¹²

5. Migration routes change over time as countries tighten up their processes and new conflicts and areas of insecurity stimulate greater numbers travelling from new departure points. The lack of a single, stable government in Libya and the resulting difficulty in controlling its borders and coast mean that it is a popular embarkation point.¹³ Italy has been a frequent arrival point: it received 170,000 refugees and migrants in 2014—75% of all the maritime refugees and migrants crossing the Mediterranean.¹⁴ In more recent years, as controls have increased in the west and central Mediterranean, flows moved further east, with routes being used from Turkey to Greece then up through the Balkan states to northern Europe.¹⁵ However, the March 2016 EU-Turkey agreement has resulted in a major reduction in flows of migrants from Turkey to Greece, and displacement back to the Libya-Italy route, at least in the short-term. We assess the key routes for migrants and refugees into Europe, and the scale of the flows, in detail in Chapter 3; and the impact of the EU-Turkey agreement in Chapter 7.

The EU and UK responses

6. The UK’s attractiveness as a destination for both refugees and migrants has created specific challenges, including that presented by people gathering in Calais and other Channel ports hoping to find ways to cross into this country. The Government has said that it will take a comprehensive approach to current issues around migration. This includes addressing the reasons people migrate, and their experiences during transit, at the EU external border, the UK border and when they arrive in the UK.¹⁶

7. The EU collectively has taken a number of different steps to try to address the migration crisis, including measures to bolster its ability to protect its borders and properly monitor and process people entering EU Member States. It has also tried to respond to the refugee crisis. Most recently, in March, the EU reached agreement with Turkey on the return of migrants arriving in Greece. The provisions include: the return of all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands with the costs covered by the EU; and the resettlement of one Syrian in the EU from refugee camps in Turkey for every Syrian returned to Turkey from Greece (“one in, one out”). In return the EU will pay Turkey €6 billion (up to the end of 2018) and plans for visa-free travel for Turks to the EU will be speeded up. Some of the concerns raised about the arrangements include: the limited application of the Refugee Convention; human rights issues; the logistical challenge; displacement to other migration routes; and the reluctance of some EU members to accept refugees and/or to agree to visa-free access for Turkish citizens.¹⁷

12 ONS, [Migration Statistics Quarterly Report](#), May 2016

13 Home Office written evidence ([MIG0067](#))

14 UNHCR, [The sea route to Europe: Mediterranean passage in the age of refugees](#), July 2015

15 Migration Policy Centre report: [When the best option is a leaky boat](#), October 2014

16 Home Office written evidence ([MIG0067](#))

17 European Council, [EU-Turkey Statement 18 March 2016](#); see also [EU and Turkey close in on agreement](#), 8 March 2016

Our inquiry and this report

8. We have followed our predecessors' practice of regularly assessing and commenting on immigration issues by examining the Home Office's quarterly immigration statistics and publishing reports on the work of the Immigration Directorates. Our latest report was published on 3 June 2016.¹⁸

9. In response to the acute problems faced by Syrian refugees, the then Prime Minister announced in September 2015 that the UK would resettle 20,000 Syrians over the lifetime of this Parliament.¹⁹ We reported on progress with this initiative in our first two reports on the Immigration Directorates, and we provide a further update in Chapter 4 of this report.

10. It is also our practice to carry out thematic inquiries into particular immigration issues, and the current migration crisis has been our major focus since the beginning of this Parliament. We began this inquiry by focusing on the acute problems in Calais which occurred in summer 2015, with disruption to Eurotunnel and ferry crossings caused by strikes by French workers, which provided greater opportunities for large numbers of migrants to attempt to stow away on vehicles, trains and ships. This work followed up a report published by our predecessors at the end of the last Parliament.²⁰ We examine the background to this specific problem and the measures taken to address it in the next Chapter.

11. Our inquiry has since broadened to the much wider issue of how the UK and the EU are responding to the almost unprecedented numbers of people arriving on their borders, seeking refuge or a better life. We have taken evidence from many witnesses, including political representatives of the countries and areas most affected, and from UK Ministers and officials.²¹ We have also received a substantial amount of written evidence. We are grateful to all those who have contributed to our inquiry. We are particularly grateful to the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Most Reverend Justin Welby, and to the Bishop of Durham, the Right Reverend Paul Butler, for sharing their views on migration and asylum with us.

12. Since we concluded our evidence for this inquiry and began to consider our findings, there has of course been a seismic change in the UK's relationship with the EU, following the EU Referendum on 23 June and the decision to leave the EU. However, EU policy on migration and refugees will remain crucial to the UK and the future arrangements for dealing with migration will form a central part in the negotiations for the UK's exit from the EU. In the meantime, the current arrangements will continue to operate for the two years or more that that negotiation process is likely to take. This report therefore sets out our assessment of the challenges which Europe and the UK face in dealing with the migration crisis, and our recommendations for how the UK unilaterally, and Europe collectively, should respond. We will consider the major implications of EU exit for justice and home affairs issues, including immigration and asylum, in more detail in forthcoming inquiries.

18 Second Report of Session 2016–17, [The Work of the Immigration Directorates \(Q4 2015\)](#), HC 22; see also Second Report of Session 2015–16, [The Work of the Immigration Directorates \(Q2 2015\)](#), HC 512; and Sixth Report of Session 2015–16, [The Work of the Immigration Directorates \(Q3 2015\)](#), HC 772

19 Prime Minister's oral statement to Parliament, 7 September 2015, [Syria: refugees and counter-terrorism](#)

20 Eighteenth Report of Session 2014–15, [The work of the Immigration Directorates: Calais](#), HC 902, Chapter 1

21 Lists of Witnesses and of Written Evidence are set out at the end of this Report.

2 Calais and the Channel ports

Juxtaposed border controls

13. Calais is a common point for migrants to try to enter the UK illegally. The Calais-Dover route is the narrowest point of the English Channel, it has the quickest ferry times, the most ferry crossings, and regular trains via Eurotunnel. As our predecessor Committee pointed out in their March 2015 report, the bottleneck created by migrants gathering in the Calais area led to the development of camps of several thousand refugees and migrants.²²

14. In 2003, the British, French and Belgian governments signed the Le Touquet agreement establishing “juxtaposed controls”. Juxtaposed controls refer to reciprocal arrangements between the three countries, under which immigration checks on certain cross-Channel routes take place before passengers board the train or ferry, rather than on arrival in the UK, to prevent undocumented passengers reaching the UK in order to lodge an asylum application. Border Force currently operates juxtaposed controls at seven locations in France and Belgium:

- Calais and Dunkirk for ferry passengers and vehicles;
- Coquelles for vehicles using the Channel Tunnel; and
- Paris, Brussels, Lille and Calais-Fréthun for Eurostar foot passengers.²³

15. We discussed the possible impact of EU exit on the juxtaposed border arrangements earlier this year, first with the then Minister for Immigration, Rt Hon James Brokenshire MP, and then with the then Home Secretary, Rt Hon Theresa MP. Mr Brokenshire was concerned that there were “parties” in France “advocating very clearly that they would like to see an end to the juxtaposed controls”, although “this was not the view of the French government”.²⁴ Mrs May agreed that “there are many voices in France suggesting that the Le Touquet agreement should be torn up and France should revert to the previous situation where there were no juxtaposed controls”.²⁵

16. Since the EU Referendum, the French presidential candidate Alain Juppé has stated he would be likely to scrap the Le Touquet agreement and return the border to UK territory, if elected.²⁶ This followed calls from both the French Minister for the Economy, Emanuel Macron, and the Mayor of Calais, Natacha Bouchart (from whom we took oral evidence at the start of this inquiry) for the juxtaposed border arrangements to be ended.²⁷ However, as Mr Brokenshire emphasised to us on 12 July, both President Hollande and Interior Minister Cazeneuve have reiterated that they expect juxtaposed border controls to be unaffected by the UK exit from the EU.²⁸

22 Eighteenth Report of Session 2014–15, [The work of the Immigration Directorates: Calais](#), HC 902, Chapter 1

23 Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, [An Inspection of Juxtaposed Controls November 2012–March 2013](#)

24 Oral evidence taken on [9 February 2016](#), on the work of the Immigration Directorates, Qs 125–138

25 Oral evidence taken on [22 March 2016](#) on the work of the Home Secretary, HC 799, Qs245–252

26 The Independent, [4 July 2016](#), “French presidential frontrunner Alain Juppé calls to end Le Touquet agreement and place border with UK on British soil”

27 Politico, [28 June 2016](#), “Macron wants UK border moved as Eurotunnel warns of post-Brexit migrant flood: reports”

28 Oral evidence taken on the Work of the Immigration Directorates, [12 July 2016](#), Q214

17. Since the EU Referendum, there have been reports of some politicians in France calling for the trilateral Le Touquet agreement on juxtaposed borders to end, and for the UK border to be moved back from Calais and other Channel ports to the Kent coast. Such comments are unproductive and are likely to encourage more migrants to travel to Calais. There are clear advantages to the UK from a facility that allows UK authorities to identify and carry out security checks on travellers, and examine passenger and freight vehicles, on the continental side of the Channel. We believe that the arrangements for juxtaposed borders and the co-operation which exists between police and border agencies on both sides of the Channel must continue. This is not just in the interests of the UK, but also France. Those involved in terrorism and criminal gangs do not respect borders and both countries need to be vigilant in confronting these ever-present threats. Maintaining the Le Touquet agreement should be acknowledged as a priority for the UK Government.

Increased attempts to cross the Channel in summer 2015

18. In July 2015, Calais was blockaded by a series of strikes by French ferry workers. The strikes led to long delays on both sides of the Channel, with queues of goods and passenger vehicles at ferry ports and at the Eurotunnel terminus. This created increased opportunities for migrants and refugees to attempt to board UK bound vehicles. For example, on 2–3 July, it was reported that up to 150 migrants had stormed the tunnel, causing disruption to services leading to delays and cancellations. There were also deaths of migrants, including on 7 July, when a migrant died on a freight train while trying to reach the UK from the French side of the Channel.²⁹

19. We took oral evidence in July and September 2015 on the problems this disruption was causing in local areas on both sides of the Channel, and the danger to migrants, from a range of witnesses including road haulage and Eurotunnel representatives, the then Minister for Immigration, the Director General of Border Force, and the Mayor of Calais. We were told that Border Force had detected 30,180 attempts to enter the UK through the juxtaposed controls in the 10 months from March 2014 to the end of January 2015, compared to 18,000 attempts in the year to March 2014. French counterparts, the Police aux Frontières, had intercepted a similar number on their side. The French police release “clandestines” they apprehend back into the French countryside. The 30,000 attempts to enter the UK through the juxtaposed ports do not therefore necessarily represent 30,000 individuals, but are likely to represent a smaller number of migrants making repeated attempts. Many of the illegal migrants are assisted by criminal gangs.³⁰

20. In August 2015, the French Minister of the Interior and the then Home Secretary issued a Joint Ministerial Declaration on UK/French Co-operation Managing Migratory Flows in Calais. It included a commitment for the UK to make a financial contribution of €5 million per year for two years in support of a range of measures to tackle the problems.³¹

29 BBC website, [4 July 2015](#), Dozens of Calais migrants try to storm Channel tunnel; and The Guardian, [7 July 2015](#), Migrant dies on UK-bound freight train near Calais

30 Eighteenth Report of Session 2014–15, [The work of the Immigration Directorates: Calais](#), HC 902, Chapter 1. See also oral evidence taken on Immigration—the situation in Calais on [14 July 2015](#), HC 318 and oral evidence taken on the Migration Crisis, [8 September 2015](#), HC 427

31 Managing Migratory Flows in Calais: [Joint Ministerial Declaration on UK/French Co-operation](#), 20 August 2015

Steps to tackle illegal migrants crossing the Channel

21. The UK and French governments have invested in physical infrastructure around Calais, including additional fencing and floodlighting, CCTV, and infra-red detection technology. The UK has supported Eurotunnel to increase the number of security guards and the French have deployed several hundred more police to the area. The two Governments agreed to greater cooperation on tackling migrant smugglers, including intelligence-sharing and cooperation on prosecutions. There is now a joint command and control centre in Calais from which law enforcement staff from the two countries coordinate operations. Border Force monitors the situation in other Channel and North Sea ports to assess whether additional security needs to be introduced at more UK ports.³²

22. The then Minister for Immigration provided us with an update in February 2016. He said that the latest estimate was that there were between 5,000 and 7,000 migrants living in camps in the Calais area. This is a significant increase on the figure the Mayor of Calais provided in evidence to us last September. The French Government has established 94 centres away from Calais where migrants receive support and can claim asylum. French authorities had advised that this had resulted in about 2,500 people moving away from the camps around Calais and Dunkirk.³³ At the end of February, the French authorities began dismantling the “Jungle” camp in Calais where as many as 3,500 migrants were estimated to be living.³⁴

23. As our predecessors emphasised, increasing security at one point on the French Channel coast carries the risk of simply displacing illegal migrants to other potential embarkation and arrival points, and this has proved to be the case.³⁵ It was reported in the press in mid-April that the National Crime Agency (NCA) had found evidence of people-smuggling gangs being displaced from Calais and Dunkirk. Smuggling was reported to have increased at ports including Hull, Immingham, Tilbury, Purfleet, Newhaven and Portsmouth. Prices paid by illegal migrants were said to range from as little as £100 for a single, basic attempt to more than £6,000 for a journey in “high-quality concealment”. Some migrants were reported to have paid up to £12,000 for transport from Dunkirk to the UK in rigid-hulled inflatable boats.³⁶ The issue of migrant smuggling is examined in detail in Chapter 5.

24. When the French authorities started dismantling the camps at Calais, the Belgian authorities reinstated controls on their border with France in anticipation of those evicted from Calais exploring the port of Zeebrugge as an alternative to Calais. Both Calais and Zeebrugge were mentioned in a 2016 Europol report as places of activity for criminals involved in migrant smuggling (see Chapter 5).³⁷

25. At a UK-France summit in Amiens on 3 March 2016, the then Home Secretary and the French Interior Minister, Bernard Cazeneuve, agreed to spend a further £17 million in the next financial year on measures to address migration pressure in Calais and the surrounding area. This agreement built on the earlier one in August 2015 on cooperation

32 Home Office written evidence ([MIG0067](#))

33 Oral evidence taken on [9 February 2016](#), Qs 139–141

34 The Guardian, 1 March 2016, [Calais ‘Jungle’ camp: clashes as authorities demolish homes](#)

35 Eighteenth Report of Session 2014–15, [The work of the Immigration Directorates: Calais](#), HC 902, para 10

36 See, for example, The Times, [13 April 2016](#), Illegal migrants smuggled into Britain in inflatable boat,; and Daily Express, [13 April 2016](#), Migrants’ £14,000 ticket to Britain: Vast scale of Calais people smuggling racket exposed

37 Europol, [Migrant smuggling in the EU](#), February 2016

and security in the Calais area. This new funding will pay for further infrastructure projects; to assist the French police in protecting the roads around Calais; to fund migrant facilities in other parts of France; and to continue joint work to return migrants not in need of humanitarian assistance to their home countries.³⁸

26. The situation in Calais and elsewhere on the French side of the Channel coast is a manifestation of the wider problem across Europe. The number of migrants in Calais is relatively small compared to the flows entering Europe and being managed by other countries. However, there is a potential threat to UK security, and the ongoing challenge to migration controls which this aspect of illegal migration presents remains of serious concern to us. The Home Office must continue to adapt its response to cross-Channel illegal migration to reflect changes in methods and routes used by migrant smugglers. It must also work actively with EU countries and agencies to tackle the root causes of people gathering in the Calais area with the aim of crossing to the UK.

Coastal security

27. When we took evidence from the then Minister for Security, Rt Hon John Hayes MP, in November 2015, following the terrorist attacks in Paris, he told us that there was “a significant challenge” in ensuring security at smaller UK ports and airports and that the Government was undertaking “urgent work” on this. He went on to say that:

[...] we do need to refresh our thinking about those points of entry for goods and people. It is almost true that the more you strengthen the protections you put in place at the principal points of entry, the more you displace the malevolent attention of those who seek to do us harm to those other places. So we have initiated a fresh review, a fresh piece of work on smaller airports and smaller ports because we share your concerns.”³⁹

28. The UK Government confirmed at the end of May that new measures to strengthen coastal security would come into force to tackle smuggling of people, drugs and weapons. Border Force officers will now be able to stop, board, divert and detain vessels and arrest anyone they suspect of having broken immigration laws, in response to warnings that an increasing number of people are using “more dangerous” routes to try to reach the UK because of better security measures at the Channel Tunnel and ferry port in Calais. Eight new patrol boats will also be made available to Border Force to supplement the existing fleet of five vessels.⁴⁰ However, it was subsequently reported that only four of the new boats will be deployed now; the remainder will not be fully operational for another 18 months. It was also reported in May that French military vessels and aircraft had been ordered to patrol the English Channel to search for migrants trying to reach the UK by boat, due to French concerns about illegal migrants trying to find alternative routes.⁴¹

29. The table below shows the number of patrol vessels which the UK has, compared to other maritime countries in Europe.

38 Home Office press release, [3 March 2016](#); see also Prime Minister’s speech at UK-France summit, [3 March 2016](#)

39 Oral evidence taken in the Countering Extremism inquiry, [24 November 2015](#), Qs449–453

40 Home Office news story, [26 May 2016](#), “New powers to strengthen coastal security”

41 The Times, [1 June 2016](#), “Border guards face 18-month wait for migrant patrol boats”; and The Times, [20 May 2016](#), “French navy patrols Channel to stop migrants”

Table 1: Number of coastguard and other patrol vessels in European maritime countries

Country	Number of vessels	Coastline (miles)
UK (Border Force)	3	7,723
Italy (Guardia di Finanza)	600	4,722
Turkey (Coast Guard Command)	107	4,473
Spain (Civil Guard)	147	3,085
Greece (Hellenic Coast Guard)	240	8,497
Croatia (Croatian Coast Guard)	9	3,625
Netherlands (Netherlands Coastguard)	16	280

Source: UK [Border Force](#) website; Wikipedia ([Italy](#), [Greece](#), and [Croatia](#)); Bosphorus Naval News ([Turkey](#)); and [Netherlands Coastguard](#)

30. When we took evidence from the Director General of Border Force, Sir Charles Montgomery, in December 2015, he had not then been informed what his budget for 2016–17 would be.⁴² We took the opportunity of an oral evidence session with the then Home Office Second Permanent Secretary, Oliver Robbins, on 12 April 2016 to ask whether Sir Charles had now been informed about his budget for the current financial year, given that it had already begun. Mr Robbins was unable to answer our questions.⁴³ The then Home Secretary finally confirmed that Sir Charles had been informed about his budget, in a letter to the Committee Chairman on 18 April.⁴⁴

31. **When the Director General of Border Force, Sir Charles Montgomery, gave evidence to us in December 2015, he had not been informed what his budget for 2016–17 would be. When we asked the then Second Permanent Secretary about this in oral evidence in April 2016, after the current financial year had begun, he was unable to tell us whether Sir Charles had yet been told what his budget was. The then Home Secretary subsequently confirmed in writing that Sir Charles had been informed about his budget. This initial confusion was unacceptable—when select committees request information, it should be provided in a timely way.**

32. **Border Force has been given a key role in implementing strengthened coastal security measures but it clear that it is experiencing problems in gaining access to a sufficient number of patrol boats: only four of the new vessels are currently deployed and the remaining four will not be available for more than a year. Maritime patrols are an essential element of border security for an island nation. Border Force needs to be given all the necessary equipment, including vessels, to enable it to carry out its responsibilities effectively. The number of Border Force vessels in operation appears to be worryingly low. Royal Navy vessels should be made available to Border Force to make up for shortfalls, where necessary.**

33. **In relation to our work on counter-terrorism, the then Minister for Security, John Hayes MP, acknowledged that tightening security at larger ports and airports risks displacing “malevolent attention” to smaller points of entry. This is equally true in relation to displacement of illegal migration and small ports are now being used by criminal gangs to move people between the Continent and the UK. Moreover, whilst the Government can be commended for its efforts to secure Calais, it has not heeded**

42 Oral evidence taken in the inquiry into Countering Extremism, [1 December 2015](#), Q567

43 Oral evidence taken on the Work of the Home Office, [12 April 2016](#), Qs101–109

44 Letter from the Home Secretary to the Chair of the Committee, [18 April 2016](#)

warnings, including from this Committee, that migration flows would be displaced to Belgium and the Netherlands, and most recently to Germany. Security must be tightened at small ports and airports which are being used as entry points from these new departure points on the continental coast as a matter of urgency. The Government should inform us what progress has been made on the “urgent work” that it says it is carrying out to protect small ports and airports, in addition to the increase in Border Force vessels, which is itself delayed.

34. The initial prompt for our inquiry was the issue of border security in relation to Calais and Dunkirk that arose in summer 2015. However, our concerns range much more widely than that. That there are unofficial migrant camps at the border of two of Europe’s wealthiest nations is a matter of serious regret and concern. A wide range of the evidence submitted to us by experts and volunteers confirms that the conditions in the camps are absolutely atrocious and are directly causing suffering and ill health for many residents. In a letter to this Committee in July 2015, the then Immigration Minister confirmed that the information he had from France was that the most common five nationalities of migrants at Calais were Syrian, Eritrean, Sudanese, Iranian and Iraqi. Written submissions highlighted the number of camp residents, including children, who have family members in the UK or other ties to this country. It is clear that there are many people in these camps entitled to humanitarian protection or refugee status, including some who should have their claims processed in the UK.

35. We require much more information on the work the French and UK governments are undertaking to improve conditions at the camps, and to ensure all who are entitled to humanitarian protection or refugee status obtain it—and are able to do so swiftly. The Government should set out what fraction of the sums invested in Calais have been used in this way, as opposed to strengthening border security. Ultimately, we are yet to see any evidence of a strategy designed to deliver a long-term solution to the presence of these camps, and both governments must work together urgently to deliver one.

3 Numbers and origin of refugees and migrants

Refugees and asylum seekers

36. It is difficult to know exactly how many migrants and refugees have entered Europe in the recent past but one measure is the number of applications for asylum. The most common nationalities applying for asylum in 2015 are shown in the Table below.

Table 2: First time asylum seekers by citizenship in Europe in 2015

Country of citizenship	Number of applicants
Syria	362,775
Afghanistan	178,230
Iraq	121,535
Kosovo	66,885
Albania	65,935
Pakistan	46,400
Eritrea	33,095
Nigeria	29,915
Iran	25,360
Other	325,510
Total	1,255,640

Source: [Eurostat Asylum in the EU Members States](#) March 2016.

37. The UK received 41,563 asylum applications in the year to March 2016. The largest number came from nationals of Iran (4,811), followed by Pakistan (3,511), Iraq (3,374), Eritrea (3,340) and Afghanistan (3,133). 2,235 Syrian nationals were granted asylum or protection, with a further 1,667 granted humanitarian protection under the Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme.⁴⁵ We discuss Syrian refugees in more detail in Chapter 4.

38. The country where individuals enter the EU is not necessarily the same as the country where they make their application. The table below shows the number of asylum applications in each EU member state in 2014 and 2015.

Table 3: First time asylum applications in EU Member States

Country	Number of first time applicants			% share in EU total
	2014	2015	% change 2014 – 2015	2015
Belgium	14,045	38,990	+178%	3.1%
Bulgaria	10,805	20,165	+87%	1.6%
Denmark	14,535	20,825	+43%	1.7%
Germany	172,945	441,800	+155%	35.2%
Ireland	1,440	3,270	+127%	0.3%
Greece	7,585	11,370	+50%	0.9%
Spain	5,460	14,600	+167%	1.2%
France	58,845	70,570	+20%	5.6%
Italy	63,655	83,245	+31%	6.6%
Hungary	41,215	174,435	+323%	13.9%
Netherlands	21,780	43,035	+98%	3.4%
Austria	25,675	85,505	+233%	6.8%
Finland	3,490	32,150	+822%	2.6%
Sweden	74,980	156,110	+108%	12.4%
UK	32,120	38,370	+19%	3.1%
EU total	562,680	1,255,640	+123%	100%

Source: Eurostat News Release, [4 March 2016](#), Asylum in the EU Members States

The numbers applying for asylum in the UK remain relatively low: in the year ending June 2015, the UK received 4% of all asylum claims made in the EU.⁴⁶

Migration routes through the Mediterranean

39. Migration into Europe is by no means a new phenomenon, but the routes have changed in recent times and the numbers trying to enter have vastly increased.⁴⁷ Instability has increased in North Africa and the Middle East since 2000, with wars in Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), Libya (2011) and Syria (2011), as well as the repercussions of the Arab Spring, beginning in Tunisia in 2011.


40. Routes from Albania to Italy, Morocco to Spain, and West Africa to the Canary Islands have been popular since the early 1990s. Libya has become a key departure point for migrants from many parts of Africa across the Mediterranean towards Europe.⁴⁸ The tightening of controls on routes via the western and central Mediterranean resulted in migrants moving further east, with the most common routes becoming North Africa to Italy, and from Turkey to Greece, then up through the Balkan states to northern Europe.⁴⁹ The graphic below shows the main migrant, and migrant smuggling, routes into and through Europe.

46 Refugee Council written evidence ([MIG0058](#))

47 Dr Vicki Squire et al written evidence ([MIG0050](#))

48 Home Office written evidence ([MIG0067](#))

49 Migration Policy Centre report: [When the best option is a leaky boat](#), October 2014



Source: Europol, [Migrant smuggling in the EU](#), February 2016

41. During the first six months of 2015, 68,000 people used the route across the eastern Mediterranean, overtaking the 67,500 taking the central Mediterranean route to Italy. The main nationalities using the eastern Mediterranean route during that period were Syrian (57%), Afghans (22%) and Iraqis (5%).⁵⁰ The flow of people did not reduce over winter. In the short period between 1 January and 10 February 2016, over 77,000 people arrived in Greece by sea, 47% of whom were Syrian.⁵¹ The Archbishop of Canterbury has described the flow of migrants as “colossal” and said that “this is one of the greatest movements of people in human history. Just enormous.”⁵²

42. In the single month of October 2015, 210,000 people arrived in Greece. At one point, nearly 8,000 people arrived on the Aegean islands in one day. The Greek authorities are responsible for the refugees and migrants who arrive in their territory, but processing the numbers involved has proved to be very difficult. Greece does not have the infrastructure or reception facilities in place to deal with them, not least because they generally arrive on sparsely populated islands.⁵³ The UNHCR is one of many organisations that has been

50 UNHCR, [The sea route to Europe: Mediterranean passage in the age of refugees](#), July 2015

51 International Organization for Migration written evidence ([MIG0061](#))

52 Interviews in *The House Magazine*, [10 March 2016](#). See also oral evidence taken on [7 June 2016](#), Q1

53 Oral evidence taken on [24 November 2015](#), Qs168 and 173; International Rescue Committee written evidence ([MIG0064](#)). See also UNHCR briefing note, [20 October 2015](#); and IoM [Missing Migrants Project](#)

working with the local authority on Lesbos to provide accommodation, interpretation services, clean water and sanitation, and services for women and children. UNHCR activity on Lesbos represents 40% of the UNHCR budget for Greece.⁵⁴

43. Mr Khalid Chaouki, a Member of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, told us that no single country could manage the challenge alone, and believed that it was “unfair” to ask a country in difficulty, such as Greece, to face the situation on its own.⁵⁵ It was reported that Italy had spent €1.16 billion accommodating 99,000 refugees in 2015—a cost of about €11,700 per refugee per year.⁵⁶ Mr Bikas Konstantinos, the Greek Ambassador to the UK, told us in November that Greece, a country with a population of 11 million, was hosting two million refugees and migrants. This had cost Greece more than €2 billion to date.⁵⁷ Estimates for 2016 indicate that Greece will spend at least €600 million to house 40,000 recently arrived refugees—a cost of €15,000 per migrant.⁵⁸

44. Most migrants arriving in Italy or Greece do not want to stay there. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) estimates that most Syrians, Eritreans and Sudanese travel on from Italy within 48 hours of arrival. Over 390,000 migrants and asylum seekers were registered as arriving in Hungary from other arrival points in 2015. Between 1 January and 10 February 2016, 85,215 people were registered entering Croatia. As the number of migrants has increased, the response from transit countries has become harsher. In early 2016 many countries responded to the migrant flows by building fences (including Hungary), or by either closing borders completely, or imposing very small quotas on crossings. For example, in February, Austria said it would allow a daily quota of 3,200 migrants to cross from Slovenia.⁵⁹

45. Most significantly, the recent EU-Turkey agreement on return of migrants is already having a dramatic impact on the routes being used by migrants: the number of migrants arriving in Greece in April 2016 dropped by 90% compared to March. Another factor contributing to the huge reduction in the numbers of migrants using routes via Greece is Macedonia’s closure of its border with Greece, also in March this year. This has prevented migrants travelling on to northern Europe, leaving them stranded on Greece’s northern border.⁶⁰ The makeshift Idomeni camp on the Greek side of the border was then dismantled in May, with the estimated 8,400 migrants being moved to designated processing facilities near Thessaloniki.⁶¹

46. Migration into Europe has been a long-standing challenge for EU countries, including the UK. However, the situation has now become a crisis, in large part because of the Syrian war, and the continuing instability in Libya and other parts of north Africa. Although current migration flows are a continuation of patterns that have ebbed and changed over many years, the current numbers of people seeking to move into Europe are unprecedented in modern times. The Archbishop of Canterbury has

54 UNHCR update, [6 November 2015](#)

55 Oral evidence taken on [26 January 2016](#), Qs214 and 217

56 Reuters, [21 October 2015](#), “Italy relocates 70 refugees as costs to house migrants double”

57 Oral evidence taken on [24 November 2015](#), Q162

58 Greek Reporter, [14 March 2016](#), “Migrant crisis will cost Greece more than original estimate of 600 million euros”

59 International Organization for Migration written evidence ([MIG0061](#))

60 Frontex news release, [13 May 2016](#), “Number of migrants arriving in Greece dropped 90% in April”

61 BBC News website, [24 May 2016](#), Greece moves thousands of migrants from Idomeni camp

described the scale of the crisis as “colossal”. Syrian refugees present the most acute and numerous challenge, but there are other countries from which migrants continue to flow in large numbers.

47. The EU and its Member States failed to anticipate the scale of migrant flows, and did not have the structures and mechanisms in place to cope. As a result, the EU has been too slow to respond in a coordinated way. The EU’s March 2016 agreement with Turkey on return of migrants is arguably a first step towards a meaningful response but it has come far too late and is itself highly controversial for a number of reasons. Further action is urgently required to ensure that vulnerable people seeking refuge do not suffer further exploitation by criminals, accompanied by fear, harm and the current high risk of death.

4 Addressing the causes of mass migration

Support to source countries

48. Part of the UK response to the migrant crisis is to try to tackle the long-term issues in source and main transit countries, through humanitarian and development aid. This included £2 billion in bilateral aid to countries in Africa in 2015–16. As a key driver of migration, war-torn Syria is also a major focus of UK aid. The UK has contributed over £550 million to Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey to assist with refugees from Syria. The UK also supports humanitarian work in Syria itself, including for provision of emergency shelter, food rations, medical aid and clean water.⁶² The UK hosted a conference on Syria in February 2016 at which the then Prime Minister pledged to double the UK’s contribution to the Syria crisis from £1.12 billion to £2.3 billion. The Government says that the UK’s contribution to date has funded: the supply of 20 million food rations; clean water to 1.6 million people; 2.5 million medical consultations; 6 million relief packages; and help with sanitation and hygiene for 7.2 million people. Other pledges at the conference totalled over US\$11 billion up to 2020.⁶³

49. Many of the submissions to our inquiry welcomed the financial commitment that the UK Government had made to the countries affected by the Syrian war. However, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) said that these commitments cannot be used as a reason to evade obligations closer to home, or to insist that states close to Syria contain the refugees, as “responsibility for refugees cannot be defined by proximity”. The IRC also pointed out that the major NGOs responding to the migration crisis were struggling to raise funds:

Few European governments have provided aid directly to the NGOs responding on the ground, which means that NGOs, relying on private donations, are running out of money. UNHCR, IOM and partners have released a \$550m appeal for humanitarian operations in Europe that must be met.⁶⁴

In September 2015, the then UN High Commissioner for Refugees, António Guterres, described the global humanitarian community as “financially broke”.⁶⁵

50. We strongly endorse a coordinated approach to the provision of support to those countries around Syria, which are doing so much to fulfil their moral obligation to take in large numbers of refugees, including Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. In the absence of realistic prospects of the impacts of the conflict coming to an end in the near future, the UK’s contribution to humanitarian relief is warmly welcomed, and maintaining it is essential. However, providing such aid does not absolve the UK from also providing

62 Home Office written evidence ([MIG0067](#))

63 Prime Minister’s Office Announcement, [4 February 2016](#), “UK to invest an extra £1.2 billion supporting Syria and the region”; See also GOV.UK [Supporting Syria Conference 2016](#) webpages

64 International Rescue Committee [Situational Briefing, 23 February 2016](#), Urgent action needed on European refugee crisis. See also IRC written evidence ([MIG0064](#))

65 The Guardian, [6 September 2015](#), UN agencies ‘broke and failing’ in face of ever-growing refugee crisis

more direct support for the thousands of Syrian refugees who have already arrived in Europe, particularly those whom the UK Government, in different circumstances, would consider to be vulnerable and therefore deserving refuge.

Resettlement of Syrian refugees

51. In January 2014, the UK Government said that it would not take part in any EU-wide scheme to resettle Syrian refugees arriving in Europe, but instead would operate its own mechanism—the Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme (VPRS). In September 2015, the then Prime Minister announced that the UK Government would expand its current scheme, and resettle 20,000 Syrians over the course of this Parliament to 2020. The programme is focusing on helping the most vulnerable refugees who cannot be supported effectively in the region, on the basis of the UNHCR identifying potential candidates in need of resettlement. The following categories of people qualify:

- women and girls at risk;
- survivors of violence and/or torture;
- refugees with legal and/or physical protection needs;
- refugees with medical needs or disabilities;
- children and adolescents at risk;
- persons at risk due to their sexual orientation or gender identity; and
- refugees with family links in resettlement countries.⁶⁶

52. Those who qualify are interviewed by the UNHCR and, if successful, the UNHCR then submits their case to the UK for consideration. The process involves a “fairly sophisticated security check” and a medical assessment conducted by the IOM. The background and medical details are sent to the relevant local authority in the UK so that an assessment can be made of care and accommodation needs. Successful candidates are given humanitarian protection, which is generally permission to stay for five years.

53. Those resettled are provided with accommodation and help in integrating in the UK, including English language tuition and access to benefits, and are allowed to work. After five years, the resettled person will be able to apply for indefinite leave to remain in the UK.⁶⁷ The UK is using over £460 million from the International Development budget to pay for the first year costs of the scheme, and up to a further £130 million will be allocated by 2019–20 to local authorities to contribute to the cost of supporting the refugees beyond their first year.⁶⁸

54. The Government told us that the pace of resettlement would depend on several factors, including the rate at which the UNHCR can make referrals and the number of places made available in the UK. When we pressed the then Minister for Syrian Refugees

⁶⁶ Home Office written evidence ([MIG0067](#))

⁶⁷ Home Office written evidence ([MIG0067](#)); see also oral evidence taken on [13 October 2015](#)

⁶⁸ Third Special Report from the Home Affairs Committee, *The Work of the Immigration Directorates* (Q2 2015): [Government Response](#), HC 693, pp4–5; see also Sixth Report, [The Work of the Immigration Directorates](#) (Q3 2015), HC 772, paras 53–58

in November 2015 about the pace at which he expected Syrian refugees to arrive over the five-year period, he was very clear that this would not be predictable and he would not disclose how many had arrived by that date. The Government did give a commitment that 1,000 refugees would arrive before Christmas 2015, and this was achieved with days to spare, with the 1,000th refugee arriving on 16 December 2015. At that point, over 50 local authorities had taken a share of those who had arrived.⁶⁹

55. We commented on the low number of local authorities involved in providing asylum accommodation in our February report on the Immigration Directorates and recommended that more local authorities should take part in the dispersal system.⁷⁰ The Government has been reluctant to provide figures for the number of Syrian refugees housed by each local authority but these were eventually published with the latest asylum statistics at the end of May and are set out in the Annexes to this report.⁷¹ These show that, of the 1,602 people accepted under the VPRS to March 2016, 610 have been resettled in Scotland. 171 people have been resettled in the Yorkshire and Humberside region and 105 in Coventry. Only four London Boroughs (Barnet, Camden, Islington and Kingston-upon-Thames) have taken any of the Syrian refugees.⁷²

56. The Government has said that those resettled in the UK will have their need for protection reviewed at the end of the temporary period and, if the situation in their home country has improved and their reason for asylum no longer stands, then the UK will “seek to return them to their home country rather than offer settlement here in the UK”.⁷³

57. The UK Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme has started well, and there are signs that the co-operation necessary between central Government, local authorities, and the various agencies involved is working efficiently. We reiterate our support for the Government’s commitment to receive 20,000 Syrian refugees by 2020 and our appreciation of the efforts of all those who worked to achieve the target of 1,000 arriving by Christmas 2015, and we commend the then Minister for Syrian Refugees for achieving this.

58. However, it is clear from the recently published statistics that more local authorities need to contribute to providing asylum accommodation, including for Syrian refugees. There is now a two-tier system among local authorities, with some providing support to Syrian refugees and others not doing so. A similar two-tier system applies in the level of support local authorities provide for other asylum-seekers. The Government needs to be much more proactive in encouraging a fair distribution of asylum seekers throughout the country and Ministers should take the lead on this, by encouraging their own local authorities to take their fair share of refugees.

59. Those who come to the UK under the Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme are only given humanitarian protection for five years. We are concerned that the Government appears to be moving towards a system of limited time periods for providing refuge, which may not wholly meet its obligations under the 1951 UN Convention on the status of refugees. The situation in Syria should be reviewed comprehensively once the five-year point is approaching for any refugee.

69 BBC news website, [16 December 2015](#), Syria crisis: First 1,000 refugees have arrived in UK,

70 Sixth Report, [The Work of the Immigration Directorates](#) (Q3 2015), HC 772, para 50

71 Home Office, [Immigration statistics, January to March 2016](#): data tables, Vol 4, Table as_20_q

72 The Guardian, [27 May 2016](#), “Scotland has taken in more than a third of all UK’s Syrian refugees”

73 Home Office written evidence ([MIG0067](#))

Costs of asylum provision

60. It is difficult to find official figures for the costs to the UK of receiving and providing for asylum seekers. The Home Office states that the average “unit cost” of processing an asylum application in 2014–15 was £7,848. However, this includes the costs of any appeals, support, and detention as well as the administration costs of processing each application.⁷⁴

61. In evidence to us submitted in February 2016 on asylum accommodation, two of the provider companies supplied some information on the payments they receive from the Home Office. Serco stated that its average income per month per service user was around £300, but that the average cost to Serco was around £450. For a full year, the average revenue Serco is paid per service user is around £3,600, and the loss per service user per year is around £1,850. G4S told us that the average payment it receives is £9.35 per service user per night, which equates to £280 per month or £3,412 per year.⁷⁵ On the specific costs of Syrian refugees, the BBC has cited information indicating that the Home Office estimates the cost to local authorities of each refugee accepted under the Syrian Vulnerable Persons Scheme to be £8,520. Additional costs of £12,700 for benefits and £2,200 for medical care would be funded by central government, making a total of £23,420.⁷⁶

Safe and legal routes into Europe

62. The Red Cross EU Office has stated that increasingly restrictive immigration policies in EU countries have steadily made it more difficult for non-EU nationals to enter the EU. Those wishing to do so have to rely more on asylum and family reunion routes. In turn, the rising number of asylum applications has increased pressure to ensure only genuine asylum seekers are offered protection. The opportunity for those wishing to enter Europe legally to claim asylum has also reduced: airlines will not let people board Europe-bound flights without visas, but European states now restrict visas which were previously available to refugees.⁷⁷ The IRC said:

Schengen area countries granted over 30,000 visas to Syrians in 2010, for example, but very few in 2013. The UK’s approval rate for Syrian visas has dropped significantly over that time period. Thus even refugees who could easily afford plane tickets to the UK and other European countries, and who would almost certainly be successful in their asylum claims, are unable to travel here legally.⁷⁸

63. The lack of a legal route incentivises people to pay smugglers and take dangerous routes.⁷⁹ Many organisations therefore support the creation of effective legal routes to the

74 Home Office, [Asylum transparency data: May 2016](#), Table ASY_04

75 Letter from Rupert Soames OBE, Chief Executive, Serco Group plc, to the Chair of the Committee, [26 February 2016](#); and Letter from Peter Neden, Regional President – G4S UK & Ireland, to the Chair of the Committee, [22 February 2016](#)

76 BBC News website, [15 October 2015](#), “Syria refugees to cost ‘up to £23k each’ in first year in UK”

77 Red Cross EU Office, [Europe in crisis: Facilitating Access to Protection, \(Discarding\) Offshore Processing and Mapping Alternatives for the Way Forward](#), December 2015

78 International Rescue Committee written evidence ([MIG0064](#))

79 Amnesty International written evidence ([MIG0062](#)); see also European Commission, [Action Plan on Migrant Smuggling](#), May 2015

EU. Some countries, such as Brazil, do provide humanitarian visas—where someone who wishes to apply for protection can do so before arriving in that country. Switzerland and France offer humanitarian visas for Syrians; however the UK offers none.⁸⁰

64. The Archbishop of Canterbury agreed that safe and legal routes should be provided. He accepted that these mechanisms needed to be carefully crafted “to avoid pulling those who would not otherwise come but may feel this is the only resort” and that it was important to offer assistance in the region which migrants were fleeing because “you want to offer people the hope” of being able to remain in their own area. But he was clear that legal routes were necessary “to undermine completely the people traffickers, because that is the most dangerous and the most extortionate way” of people trying to reach Europe. He pointed out that it was “the strong” who used the more reliable trafficker routes and that the most vulnerable people “tend to get left behind or die tragically en route”.⁸¹

65. The Government has said that it will not take part in the current EU schemes to relocate or resettle refugees. This is because it does not wish to participate in any initiative that might act as a magnet for those seeking refuge and thereby encourage them to risk taking dangerous routes to try to reach the UK. We accept this approach. In these circumstances, we would ask the Government to explain whether it is considering any expansion of safe and legal routes, such as humanitarian visas, for those from conflict regions seeking protection, as advocated by the Archbishop of Canterbury and a wide range of expert NGOs and others. The Government should also make clear how its response to the migrant crisis is providing protection for refugees other than Syrians in the UK, without provision in place for them to travel to the UK to apply for asylum.

66. We asked the Archbishop of Canterbury whether he believed that the UK was “full” when it came to the question of taking more migrants and refugees. He said “I do not think Britain is full [...] we can take more people in”. But he warned that “we have to think very hard about doing it. You can do the right thing in such a wrong way that it becomes the wrong thing—that is the danger” and he was clear that “careful preparation and good policy” were needed. He also believed that communities who had concerns about migration should be “listened to”, and that they also needed to be reassured that the resources of their communities were being “augmented and strengthened” in order to cope with receiving refugees.⁸² We put the same question to Lord Green of Deddington, Chair of Migration Watch who told us: “I am quite sure that Britain is very crowded, and that is the view of 75% of the population. Is it full? No, but there is a very strong feeling among the public that they would like to reduce the rate of increase of the population”.⁸³

67. The Chair of Migration Watch, Lord Green of Deddington, accepted in evidence to us that the UK is not yet “full” in relation to migration. The Archbishop of Canterbury agreed that the UK was not full and believed that, with “careful preparation and good policy”, including the necessary resources being provided to local communities, the UK had the capacity to fulfil its moral obligation to accept more refugees fleeing war zones and catastrophes, as well as asylum-seekers. We share this view.

80 International Rescue Committee written evidence ([MIG0064](#))

81 Oral evidence taken on [7 June 2016](#), Q26

82 Oral evidence taken on [7 June 2016](#), Qs38–46 and Q57

83 Oral evidence taken on [7 June 2016](#), Q96

5 Protecting the EU's external and maritime borders

Migrant smuggling

68. Migrant smuggling involves an individual paying willingly for the services of a smuggler to facilitate crossing an international border.⁸⁴ Europol has estimated that over 90% of the irregular migrants and refugees who entered the EU in 2015 used services provided by migrant smuggling networks. The criminal turnover associated with migrant smuggling to and within the EU for 2015 is estimated at between €3 billion and €6 billion.⁸⁵

69. The 2015 European Agenda on Migration identified the fight against migrant smuggling as a priority, in order to prevent exploitation by criminal networks and reduce incentives to irregular migration. The Agenda aimed to transform migrant smuggling operations from 'low risk, high return' to 'high risk, low return'.⁸⁶

70. Europol has collected detailed data on how and where the smuggling networks operate. Commonly, the network provides transport and drivers, fraudulent documents, a broker to contact migrants and others in the network, and access to corrupt officials and military personnel to evade law enforcement. Outside the external border, the main places of criminal activity for smuggling are in North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean (for example, Amman, Cairo, Casablanca, Izmir and Tripoli). Within the EU, the main places are capital cities (London, Budapest, Rome, Berlin), major ports (Calais, Hamburg, the Hook of Holland, Thessaloniki and Zeebrugge) and border crossings. Smuggling networks coalesce at these points to meet demand.

71. Europol estimates that about 20% of the criminals identified as involved in smuggling in 2015 were linked to other criminal activity, such as drug smuggling or human trafficking for sexual exploitation, and expected the scale of exploitation to increase significantly in coming years. It believes that a successful response from law enforcement requires the "strong and consistent engagement of Member States and other partners through enhanced information sharing and operational control."⁸⁷ Smuggling occurs within Europe but most of the attention has been on the activity which facilitates passage across the Mediterranean.

72. The UK Government has said that it wants to dismantle the criminal networks that "facilitate travel for profit" and put lives at risk.⁸⁸ Its priority is to gather intelligence on networks involved in migrant smuggling both across and within EU borders, and for that intelligence to be shared across the EU. A multi-agency Organised Immigration Crime Task Force has been established—involving the National Crime Agency, Border Force, Immigration Enforcement and the Crown Prosecution Service—to focus on the criminals in source and transit countries, across the Mediterranean, and at the UK border with

84 Human trafficking involves the coercion of a victim into exploitation which may or may not be linked to the crossing of an international border.

85 Europol, [Migrant smuggling in the EU](#), February 2016; European Commission communication [Action Plan against migrant smuggling](#) May 2015

86 European Commission communication [Action Plan against migrant smuggling](#) May 2015

87 Europol, [Migrant smuggling in the EU](#), February 2016

88 Home Office written evidence ([MIG0067](#))

mainland Europe. The UK also participates in JOT Mare, established by the EU in March 2015, as a forum to collect, analyse and share intelligence on immigration crime among Europol Members.⁸⁹

Frontex—the EU border agency

73. Frontex (the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders) was established in 2004 to promote cooperation between Member States on border management. It has limited powers, but facilitates coordination between Member States, and assists with joint operations, training, and collecting data from border agencies in each country, to research patterns and conduct risk analysis. Frontex is reliant on individual Member States to provide staff and resources for operations.

74. Frontex has struggled during the migration crisis because of its limited staffing and resources, and because it can only intervene when invited to do so. The implications of these weaknesses were illustrated when Greece refused to request its assistance when it was struggling with huge numbers of migrants arriving throughout 2015, leading to politicians from other EU countries calling for Greece to be excluded from the Schengen area.⁹⁰

75. The UK is not a member of the Schengen area so is not obliged to contribute to Frontex. However, it “actively supports” Frontex, and has done so since it was established in 2004, in the form of providing experts to joint operations, return operations and training activities, supporting research, development and risk analysis, and supplying detection equipment. The UK has also offered “de-briefers and nationality screeners” to help support Frontex as part of the UK’s Organised Immigration Crime Task Force tackling criminal networks operating in the Mediterranean. The UK Government has said that it “firmly believes that a common immigration and asylum policy across the EU is not a viable approach and that each member state needs to take responsibility for its own border”. However, it wants to see Frontex “develop sustainably”.⁹¹

76. In December 2015, the European Commission introduced proposals to transform Frontex into a European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG). This would elevate it from its current coordination role to one where it can take control when Member States are unable or unwilling to do so, and it will be able to act on the EU’s external borders without a Member State’s consent. Its new capabilities will include: a reserve of 1,500 rapidly deployable border guards (within three days) plus 1,000 permanent staff; its own equipment; a monitoring and analysis centre; surveillance capacity; a mandate to work with third countries, including in joint operations; and a European Return Intervention Team to deal with returns of illegal entrants.⁹²

77. Control of the EU’s external borders is critical to an effective approach to the migration crisis, which is resulting in such high migratory flows. Large numbers of unregistered migrants moving into the Schengen area exacerbates existing security threats and risks undermining migration controls in other countries, including the UK. Members of the Schengen area need to agree whether control of external borders

89 Home Office written evidence ([MIG0067](#))

90 The Economist, [7 December 2015](#), Why Greece was almost kicked out of Schengen; Financial Times, 1 December 2015, Greece warned EU will re-impose border controls

91 Home Office written evidence ([MIG0067](#))

92 European Commission, [A European Border and Coast Guard to Protect Europe’s External Borders](#), 15 December 2015

is the responsibility of the frontline state or is a collective EU responsibility to which they all contribute. We have noted that some Member States have implemented their own passport controls within the Schengen area, in breach of the Schengen principles and no doubt due to a lack of faith in the integrity of the external Schengen border.

78. We welcome the proposals put forward by the European Commission to reform Frontex, the agency charged with protecting the EU's external borders. We believe these reforms would have a positive impact in empowering the new European Border and Coast Guard Agency to take effective action when individual Member States are unable or unwilling to do so. This would not affect the UK's role directly, even while it remains in the EU, as it is not a full member of Schengen. However, the UK does provide staff and equipment to work with Frontex and its support for the EU's Rapid Intervention Border Teams (RABIT) has always been welcomed. The Government should make clear how it intends to engage with the new EU border agency and how its engagement will differ from its current relationship with Frontex once the UK leaves the EU. We also recommend that the UK remain a key player in Europol from outside the EU, as the US is now.

Mediterranean crossings: search and rescue

79. One of the key routes into Europe is across the Mediterranean. The IOM recently reported that an estimated 227,316 migrants had entered Europe by sea so far in 2016, arriving in Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Spain, with Libya as the main departure point, followed by Egypt.⁹³ Many of the people crossing the Mediterranean pay smugglers for a place in a small, overcrowded, unseaworthy boat, without a crew or the power to reach land. These boats do not always complete their journey and, tragically, there have been many thousands of deaths of migrants over recent years. The IOM reports that, so far in 2016, 2,920 deaths have been recorded, compared with 1,838 in the first six months of 2015, an increase of 1,082. (Previous full year totals were 3,279 in 2014 and 3,770 in 2015.⁹⁴) There were 383 deaths in June alone—the highest monthly total for June in three years.⁹⁵ As many as 400 migrants were reported to have died in a single incident in April when a boat carrying about 800 people capsized en route from Egypt to Italy; and further incidents were reported in May involving the deaths of dozens more migrants.⁹⁶

80. In response to the high number of deaths in the Mediterranean in previous years, in October 2013 Italy initiated Mare Nostrum, a proactive search and rescue operation across 27,000 square miles of sea, to find boats before they got into difficulty. In 12 months Mare Nostrum saved over 100,000 lives, but the Italian Government could not afford to maintain the operation at the cost of €9 million a month and it was halted. It was followed from November 2014 by two operations led by Frontex, with vessels provided by Member States: Operation Triton (in the Central Mediterranean) and Operation Poseidon (in the Eastern Mediterranean).⁹⁷

93 IOM [Mediterranean Migrant Arrivals in 2016](#), 7 July 2016

94 IOM [Missing Migrants Project](#)

95 IOM [Mediterranean Migrant Arrivals in 2016](#), 7 July 2016

96 Daily Telegraph, [18 April 2016](#), "400 migrants feared dead after boat capsizes in Mediterranean"; and The Guardian, [26 May 2016](#), "Dozens feared dead as migrant boat capsizes in Mediterranean".

97 The Guardian, [31 October 2015](#), "Italy: end of ongoing sea rescue mission 'puts thousands at risk'"

81. Following cancellation of Mare Nostrum, the UK Government originally refused to support search and rescue operations, arguing that they operated as a pull factor; that decision was subsequently reversed.⁹⁸ The UK contribution to the new missions included sending HMS Bulwark (an amphibious transport dock) to take part in search and rescue operations, on condition that anyone rescued would be taken to the nearest port and not be able to claim asylum in the UK. HMS Bulwark was in the Mediterranean from April to July 2015 and was involved in saving 2,900 lives. The UK also sent two Border Force cutters in May 2015 for five months and later chartered a civilian vessel, VOS Grace, from November 2015 to mid-April 2016, with a detachment of Border Force officers, Royal Marines and a medical team.⁹⁹

Tackling migrant smuggling across sea borders

82. In May 2015, the EU launched an operation in the southern central Mediterranean to disrupt migrant smuggling and trafficking networks and to prevent the further loss of life at sea. This was initially called EUNAVFOR MED and then renamed Operation Sophia. The first phase of the operation was limited to carrying out surveillance on smuggling activity. From October 2015, the next phase widened to include the facility to board, search, seize and divert vessels suspected of being used for human smuggling or trafficking. The UK deployed the survey ship HMS Enterprise in support of this operation in July 2015 (after HMS Bulwark returned) and a Type 23 Frigate HMS Richmond from March to December 2015.¹⁰⁰ HMS Richmond was reported as being involved in “multiple rescues, saving hundreds of lives” and it also confiscated £26.5 million of heroin and £3 million in cannabis.¹⁰¹ However, the House of Lords European Union Committee concluded in May that, while Operation Sophia is “valuable as a search and rescue mission”, it does not “in any meaningful way deter the flow of migrants, disrupt the smugglers’ networks, or impede the business of people smuggling on the central Mediterranean route”. It pointed out that arrests made as part of Operation Sophia to date have involved “low-level targets” and that destruction of wooden boats has led to smugglers using rubber dinghies “which are even more unsafe”.¹⁰²

83. Frontex and national coastguard operations were supplemented in February 2016 when NATO deployed Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2) to the Aegean Sea, to take part in “national and international efforts to cut the lines of illegal trafficking and illegal migration in the Aegean Sea”. The operations include reconnaissance and surveillance to identify smuggler boats, with information then passed on to Frontex, and the Greek and Turkish coastguards. The UK supported the mission by deploying amphibious landing ship RFA Mounts Bay in early March, supported by a Wildcat helicopter; three Border Force vessels also took part.¹⁰³ At the end of May 2016, the then Prime Minister announced during the G7 summit that a Royal Navy ship would be deployed off the Libyan coast this summer to tackle people smugglers, although it is not clear whether this deployment has actually taken place yet.¹⁰⁴

98 The Guardian, [27 October 2014](#), “UK axes support for Mediterranean migrant rescue operation”

99 Home Office written evidence ([MIG0067](#))

100 Home Office written evidence ([MIG0067](#))

101 Royal Navy website, [11 December 2015](#), Drug-busting and life-saving HMS Richmond returns home from nine-month deployment

102 House of Lords European Union Committee, [14th Report of Session 2015–16](#), Operation Sophia, the EU’s naval mission in the Mediterranean: an impossible challenge, May 2016, HL Paper 144

103 HMG Press release, [7 March 2016](#); and NATO press releases [26 February 2016](#), [27 February 2016](#), and [6 March 2016](#)

104 BBC News, [27 May 2016](#), “Migrant crisis: UK set to send Royal Navy warship to Libya”

84. Given that Libya is now the biggest source of illegal migrants trying to reach Europe, the Chairman of the Committee asked the then Foreign Secretary, Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP, whether Libya needed to be offered financial support to tackle the migrant problem at the point of departure in a similar way to the arrangements the EU has agreed with Turkey. In return EU countries would also need to gain access to Libyan waters for their patrol vessels. Mr Hammond was dismissive of the proposal and argued instead that the UK should aim to “package the objectives that we want to achieve with the objectives that are priorities for the Libyans”.¹⁰⁵

85. The Government has supported both Frontex search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean and NATO operations aimed at disrupting migrant smuggling in the Aegean by deploying Royal Navy, Border Force and other vessels. We welcome these deployments although, given the low number of Border Force vessels in operation, it is important that this does not detract from their crucial role in policing the Channel. It is not acceptable for EU Member States to leave these essential tasks to the countries most affected, including Italy, Greece and Turkey. All EU national governments should share the burden and contribute to disrupting the activities and destroying the boats and equipment of criminal elements who are the source of much of the migrant crisis, and who are the only party in this crisis to have gained from the suffering of vulnerable people.

86. Although the deployments to date have saved lives, it is clear that they are not yet achieving their primary task of deterring migrant flows and disrupting smuggling networks. The response has been too slow and more robust and urgent collective action by EU countries is needed, with a clear mandate to deal with high-level criminality. Libya has now become the main departure point for illegal migration across the Mediterranean and the focus should be on preventing boats leaving north Africa in the first place. For the action to be limited to rescuing people from the sea and collecting drowned bodies, as it seems to be at present, is wholly unacceptable.

87. As we enter high summer, the then Prime Minister’s announcement in May that a Royal Navy vessel was being sent to address migrant flows from Libya appears to have stalled. Moreover, the approach taken by the then Foreign Secretary in respect of Libya, where a reported 500,000 people are waiting to cross the Mediterranean illegally, is complacent. Given the UK’s involvement in the Libyan civil war and in the rebuilding and reconciliation efforts which have followed, the EU should be able to offer Libya a deal, with substantial funding provided to tackle people smuggling at the points of departure, and access to Libyan territorial waters for European country vessels agreed in return.

¹⁰⁵ HC Deb, [19 April 2016](#), col 789

6 Processing and treatment of migrants

Dublin regulations

88. Under the Dublin regulations, the Member State through which an asylum seeker first enters the EU is generally responsible for examining the asylum application. Exemptions exist if a close connection can be established based on family ties or a previously issued residence permit or visa in another Member State. States cannot say they are not responsible if it can be evidenced that someone entered their country first. In return, any State can request the acceptance of the migrant by the country of first arrival.¹⁰⁶ Proving the country of first arrival is not straightforward, however, and relies heavily on an individual's identity and fingerprinting data being entered onto EURODAC—the EU asylum fingerprint database.

89. In practice, under the current arrangements, responsibility for identifying, registering and processing claims for asylum, and integrating those who have a valid claim for international protection, rests with a small number of exposed frontline Member States. We were told by Italian and Hungarian representatives that the system does not work effectively with the current number of people arriving at the external border. Greece does not have the capacity to examine the asylum applications of 600,000 people. Asylum-seekers who arrive in Italy or Greece must therefore either remain there for protracted periods or resort to trying to continue their journey illegally, with the risk of being sent back to Italy or Greece if they are picked up elsewhere.¹⁰⁷

90. There were 435,000 asylum applications in the EU in 2013, and transfers under Dublin were requested in 16,014 cases, or 3.7% of all those claiming asylum.¹⁰⁸ Requesting a transfer does not mean it actually happens. Data for the period 2009 to 2013 show that of an average of 55,000 annual applications issued, only 73% transfers were accepted, and only about 26% were physically transferred—approximately 14,000 persons per year. The proportion of transfers of actual persons on the basis of the Dublin system compared to the number of asylum seeker applications for international protection in the EU was approximately 4%.¹⁰⁹ In 2014, the UK requested 1,831 transfers under Dublin and transferred 252 people.¹¹⁰

91. There have been calls for the Dublin system to be reviewed. Following Germany's suspension of the arrangements in August 2015, a spokesperson for the European Commission said that this was a recognition that the Member States at the external border cannot be left to manage the numbers trying to enter Europe on their own.¹¹¹ The Commission subsequently said that the operation of the Dublin rules was perceived as being “fundamentally unfair”.¹¹² In May the Commission published proposals for reform of the Dublin rules which, while retaining the principle of claiming asylum in the first country, would include a new ‘fairness mechanism’ to redistribute claims where a Member

¹⁰⁶ The latest version of the Dublin Regulation—[Dublin III](#)—was adopted in June 2013. The countries which participate in the arrangements are the 28 EU States plus Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein.

¹⁰⁷ Oral evidence taken on [24 November 2015, Q191](#); and on [26 January 2016](#), Qs 216, 246

¹⁰⁸ Eurostat, [Dublin statistics on countries responsible for asylum application](#), July 2015

¹⁰⁹ Study Group on the reception system, [Report on the reception of migrants and refugees in Italy](#), Rome, October 2015

¹¹⁰ Eurostat, [Dublin statistics on countries responsible for asylum application](#), July 2015

¹¹¹ Deutsche Welle, [25 August 2015](#), Germany suspends 'Dublin rules' for Syrians

¹¹² European Commission, [Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the State of Play of Implementation of the Priority Actions under the European Agenda on Migration](#), 10 February 2016

State would otherwise be left facing disproportionate pressure on its asylum system. Mr Khalid Chaouki, a Member of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, told us that he wanted a review of Dublin, to consider whether an EU asylum permit should be developed that would facilitate freedom of movement for refugees, similar to the arrangements for other immigrants. Mr Gergely Gulyás, Deputy Speaker of the Hungarian National Assembly, told us that he would prefer to maintain the element of Dublin that requires a refugee to be accepted at the first safe country. He did not think it was appropriate for the refugee to choose a particular country of safety and illegally cross safe borders to do so. He saw the protection of borders as part of national competence and also an obligation within the Schengen Agreement.¹¹³

Fingerprinting

92. A major part of registration of migrants is the identification and fingerprinting of new arrivals. Fingerprinting is more reliable than documentation, which can be forged, and commonly forms the basis for future transfer applications under the Dublin Convention. However, there is inconsistency in the registration, fingerprinting and entering of details onto EURODAC of new arrivals entering the EU at unofficial border crossings between different European countries, and both Italy and Greece have been criticised in the past for not fingerprinting new arrivals.¹¹⁴ There have also been discrepancies between the number of irregular arrivals and the number of individuals whose fingerprints were entered on the EURODAC database. The IRC said the Dublin rules incentivise people to avoid registration and fingerprinting, and to use smugglers to enter the EU clandestinely.¹¹⁵

93. Frontex figures show that between July and November 2015 65,050 people arrived by sea in Italy but only 29,176 were fingerprinted and added to EURODAC. The Commission said in December that it wanted Italy to achieve a 100% fingerprinting rate for new arrivals “without delay”. In the period from September 2015 to January 2016, the proportion of migrants arriving in Italy whose fingerprints were included in the EURODAC database rose from 36% to 87%. Over the same period the rate for new arrivals in Greece rose from 8% to 78%.¹¹⁶

94. **Application of the provisions of the Dublin Convention has a direct impact on UK migration controls because many of the migrants and refugees who arrive illegally in Calais with the aim of making an asylum claim in the UK will have passed through another EU state. The existing Dublin regulations were not designed for a crisis such as the present one, and the European Commission has proposed to improve them with a revised scheme designed to ensure that responsibility for processing asylum claims does not rest disproportionately with frontline states but instead, when required, is shared by EU members. The UK indicated that it would oppose any such changes to the Dublin regulations, even putting aside the question of its exit from the EU. Regardless of whether these changes proceed, proper systems for registering and tracking migrants need to be in place as part of the Dublin arrangements and an effective fingerprinting system is crucial for this. However, it is unfair for EU countries that are distant from**

113 Oral evidence taken on [26 January 2016](#), Qs228 and 252–255

114 Oral evidence taken on [24 November 2015](#), Q152

115 International Rescue Committee written evidence ([MIG0064](#))

116 European Commission, [Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the State of Play of Implementation of the Priority Actions under the European Agenda on Migration](#), 10 February 2016

the current points of arrival in the EU to criticise the main arrival countries for not implementing fingerprinting requirements effectively, given the vast numbers that they have been left to cope with, with inadequate support.

Hotspots

95. As part of the European Agenda on Migration, the Commission proposed to relieve pressure on the frontline Member States by creating hotspots—reception centres with integrated teams working 24 hours a day and seven days a week.¹¹⁷ The integrated teams include staff from three agencies: the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), Frontex, and Europol. The intention is for new arrivals to be identified, registered and fingerprinted (and their details put on EURODAC); to have their documentation checked against security databases; and then to be channelled into either the national asylum system, the European relocation system, or the return system. The aim is for hotspots to facilitate new arrivals being received in better conditions and processed faster.¹¹⁸

96. There was criticism that it was taking too long to establish the hotspots. The initiative began in July 2015; Italy was to have seven and Greece to have five such centres.¹¹⁹ Six hotspot areas have been designated by the Italian government: Lampedusa, Pozzallo, Porto Empedocle (Sicily), Trapani (Sicily), Augusta and Taranto. The plan in Greece is for a regional headquarters in Piraeus (Port of Athens) with hotspots on the different islands where arrivals are most common.¹²⁰ The first Greek hotspot was opened on the island of Lesbos in October 2015. The IRC said it took until February 2016 for four further centres to be established.¹²¹ The European Commission found in February 2016 that only two were operational in Italy and one in Greece.¹²²

97. To ensure that hotspots can register all new arrivals requires them to be resourced appropriately. Two of the agencies involved, Frontex and EASO, are reliant on Member States to make the necessary expert staff available. However, this has not been forthcoming. The Greek Ambassador told us last November that Greece had asked for 740 Frontex staff for the hotspots on the Greek Islands but by then had received only 100. He argued that, without these resources, processing takes longer and conditions in the reception centres deteriorate.¹²³ Médecins Sans Frontières said the hotspot on Lesbos left refugees “stranded in mud and rain, without food, water, shelter or warm clothes”.¹²⁴ In February, the European Commission itself raised many concerns, including the need for updated IT systems to ensure that personal data can be checked against security databases, and for more medical staff to enable faster screening.¹²⁵

98. The Home Office told us that the Government supports the hotspot proposals, and the involvement of Frontex, EASO, Europol (and Eurojust), to intervene quickly, and emphasised the benefits of those who do not apply for asylum being “swiftly returned to

117 European Commission, [The Hotspot Approach to Managing Exceptional Migratory Flows](#)

118 Oral evidence taken on [24 November 2015](#), Q167

119 Oral evidence taken on [26 January 2016](#), Q229

120 European Commission, [The Hotspot approach to managing exceptional migratory flows](#)

121 IRC written evidence ([MIG0064](#))

122 European Commission, [Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the State of Play of Implementation of the Priority Actions under the European Agenda on Migration](#), 10 February 2016

123 Oral evidence taken on [24 November 2015](#), Qq163–164

124 Reliefweb, [25 October 2015](#), More than 1000 people stranded outside in Lesbos – MSF treating hypothermia

125 European Commission, [Progress Report on the Implementation of the hotspots in Italy](#), 15 December 2015

their country of origin”.¹²⁶ The Home Office pointed out that the UK has been “contributing more resource in the last 3 years than any other Member State” to Greece, Italy, Bulgaria and Cyprus, and has offered a further 10 experts to support EASO in response to its requests. It did not provide data on its support for Frontex staff within the hotspots.¹²⁷

Relocation from EU countries of arrival

99. In May 2015, the European Commission proposed the transfer of 40,000 people in need of protection from Italy and Greece to other Member States over two years. In September, EU Home Affairs Ministers agreed to relocate a further 120,000 refugees from Greece, Italy and “other Member States directly affected by the refugee crisis”.¹²⁸ Hungary was also under pressure from large numbers, with up to 2,000 a day crossing the border at Rozko, but declined to sign up to the relocation mechanism.¹²⁹ The refugees would be relocated to other countries using a “distribution key” based on the size of the population, total GDP, the number of asylum applications received over the previous four years and the unemployment rate. Receiving countries would be paid €6,000 for each person relocated. Not all migrants arriving in Italy or Greece would be eligible for relocation and it would only apply to Syrians, Eritreans and Iraqis, which was justified by the high acceptance level (“recognition rate”) of over 75% for applications from these nationalities across the EU.

100. Relocation is intended to work in tandem with the hotspots, so registration on arrival is quickly followed by establishing their entitlement for relocation. After relocation, their application for asylum would be processed in the new country. The effective operation of the hotspots would mean those eligible for protection were moved on as quickly as possible and the difficulty of establishing their asylum claim was shared.¹³⁰ The Commission has said that “both the legislation and the structures are in place to allow for the emergency relocation of up to 160,000 people” who are in clear need of international protection. The EU budget has provided €640 million to support relocation.¹³¹

101. The target number of 160,000 migrants to be relocated is small relative to the more than one million migrants who arrived in Europe in 2015, and the pace of relocation is very slow. As of 15 March 2016, EU countries had pledged to relocate a total of 3,723 refugees from Italy and Greece, but only 937 had been moved. The Commission has described this as “unsatisfactory”.¹³² The IRC pointed out that, if relocation continues at the current rate, it will take more than 100 years to achieve the 160,00 target—which itself is less than 20% of the people who arrived in Europe in 2015.¹³³

102. Persuading EU states to participate in relocation has been difficult from the start. Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic have resisted being part of any mandatory scheme, and both Slovakia and Hungary have legally challenged it. The then

126 Home Office written evidence ([MIG0067](#))

127 Home Office written evidence ([MIG0067](#))

128 European Commission Statement following the decision at the Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council to relocate 120,000 refugees, [22 September 2015](#)

129 Deutsche Welle, [25 August 2015](#), Germany suspends ‘Dublin rules’ for Syrians

130 Oral evidence taken on [26 January 2016](#), Q229

131 European Commission, [Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the State of Play of Implementation of the Priority Actions under the European Agenda on Migration](#), 10 February 2016

132 European Commission – Press release, [Relocation and Resettlement: EU Member States urgently need to deliver](#), 16 March 2016

133 International Rescue Committee [Situational Briefing, 23 February 2016](#), Urgent action needed on European refugee crisis

Home Secretary confirmed to us in December that the UK would use its opt-out and would not take part in any mandatory relocation scheme.¹³⁴ Sweden and Austria have requested a suspension from their relocation commitments due to the high numbers of migrants they are already managing.

103. Italy and Greece know that many of the migrants who arrive on their shores have no intention of staying there but these countries are being forced to devote resources to the hotspot arrangements. Moreover, if migrants are registered there on arrival, it effectively makes Italy and Greece susceptible to thousands of returns under the Dublin regulations. Understandably, migrants do not know how relocation is supposed to work so are suspicious about cooperating, particularly if relocation sends them to a country to which they do not want to go.¹³⁵ Mr Gulyas said that any agreement to allocate people to a particular country is unmanageable because there is no internal border. He said that “Somebody who is aiming to go to Sweden or Germany will find a way to go there, regardless of whether the quota tells them to be in Bulgaria or in Hungary”. Mr Chaouki told us that refugees know which countries offer better facilities for new arrivals and, unless asylum services are consistent across Europe, asylum seekers will go to the “five-star level of reception countries”.¹³⁶

104. If it can be made to work effectively, the EU’s hotspot initiative will go some way to recognising that individual frontline countries cannot be left to bear the brunt of vast migration flows. For the hotspots to be a success, commitment and practical support is required from all EU members, and from the UK, for staff, equipment and other necessary resources. Greece and Italy cannot be blamed if the hotspots remain understaffed and under-resourced. We welcome the practical support provided by the UK to date. It should be noted that the UK has opted out of the EU scheme for dealing with the migration crisis and that its unilateral commitments are currently limited mainly to the 20,000 Syrians refugees it has agreed to accept by 2020.

Returns

105. The EU Agenda on Migration acknowledged that systems across the EU for the return of those who are not eligible for humanitarian protection was unsatisfactory, and was incentivising irregular migration. It argued that an effective return policy is a strong deterrent because people would be reluctant to pay smugglers large sums if they run a high risk of being returned home quickly, even if they manage to reach the EU. However, in 2014 less than 40% of the irregular migrants ordered to leave the EU actually left.¹³⁷ The Commission has now proposed that Frontex coordinate the management of returns, through identification, issue of travel documents, and ongoing work with the countries of transit and origin.¹³⁸ It has also said that agencies in each Member State with responsibility for returns need to be resourced appropriately.¹³⁹

134 Oral evidence taken on the work of the Home Secretary on [16 December 2015](#), Q139

135 Politico, [16 January 2016](#), Why the EU’s refugee relocation policy is a flop

136 Oral evidence taken on [26 January 2016](#), Qs226 and 260

137 Study Group on the reception system, [Report on the reception of migrants and refugees in Italy](#), Rome, October 2015

138 European Commission, [Action Plan on Migrant Smuggling](#), May 2015

139 European Commission, [Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the State of Play of Implementation of the Priority Actions under the European Agenda on Migration](#), 10 February 2016

106. As an illustration of the scale of the challenge, the Commission found that over 50% of the migrants arriving in the Italian hotspots were not in need of international protection, and urged the Italian authorities to take action to speed up forced returns. Italy returned 14,113 people in 2015 out of over 83,000 asylum applications.¹⁴⁰

107. The UK Government is clear that “detection at the point of entry into the EU must have consequences. Swift returns from the external border should be a priority for the EU and its Member States”. It believes that the hotspots will help identify “who is and who is not in need of international protection”. The UK has also asked for returns procedures to be speeded up, and for returns decisions to be made for those who enter Greece irregularly, do not apply for asylum, or are found not to qualify for asylum. It also argues that action is needed to prevent irregular migrants from absconding while waiting to be returned.¹⁴¹

Schengen

108. Movement of illegal migrants within continental Europe has been facilitated by the removal of passport checks at internal borders, following the Schengen Agreement in 1985. Schengen is part of the framework for free movement of goods, persons, services and capital between Member States.¹⁴² Schengen assumes that those benefitting from free movement are either in possession of an EU Member State passport or have a legal right to be in the EU. It was not designed to operate under circumstances where large numbers of people would move across internal borders without an EU passport or a legal right to be in the EU.

109. Several countries have responded to the increased migratory flows by reintroducing border controls. Schengen rules allow for temporary border checks to be put in place for 10 days if necessary for “public policy or national security” reasons. The controls can be renewed in 20-day periods for a maximum of two months. Such controls “should remain an exception and should only be effected as a measure of last resort, for a strictly limited scope and period of time”. By February 2016, Belgium, Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden and Norway had all suspended Schengen at some point and reintroduced some form of border checks. There are calls within the EU to revisit how Schengen operates. However, our witnesses from Greece, Italy and Hungary all wanted to retain Schengen.¹⁴³

Increasing security at EU borders

110. The European Commission has said that an essential aim of the hotspots project is enhanced security at the border. Documents given to migrants and refugees to allow onward travel will now include security features to prevent them being swapped or forged, and to enable them to be checked systematically against verification databases, including the Schengen Information System—a database which enables the relevant border authorities in each country to enter and consult alerts on third-country nationals

¹⁴⁰ European Commission, [Progress Report on the Implementation of the hotspots in Italy](#), 15 December 2015

¹⁴¹ Home Office written evidence ([MIG0067](#))

¹⁴² In 1985, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany and France signed the “Schengen Agreement” in the small village of Schengen, Luxembourg. The number of “Schengen states” has increased since to Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland (non-EU member), Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein (non-EU member), Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway (non-EU member), Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland (non-EU member)

¹⁴³ Oral evidence taken on [24 November 2015](#), QqQ170, 177 186; and on [26 January 2016](#), Q217

so they can be refused entry where necessary.¹⁴⁴ (This is separate from the EURODAC database discussed above.) The EU wants Member States to ensure that all migrants are fingerprinted and secondary movements by unregistered migrants are avoided and so has said that “as a last resort” the “proportionate use of coercion” is available to national authorities to ensure fingerprinting. The EU is pushing for 100% coverage of identification and registration of all new arrivals, and for criminals involved in fraudulent use of travel and identity documents to be prosecuted.¹⁴⁵

EU border security and terrorist attacks

111. Two of the terrorists involved in the November 2015 Paris attacks are believed to have passed through Greece, one with an EU passport and one with a Syrian passport. As noted above, after the attacks, France called for Schengen to be suspended so that identity checks could be reintroduced on its internal borders, and a number of other countries reintroduced some form of border checks. Identification checks of non-EU nationals with a Schengen visa have since become more frequent.¹⁴⁶ Europol has said that members of terrorist groups or returning foreign fighters with EU nationality “generally rely on genuine or fraudulent documents” to enter the EU rather than using smuggling networks.¹⁴⁷ The Greek Ambassador to the UK told us, in relation to the Paris attacks, that Greece was not informed by the French authorities that suspects might be travelling under a falsified passport and neither individual triggered an alert on the relevant databases when checked by the Greek authorities.¹⁴⁸

112. Before the Paris attacks, Member States were required to check the passport of EU nationals on entry and exit at the external border but they did not have to check their identity against security databases. For non-EU nationals both passports checks and identity checks against security databases were required, but only on entry; checks on exit were optional. In December 2015 the European Commission proposed changes to strengthen security. This would mean that the identity of EU travellers would be checked against security databases; however, if such checks were found to have a disproportionate effect on the flow of traffic then they could be made on a targeted basis. Passport and security database checks would be carried out for non-EU travellers on both entry to and exit from the external border and these would be mandatory irrespective of the effect on the flow of traffic.¹⁴⁹

113. After the Paris attacks, the then Home Secretary stated that in the UK:

Border Force has intensified checks on people, goods and vehicles entering the UK from the near continent and elsewhere. Additionally, in order to help the French authorities secure their own border, Border Force and the police have

144 See European Commission website, [Schengen Information System \[accessed 14 April 2016\]](#)

145 European Commission Press release, [10 February 2016](#), Implementing the European Agenda on Migration: Commission reports on progress in Greece, Italy and the Western Balkans

146 Daily Telegraph, [16 November 2015](#), Paris attacks: France to call for effective suspension of Schengen open borders; BBC Online, [4 January 2016](#), Migrant crisis: Sweden border checks come into force; Daily Telegraph, [11 November 2015](#), Sweden calls on Britain to help with migrant crisis as it re-imposes border controls; Daily Telegraph, [14 September 2015](#), Refugee crisis: Europe’s borders unravelling as Austria and Slovakia impose frontier controls; BBC Online, [7 March 2016](#), Schengen: Controversial EU free movement deal explained

147 Europol, [Migrant smuggling in the EU](#), February 2016

148 Oral evidence taken on [24 November 2015](#), Qs152–157

149 Statewatch, The reform of Frontex: Saving Schengen at Refugee’s Expense, date; BBC Online, [7 March 2016](#), Schengen: Controversial EU free movement deal explained

been undertaking additional and targeted security checks against passengers and vehicles travelling to France via both maritime and rail ports and a number of airports across the country.¹⁵⁰

114. In the context of the current intense security threats to EU countries, it is clearly in the interest of all countries for there to be effective security checks at EU external borders. Although the measures taken by the UK since the Paris attacks are welcome, no country can expect to be able to protect its borders alone against those who wish to do harm. The UK needs its European neighbours, and the countries on the EU external borders, to take equally rigorous steps. Terrorists do not see national borders as a barrier to their barbarism and people with illegal or lethal intent will continue to try to find ways through any security system. Cooperation and continued vigilance are necessary.

115. The Greek Ambassador to the UK told us that one of the Paris terrorists crossed from Turkey to Greece and was then able to travel on within the EU, and that another had a Syrian passport. The additional checks against security databases which the European Commission has proposed are welcome. These should be enforced, in addition to passport checks, for both EU and non-EU nationals. Equipment should be available at all EU external borders for the fingerprinting of migrants on arrival and then for background-checking to be carried out before they cross the border. Any increased delays at border crossings which this may cause may just have to be accepted, in the face of the continued threat of terrorists managing to evade EU border checks, as two of the Paris attackers appear to have done.

116. We have examined the implications for UK security of terrorist attacks, including those in Paris and Brussels, as part of our separate inquiry into radicalisation and counter-terrorism.¹⁵¹ We expect to publish our report on this highly important subject shortly.

¹⁵⁰ HC Deb [16 November 2015](#), Col 379

¹⁵¹ For more information about this inquiry, including all the oral and written evidence received, see the Countering Extremism [inquiry page](#) on the Committee website

7 The EU Agreement with Turkey

117. Most of the migrants and refugees who entered the EU in 2015 arrived in Greece, after crossing the Aegean Sea from Turkey. The Turkish authorities have frequently been criticised for not stopping the migrant boats before they left Turkish shores.¹⁵²

118. The EU published a Joint Action plan with Turkey in October 2015, offering increased humanitarian aid to help manage the Syrian refugees in Turkey, in return for Turkey improving its efforts to reduce the flow of irregular migrants crossing the Aegean Sea. Negotiations continued over several months. In February 2016, the EU said that the migrant flows were still too high and called for “further, decisive efforts” from Turkey to reduce the number. Finally, on 18 March, the EU and Turkey reached an agreement, which included the following terms:

- All irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greece will be returned.
- For each Syrian returned to Turkey, a Syrian migrant from the refugee camps in Turkey will be resettled in the EU.
- Access for Turkish nationals to the Schengen area will be brought forward to June 2016.
- Negotiations for Turkey’s accession to the EU will restart.
- The EU will speed up payment of the initial €3 billion allocated for the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. An additional €3 billion will also be provided, up to the end of 2018, if the commitments made by Turkey are met.¹⁵³

119. Concerns were expressed when the agreement was being negotiated about the legal and human rights implications of returning irregular migrants to Turkey, in exchange for Syrians being resettled from the refugee camps in Turkey. Peter Sutherland, the UN Secretary General’s special representative, said that it is against international law to deport an individual without giving them the opportunity to claim asylum and for their application to be considered, and that there need to be assurances that they will not be sent back to a country where their rights will not be protected.¹⁵⁴ UNHCR, Médecins Sans Frontières, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), Save the Children, and the Norwegian Refugee Council all announced their withdrawal from parts of Greece in protest at the conditions in which refugees and migrants were being detained.¹⁵⁵

120. The first deportations took place on 4 April 2016.¹⁵⁶ Questions remain about whether Turkey can be considered a safe third country for returns, given its human rights record. Amnesty International has alleged that Turkey has started to push Syrians back across the border into Syria. Nor is it clear whether Turkey is equipped to manage the numbers of migrants who being returned, and in particular whether deportees will be detained at designated centres or simply registered and then left to fend for themselves.¹⁵⁷ It is already the case that most Syrians migrants in Turkey are not in refugee camps.

152 ILPA written evidence ([MIG0047](#))

153 European Council, [EU-Turkey Statement 18 March 2016](#); see also [EU and Turkey close in on agreement](#), 8 March 2016

154 The Guardian, [2 April 2016](#), EU-Turkey refugee plan could be illegal, says UN official

155 Foreign Policy, [31 March 2016](#), Take a country on the brink. Now add 10,000 asylum hearings a week

156 The Guardian, [4 April 2016](#), “First boats returning migrants and refugees from Greece arrive in Turkey”

157 Greek Reporter, [31 March 2016](#), Turkey not fully ready to take refugees back from Greece

121. The Greek government has stated that it will require more resources to be able to process the number of asylum claims and has asked for 400 asylum experts from other EU countries to provide assistance.¹⁵⁸ The UK Government announced in April that, following the agreement, it planned to send 75 personnel to Greece together with equipment and medical supplies, in support of the process.¹⁵⁹

122. Concerns that the agreement would simply result in the migrant problem being displaced from Greece to other locations, and smugglers using different routes, seem to have been justified. When the agreement was reached in March, smuggling gangs were already said to be charging €5,000 for space on larger cargo and fishing vessels from southern Turkey to Italy, with other networks preparing to exploit the sea route from Albania to Italy, or across the Black Sea from Turkey to Bulgaria.¹⁶⁰ As we have stated above, the high number of deaths of migrants in the Mediterranean since March have mainly involved people trying to cross from Egypt and Libya to Italy.

123. The EU-Turkey agreement reached in March 2016 has resulted in a 90% decrease in the numbers of migrants arriving in Greece. However, concerns about the humanitarian, human rights, logistical and legal implications should not be ignored and the challenge for both Greece and Turkey in processing and moving the large numbers of people who have already reached Greece remains considerable. It is only just and fair that the EU countries which supported the agreement with Turkey should assist by providing staff, financial support and equipment. The UK Government has already provided some support to Greece in the form of personnel and equipment. It should set out the ongoing contribution it plans to make, both through EU agencies while it remains a member of the EU, and bilaterally. Turkey got a good deal from the agreement with the EU and it would receive even greater credit from EU states if it did more to stop migrants crossing to Greece in the first place.

124. It was inevitable that the agreement to deport migrants back to Turkey from Greece would lead migrant smugglers to find other routes in the region which avoid Greece, and this has proved to be the case. There were hundreds of deaths of migrants making the crossing from North Africa to Italy during April and May and more deaths are likely during the high summer months. The EU needs to take immediate, collective and comprehensive steps to tackle the new problems created by the displacement of migrants to other routes avoiding Turkey and Greece, which were entirely foreseeable. Ultimately all action to close off irregular routes will be no more than partially successful, and sometimes counter-productive, particularly in the absence of sufficient safe and legal routes. We give some consideration to this issue in the next chapter in relation to protecting vulnerable groups, but the recommendations there are also more widely applicable.

158 The Guardian, [1 April 2016](#), EU-Turkey refugee deal: staff shortages and rights concerns pose twin threat

159 Home Office news story, [21 April 2016](#), "Immigration Minister confirms UK contribution to EU/Turkey deal"

160 The Independent, [30 March 2016](#), Refugee crisis: Arrivals rocket in Italy amid warnings Turkey deal could force migrants on more dangerous routes; Foreign Policy, [31 March 2016](#), Take a country on the brink. Now add 10,000 asylum hearings a week

8 Protecting vulnerable groups

Women and children

125. The migrant and refugee flows entering Europe in 2015 included a greater proportion of women and children than in previous years. In January 2016, 55% of the irregular migrants arriving in the EU were women and minors. This represents an increase of 34% compared to 2015.¹⁶¹ NGOs working in Lesbos in Greece have reported increased numbers of women, travelling alone or with children, and children and elderly people. They emphasise that women and girls are at risk of gender-based violence, sexual exploitation, harassment and assault. The IRC said that many travelled in the hope of being reunited with family members elsewhere in Europe and that greater use of family reunion asylum arrangements would help these vulnerable people.¹⁶²

126. The increase in women and children within the migrant flows is seen as both an indicator of the severity of the situation they are fleeing, and a reflection of the fact that male family members have already travelled ahead. Several submissions called on the British Government to make it easier for refugees to make family reunion applications.¹⁶³ The Red Cross criticised the UK's lack of use of family reunion visas, which it said was forcing family members to undertake dangerous journeys to submit an application.¹⁶⁴ The Immigration Law Practitioners Association pointed out that family reunification helped provide a support network for refugees and played a significant role in integrating them into a new culture.¹⁶⁵ Mr Chaouki said family reunion had helped the integration of new migrants into Italian society, and excluding family reunion could foster irregular migration.¹⁶⁶

127. The latest iteration of the Dublin Agreement includes Article 9 which says that where an individual wishes to make a claim for protection and has a family member already residing as a beneficiary of international protection in a Member State, that Member State should be responsible for examining the application for international protection of the individual. Article 10 has the same effect if the family member's application has "not yet been the subject of a first decision regarding the substance".¹⁶⁷

128. As we set out in our June Report on the Immigration Directorates, the Government recently announced that the UK would provide an additional resettlement route to the UK specifically for 'children at risk' from the Middle East and North African (MENA) region. The scheme is aimed at unaccompanied children and children separated from their parents or other family members, as well as other vulnerable children such as child carers and those facing the risk of child labour, child marriage or other forms of neglect, abuse or exploitation. The Government has committed to resettling several hundred individuals from the MENA region in the first year with a view to accepting up to 3,000 individuals over the lifetime of this Parliament. In May 2016 the then Prime Minister announced that further provision would be made for children who are already in Europe and not therefore

161 Europol, [Migrant smuggling in the EU](#), February 2016

162 International Rescue Committee written evidence ([MIG0064](#))

163 ILPA written evidence ([MIG0047](#)); Refugee Council written evidence ([MIG0058](#))

164 British Red Cross written evidence ([MIG0051](#))

165 ILPA written evidence ([MIG0047](#))

166 Oral evidence taken on [26 January 2016](#), Qs233–234

167 Refugee Council written evidence ([MIG0058](#))

covered by the ‘children at risk’ scheme’. Unaccompanied children who entered Europe before 20 March 2016 will now also be eligible for resettlement to the UK, although the Government has not stated how many unaccompanied children from Europe it expects to be resettled.¹⁶⁸

129. When we took evidence from the Bishop of Durham in June, 157 unaccompanied children had been identified in Calais and northern France who were waiting to join their families in the UK. When we asked whether these children should be allowed to come to the UK, the Bishop stated very clearly that “They should already have arrived”.¹⁶⁹

130. The then Minister for Immigration updated us on progress with these schemes on 12 July. This included consulting local authorities about their capacity to receive unaccompanied children and discussions with the UNHCR, UNICEF, NGOs and the Italian, Greek and French Governments “to strengthen and speed up mechanisms to identify, assess and transfer children who meet the necessary criteria to the UK, where it is in their best interests”. The Minister pointed out that this required taking proper account of “complex legal and safeguarding systems” in the arrival countries and to ensure that the UK was “respectful of the domestic provisions that apply in those countries”. Specifically in respect of refugee children already in Europe, the Minister said that, since the Immigration Act was passed in May, 21 cases have been accepted from France and 17 people have been transferred. Funding to local authorities for unaccompanied asylum-seeking children was also increased from 1 July with “a 20% uplift for children aged under 16 and a 28% uplift for 16 and 17-year-olds”.¹⁷⁰

131. We accept the Government’s concern that allowing unaccompanied children to join family members already in the UK might create a “pull factor”, resulting in more vulnerable young people making dangerous journeys to try to reach the UK. We appreciate that these are sensitive and complex matters and that proper account needs to be taken of the legal and safeguarding requirements in the countries where unaccompanied children are currently located. We also acknowledge that some progress is being made on this. However, we agree with the Bishop of Durham that the 157 unaccompanied children already in Calais who have family members in the UK “should already have arrived” in the UK. The Government should, as a one-off action, accept all of these children into the UK now.

132. Separated children who arrive in the UK and require support are usually looked after by local authorities, under their requirements to take responsibility and care for all children living in their area. Local authorities are already looking after over 4,000 unaccompanied asylum-seeking children, as well as large numbers of children in destitute families whose asylum applications have been refused but who remain in the country. The concentration of arrivals of unaccompanied children in particular locations means that the burden of providing care mainly falls on a small number of local authorities, particularly in Kent and the London Boroughs around Heathrow, rather than being evenly distributed. The Local Government Association and individual local authorities themselves have pointed out they are struggling to cope with the number of children they are being expected to look after.¹⁷¹

168 See Second Report, Session 2016–17, *The Work of the Immigration Directorates (Q4 2015)*, HC 22, paras 50–51

169 Oral evidence taken on [7 June 2016](#), Q92

170 Oral evidence taken on the Work of the Immigration Directorates, [12 July 2016](#), Qs214–218

171 LGA, [LGA responds to PM announcement on unaccompanied asylum seeking children in Europe](#), 4

133. The Bishop of Durham told us in June that the Home for Good charity, which was originally established by UK churches to encourage families to become foster carers for children in the UK, had responded to the problem of unaccompanied Syrian children arriving in the country by finding 10,000 volunteers willing to foster these children. He acknowledged that they would have to be vetted, and that not all 10,000 would be accepted, but he noted that “an extraordinary number of people” had stepped forward and that “they will be in a position to offer that kind of support to all kinds of people from all kinds of nations over the coming years”, while continuing also to offer foster homes to British children.¹⁷²

134. Large numbers of women and child migrants are making dangerous illegal journeys across the Mediterranean, in the hope of being reunited with family members in the EU. We welcome the UK Government’s recent announcement of schemes to resettle unaccompanied children, both from the Middle East and North Africa, and some who have already reached Europe. However, it is important that the local authorities who are required to take responsibility for unaccompanied refugee children are properly funded and supported to take on this additional burden, particularly given the high concentration of arrivals in a very small number of locations, particularly in Kent and the Heathrow airport area. The Government should include steps to ensure the fair distribution of unaccompanied children across local authorities as part of the action we have called for in relation to dispersal of asylum-seekers.

135. Family reunion of migrants has been shown to have benefits in terms of integration and support networks, in addition to the human rights requirements of allowing families to be together, and there is clear scope for further measures to facilitate women and children joining husbands, fathers and other male relatives who have reached the UK. We recommend that the UK Government increase its use of family reunion visas for refugee asylum cases, to make it easier for applications to be made in countries of origin and to help avoid women and children feeling obliged to attempt high-risk and illegal travel to Europe in order to be reunited with male relatives. We also recommend that the UK broaden the scope of family reunion rules, and work with expert NGOs to make it easier (including through provision of legal aid) and speedier for applications for family reunion visas to be made, particularly in countries of origin or their vicinity.

Missing child migrants

136. Unaccompanied foreign minors are defined as individuals under the age of 18 who are stateless or from non-EU countries, who enter the territory of a Member State without being accompanied by an adult who is responsible for them. Europol found that over 85,000 unaccompanied minors applied for asylum in the EU in 2015, and the number is growing—the 2015 total is three times higher than the number for 2014.¹⁷³ A more recent estimate by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism suggested that there were over 95,000 asylum applications by unaccompanied minors in Europe in 2015.¹⁷⁴

137. Worryingly, many minors go missing from reception centres shortly after arrival. Brian Donald, Europol Chief of Staff, stated that 1,000 unaccompanied minors were

¹⁷² Oral evidence taken on [7 June 2016](#), Qs22 and 82–85

¹⁷³ Europol, [Migrant smuggling in the EU](#), February 2016

¹⁷⁴ Safya Khan-Ruf and Maeve McClenaghan, Bureau of Investigative Journalism, [12 April 2016](#), “Fourfold rise as 95,000 unaccompanied children claim asylum in Europe in 2015”

unaccounted for in Sweden, and that Europol has estimated that there are at least 10,000 unaccompanied minors who have gone missing since arriving in Europe.¹⁷⁵ The IRC said that “thousands” of unaccompanied children were reported missing in Europe, and there was no joined up mechanism for monitoring children moving along the migration routes.¹⁷⁶

138. The situation in Italy is illustrative of the problem. In 2014, 50% of the minors recorded as arriving were unaccompanied; in the first nine months of 2015, 73% were unaccompanied (10,322 of the total 14,109 minors rescued). Of those who were traceable, 95% were male and 81% were 16–17 years old. But many disappear from arrival centres. As of 31 August 2015, over 5,400 of the minors that had arrived were untraceable, and of those, over 3,800 were from three countries: Egypt, Eritrea and Somalia.¹⁷⁷ Mr Chaouki told us that the situation in Italy is exacerbated by the involvement of organised crime in human and organ trafficking.¹⁷⁸

139. As part of its assistance for unaccompanied children, the Government has established a £10 million Refugee Children Fund within the Department for International Development (DFID) for vulnerable refugee and migrant children in Europe. The Government says that the Fund will support UNHCR, Save the Children and the International Rescue Committee (IRC) to work with authorities in host countries to care for and assist unaccompanied or separated children. This work will include: identifying vulnerable children, providing for their immediate support, referral to specialist care, and helping find solutions such as family reunification.¹⁷⁹

140. Europol estimates that there are 85,000 unaccompanied minors amongst the migrant population in the EU. We were astonished to hear reports that large numbers of these children go missing from reception centres shortly after arrival and that they then face abuse, sexual assault and discrimination. At least 10,000 minors are estimated to have gone missing since arriving in Europe. EU countries must do more to protect these highly vulnerable young people. The Government has announced a £10 million Refugee Children Fund for vulnerable children in the EU. This should be used, and if necessary augmented, to ensure that effective support and protection are provided, and that this extremely serious problem is properly addressed.

175 The Guardian, [30 January 2016](#), 10,000 refugee children are missing; Daily Telegraph, [11 November 2015](#), Sweden calls on Britain to help with migrant crisis as it re-imposes border controls,

176 IRC written evidence ([MIG0064](#))

177 Study Group on the reception system, [Report on the reception of migrants and refugees in Italy](#), Rome, October 2015

178 Oral evidence taken on [26 January 2016](#), Q231

179 Written Statement on refugees and resettlement, [21 April 2016](#), HCWS687

Conclusions and recommendations

UK exit from the EU

1. Since we concluded our evidence for this inquiry and began to consider our findings, there has of course been a seismic change in the UK's relationship with the EU, following the EU Referendum on 23 June and the decision to leave the EU. However, EU policy on migration and refugees will remain crucial to the UK and the future arrangements for dealing with migration will form a central part in the negotiations for the UK's exit from the EU. In the meantime, the current arrangements will continue to operate for the two years or more that that negotiation process is likely to take. This report therefore sets out our assessment of the challenges which Europe and the UK face in dealing with the migration crisis, and our recommendations for how the UK unilaterally, and Europe collectively, should respond. We will consider the major implications of EU exit for justice and home affairs issues, including immigration and asylum, in more detail in forthcoming inquiries. (Paragraph 12)

Juxtaposed border controls

2. Since the EU Referendum, there have been reports of some politicians in France calling for the trilateral Le Touquet agreement on juxtaposed borders to end, and for the UK border to be moved back from Calais and other Channel ports to the Kent coast. Such comments are unproductive and are likely to encourage more migrants to travel to Calais. There are clear advantages to the UK from a facility that allows UK authorities to identify and carry out security checks on travellers, and examine passenger and freight vehicles, on the continental side of the Channel. We believe that the arrangements for juxtaposed borders and the co-operation which exists between police and border agencies on both sides of the Channel must continue. This is not just in the interests of the UK, but also France. Those involved in terrorism and criminal gangs do not respect borders and both countries need to be vigilant in confronting these ever-present threats. Maintaining the Le Touquet agreement should be acknowledged as a priority for the UK Government. (Paragraph 17)

Steps to tackle illegal migrants crossing the Channel

3. The situation in Calais and elsewhere on the French side of the Channel coast is a manifestation of the wider problem across Europe. The number of migrants in Calais is relatively small compared to the flows entering Europe and being managed by other countries. However, there is a potential threat to UK security, and the ongoing challenge to migration controls which this aspect of illegal migration presents remains of serious concern to us. The Home Office must continue to adapt its response to cross-Channel illegal migration to reflect changes in methods and routes used by migrant smugglers. It must also work actively with EU countries and agencies to tackle the root causes of people gathering in the Calais area with the aim of crossing to the UK. (Paragraph 26)

Borders and coastal security

4. When the Director General of Border Force, Sir Charles Montgomery, gave evidence to us in December 2015, he had not been informed what his budget for 2016–17 would be. When we asked the then Second Permanent Secretary about this in oral evidence in April 2016, after the current financial year had begun, he was unable to tell us whether Sir Charles had yet been told what his budget was. The then Home Secretary subsequently confirmed in writing that Sir Charles had been informed about his budget. This initial confusion was unacceptable—when select committees request information, it should be provided in a timely way. (Paragraph 31)
5. Border Force has been given a key role in implementing strengthened coastal security measures but it is clear that it is experiencing problems in gaining access to a sufficient number of patrol boats: only four of the new vessels are currently deployed and the remaining four will not be available for more than a year. Maritime patrols are an essential element of border security for an island nation. Border Force needs to be given all the necessary equipment, including vessels, to enable it to carry out its responsibilities effectively. The number of Border Force vessels in operation appears to be worryingly low. Royal Navy vessels should be made available to Border Force to make up for shortfalls, where necessary. (Paragraph 32)
6. In relation to our work on counter-terrorism, the then Minister for Security, John Hayes MP, acknowledged that tightening security at larger ports and airports risks displacing “malevolent attention” to smaller points of entry. This is equally true in relation to displacement of illegal migration and small ports are now being used by criminal gangs to move people between the Continent and the UK. Moreover, whilst the Government can be commended for its efforts to secure Calais, it has not heeded warnings, including from this Committee, that migration flows would be displaced to Belgium and the Netherlands, and most recently to Germany. Security must be tightened at small ports and airports which are being used as entry points from these new departure points on the continental coast as a matter of urgency. The Government should inform us what progress has been made on the “urgent work” that it says it is carrying out to protect small ports and airports, in addition to the increase in Border Force vessels, which is itself delayed. (Paragraph 33)

Humanitarian conditions in Calais camps

7. The initial prompt for our inquiry was the issue of border security in relation to Calais and Dunkirk that arose in summer 2015. However, our concerns range much more widely than that. That there are unofficial migrant camps at the border of two of Europe’s wealthiest nations is a matter of serious regret and concern. A wide range of the evidence submitted to us by experts and volunteers confirms that the conditions in the camps are absolutely atrocious and are directly causing suffering and ill health for many residents. In a letter to this Committee in July 2015, the then Immigration Minister confirmed that the information he had from France was that the most common five nationalities of migrants at Calais were Syrian, Eritrean, Sudanese, Iranian and Iraqi. Written submissions highlighted the number of camp residents, including children, who have family members in the UK or other ties

to this country. It is clear that there are many people in these camps entitled to humanitarian protection or refugee status, including some who should have their claims processed in the UK. (Paragraph 34)

8. We require much more information on the work the French and UK governments are undertaking to improve conditions at the camps, and to ensure all who are entitled to humanitarian protection or refugee status obtain it—and are able to do so swiftly. The Government should set out what fraction of the sums invested in Calais have been used in this way, as opposed to strengthening border security. Ultimately, we are yet to see any evidence of a strategy designed to deliver a long-term solution to the presence of these camps, and both governments must work together urgently to deliver one. (Paragraph 35)

Managing migration flows

9. Migration into Europe has been a long-standing challenge for EU countries, including the UK. However, the situation has now become a crisis, in large part because of the Syrian war, and the continuing instability in Libya and other parts of north Africa. Although current migration flows are a continuation of patterns that have ebbed and changed over many years, the current numbers of people seeking to move into Europe are unprecedented in modern times. The Archbishop of Canterbury has described the scale of the crisis as “colossal”. Syrian refugees present the most acute and numerous challenge, but there are other countries from which migrants continue to flow in large numbers. (Paragraph 46)
10. The EU and its Member States failed to anticipate the scale of migrant flows, and did not have the structures and mechanisms in place to cope. As a result, the EU has been too slow to respond in a coordinated way. The EU’s March 2016 agreement with Turkey on return of migrants is arguably a first step towards a meaningful response but it has come far too late and is itself highly controversial for a number of reasons. Further action is urgently required to ensure that vulnerable people seeking refuge do not suffer further exploitation by criminals, accompanied by fear, harm and the current high risk of death. (Paragraph 47)

Support to source countries

11. We strongly endorse a coordinated approach to the provision of support to those countries around Syria, which are doing so much to fulfil their moral obligation to take in large numbers of refugees, including Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. In the absence of realistic prospects of the impacts of the conflict coming to an end in the near future, the UK’s contribution to humanitarian relief is warmly welcomed, and maintaining it is essential. However, providing such aid does not absolve the UK from also providing more direct support for the thousands of Syrian refugees who have already arrived in Europe, particularly those whom the UK Government, in different circumstances, would consider to be vulnerable and therefore deserving refuge. (Paragraph 50)

Resettlement of Syrian refugees

12. The UK Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme has started well, and there are signs that the co-operation necessary between central Government, local authorities, and the various agencies involved is working efficiently. We reiterate our support for the Government's commitment to receive 20,000 Syrian refugees by 2020 and our appreciation of the efforts of all those who worked to achieve the target of 1,000 arriving by Christmas 2015, and we commend the then Minister for Syrian Refugees for achieving this. (Paragraph 57)
13. However, it is clear from the recently published statistics that more local authorities need to contribute to providing asylum accommodation, including for Syrian refugees. There is now a two-tier system among local authorities, with some providing support to Syrian refugees and others not doing so. A similar two-tier system applies in the level of support local authorities provide for other asylum-seekers. The Government needs to be much more proactive in encouraging a fair distribution of asylum seekers throughout the country and Ministers should take the lead on this, by encouraging their own local authorities to take their fair share of refugees. (Paragraph 58)
14. Those who come to the UK under the Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme are only given humanitarian protection for five years. We are concerned that the Government appears to be moving towards a system of limited time periods for providing refuge, which may not wholly meet its obligations under the 1951 UN Convention on the status of refugees. The situation in Syria should be reviewed comprehensively once the five-year point is approaching for any refugee. (Paragraph 59)

Safe and legal routes into Europe

15. The Government has said that it will not take part in the current EU schemes to relocate or resettle refugees. This is because it does not wish to participate in any initiative that might act as a magnet for those seeking refuge and thereby encourage them to risk taking dangerous routes to try to reach the UK. We accept this approach. In these circumstances, we would ask the Government to explain whether it is considering any expansion of safe and legal routes, such as humanitarian visas, for those from conflict regions seeking protection, as advocated by the Archbishop of Canterbury and a wide range of expert NGOs and others. The Government should also make clear how its response to the migrant crisis is providing protection for refugees other than Syrians in the UK, without provision in place for them to travel to the UK to apply for asylum. (Paragraph 65)
16. The Chair of Migration Watch, Lord Green of Deddington, accepted in evidence to us that the UK is not yet "full" in relation to migration. The Archbishop of Canterbury agreed that the UK was not full and believed that, with "careful preparation and good policy", including the necessary resources being provided to local communities, the UK had the capacity to fulfil its moral obligation to accept more refugees fleeing war zones and catastrophes, as well as asylum-seekers. We share this view. (Paragraph 67)

Control of EU external borders

17. Control of the EU's external borders is critical to an effective approach to the migration crisis, which is resulting in such high migratory flows. Large numbers of unregistered migrants moving into the Schengen area exacerbates existing security threats and risks undermining migration controls in other countries, including the UK. Members of the Schengen area need to agree whether control of external borders is the responsibility of the frontline state or is a collective EU responsibility to which they all contribute. We have noted that some Member States have implemented their own passport controls within the Schengen area, in breach of the Schengen principles and no doubt due to a lack of faith in the integrity of the external Schengen border. (Paragraph 77)
18. We welcome the proposals put forward by the European Commission to reform Frontex, the agency charged with protecting the EU's external borders. We believe these reforms would have a positive impact in empowering the new European Border and Coast Guard Agency to take effective action when individual Member States are unable or unwilling to do so. This would not affect the UK's role directly, even while it remains in the EU, as it is not a full member of Schengen. However, the UK does provide staff and equipment to work with Frontex and its support for the EU's Rapid Intervention Border Teams (RABIT) has always been welcomed. The Government should make clear how it intends to engage with the new EU border agency and how its engagement will differ from its current relationship with Frontex once the UK leaves the EU. We also recommend that the UK remain a key player in Europol from outside the EU, as the US is now. (Paragraph 78)

Tackling migrant smuggling across sea borders

19. The Government has supported both Frontex search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean and NATO operations aimed at disrupting migrant smuggling in the Aegean by deploying Royal Navy, Border Force and other vessels. We welcome these deployments although, given the low number of Border Force vessels in operation, it is important that this does not detract from their crucial role in policing the Channel. It is not acceptable for EU Member States to leave these essential tasks to the countries most affected, including Italy, Greece and Turkey. All EU national governments should share the burden and contribute to disrupting the activities and destroying the boats and equipment of criminal elements who are the source of much of the migrant crisis, and who are the only party in this crisis to have gained from the suffering of vulnerable people. (Paragraph 85)
20. Although the deployments to date have saved lives, it is clear that they are not yet achieving their primary task of deterring migrant flows and disrupting smuggling networks. The response has been too slow and more robust and urgent collective action by EU countries is needed, with a clear mandate to deal with high-level criminality. Libya has now become the main departure point for illegal migration across the Mediterranean and the focus should be on preventing boats leaving north Africa in the first place. For the action to be limited to rescuing people from the sea and collecting drowned bodies, as it seems to be at present, is wholly unacceptable. (Paragraph 86)

21. As we enter high summer, the then Prime Minister's announcement in May that a Royal Navy vessel was being sent to address migrant flows from Libya appears to have stalled. Moreover, the approach taken by the then Foreign Secretary in respect of Libya, where a reported 500,000 people are waiting to cross the Mediterranean illegally, is complacent. Given the UK's involvement in the Libyan civil war and in the rebuilding and reconciliation efforts which have followed, the EU should be able to offer Libya a deal, with substantial funding provided to tackle people smuggling at the points of departure, and access to Libyan territorial waters for European country vessels agreed in return. (Paragraph 87)

Dublin regulations

22. Application of the provisions of the Dublin Convention has a direct impact on UK migration controls because many of the migrants and refugees who arrive illegally in Calais with the aim of making an asylum claim in the UK will have passed through another EU state. The existing Dublin regulations were not designed for a crisis such as the present one, and the European Commission has proposed to improve them with a revised scheme designed to ensure that responsibility for processing asylum claims does not rest disproportionately with frontline states but instead, when required, is shared by EU members. The UK indicated that it would oppose any such changes to the Dublin regulations, even putting aside the question of its exit from the EU. Regardless of whether these changes proceed, proper systems for registering and tracking migrants need to be in place as part of the Dublin arrangements and an effective fingerprinting system is crucial for this. However, it is unfair for EU countries that are distant from the current points of arrival in the EU to criticise the main arrival countries for not implementing fingerprinting requirements effectively, given the vast numbers that they have been left to cope with, with inadequate support. (Paragraph 94)

EU hotspot initiative

23. If it can be made to work effectively, the EU's hotspot initiative will go some way to recognising that individual frontline countries cannot be left to bear the brunt of vast migration flows. For the hotspots to be a success, commitment and practical support is required from all EU members, and from the UK, for staff, equipment and other necessary resources. Greece and Italy cannot be blamed if the hotspots remain under-staffed and under-resourced. We welcome the practical support provided by the UK to date. It should be noted that the UK has opted out of the EU scheme for dealing with the migration crisis and that its unilateral commitments are currently limited mainly to the 20,000 Syrians refugees it has agreed to accept by 2020. (Paragraph 104)

EU border security and terrorist attacks

24. In the context of the current intense security threats to EU countries, it is clearly in the interest of all countries for there to be effective security checks at EU external borders. Although the measures taken by the UK since the Paris attacks are welcome, no country can expect to be able to protect its borders alone against those

who wish to do harm. The UK needs its European neighbours, and the countries on the EU external borders, to take equally rigorous steps. Terrorists do not see national borders as a barrier to their barbarism and people with illegal or lethal intent will continue to try to find ways through any security system. Cooperation and continued vigilance are necessary. (Paragraph 114)

25. The Greek Ambassador to the UK told us that one of the Paris terrorists crossed from Turkey to Greece and was then able to travel on within the EU, and that another had a Syrian passport. The additional checks against security databases which the European Commission has proposed are welcome. These should be enforced, in addition to passport checks, for both EU and non-EU nationals. Equipment should be available at all EU external borders for the fingerprinting of migrants on arrival and then for background-checking to be carried out before they cross the border. Any increased delays at border crossings which this may cause may just have to be accepted, in the face of the continued threat of terrorists managing to evade EU border checks, as two of the Paris attackers appear to have done. (Paragraph 115)

The EU Agreement with Turkey

26. The EU-Turkey agreement reached in March 2016 has resulted in a 90% decrease in the numbers of migrants arriving in Greece. However, concerns about the humanitarian, human rights, logistical and legal implications should not be ignored and the challenge for both Greece and Turkey in processing and moving the large numbers of people who have already reached Greece remains considerable. It is only just and fair that the EU countries which supported the agreement with Turkey should assist by providing staff, financial support and equipment. The UK Government has already provided some support to Greece in the form of personnel and equipment. It should set out the ongoing contribution it plans to make, both through EU agencies while it remains a member of the EU, and bilaterally. Turkey got a good deal from the agreement with the EU and it would receive even greater credit from EU states if it did more to stop migrants crossing to Greece in the first place. (Paragraph 123)
27. It was inevitable that the agreement to deport migrants back to Turkey from Greece would lead migrant smugglers to find other routes in the region which avoid Greece, and this has proved to be the case. There were hundreds of deaths of migrants making the crossing from North Africa to Italy during April and May and more deaths are likely during the high summer months. The EU needs to take immediate, collective and comprehensive steps to tackle the new problems created by the displacement of migrants to other routes avoiding Turkey and Greece, which were entirely foreseeable. Ultimately all action to close off irregular routes will be no more than partially successful, and sometimes counter-productive, particularly in the absence of sufficient safe and legal routes. We give some consideration to this issue in the next chapter in relation to protecting vulnerable groups, but the recommendations there are also more widely applicable. (Paragraph 124)

Family reunion and unaccompanied child migrants

28. We accept the Government's concern that allowing unaccompanied children to join family members already in the UK might create a "pull factor", resulting in more

vulnerable young people making dangerous journeys to try to reach the UK. We appreciate that these are sensitive and complex matters and that proper account needs to be taken of the legal and safeguarding requirements in the countries where unaccompanied children are currently located. We also acknowledge that some progress is being made on this. However, we agree with the Bishop of Durham that the 157 unaccompanied children already in Calais who have family members in the UK “should already have arrived” in the UK. The Government should, as a one-off action, accept all of these children into the UK now. (Paragraph 131)


29. Large numbers of women and child migrants are making dangerous illegal journeys across the Mediterranean, in the hope of being reunited with family members in the EU. We welcome the UK Government’s recent announcement of schemes to resettle unaccompanied children, both from the Middle East and North Africa, and some who have already reached Europe. However, it is important that the local authorities who are required to take responsibility for unaccompanied refugee children are properly funded and supported to take on this additional burden, particularly given the high concentration of arrivals in a very small number of locations, particularly in Kent and the Heathrow airport area. The Government should include steps to ensure the fair distribution of unaccompanied children across local authorities as part of the action we have called for in relation to dispersal of asylum-seekers. (Paragraph 134)
30. Family reunion of migrants has been shown to have benefits in terms of integration and support networks, in addition to the human rights requirements of allowing families to be together, and there is clear scope for further measures to facilitate women and children joining husbands, fathers and other male relatives who have reached the UK. We recommend that the UK Government increase its use of family reunion visas for refugee asylum cases, to make it easier for applications to be made in countries of origin and to help avoid women and children feeling obliged to attempt high-risk and illegal travel to Europe in order to be reunited with male relatives. We also recommend that the UK broaden the scope of family reunion rules, and work with expert NGOs to make it easier (including through provision of legal aid) and speedier for applications for family reunion visas to be made, particularly in countries of origin or their vicinity. (Paragraph 135)

Missing child migrants

31. Europol estimates that there are 85,000 unaccompanied minors amongst the migrant population in the EU. We were astonished to hear reports that large numbers of these children go missing from reception centres shortly after arrival and that they then face abuse, sexual assault and discrimination. At least 10,000 minors are estimated to have gone missing since arriving in Europe. EU countries must do more to protect these highly vulnerable young people. The Government has announced a £10 million Refugee Children Fund for vulnerable children in the EU. This should be used, and if necessary augmented, to ensure that effective support and protection are provided, and that this extremely serious problem is properly addressed. (Paragraph 140)

Annex 1

Map showing number of individuals resettled under the Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme, by local authority area, as at end of Q1 2016



Annex 2

Refugees (and others) resettled under the Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement scheme, including dependants, by local authority area (alphabetical order).

Local Authority	Region	Number resettled
Aberdeen	Scotland	30
Aberdeenshire	Scotland	32
Adur	South East	0
Allerdale	North West	0
Amber Valley	East Midlands	0
Angus	Scotland	21
Antrim and Newtownabbey	Northern Ireland	0
Argyll and Bute	Scotland	58
Armagh, Banbridge and Craigavon	Northern Ireland	0
Arun	South East	0
Ashfield	East Midlands	0
Ashford	South East	22
Aylesbury Vale	South East	0
Babergh	East of England	0
Barking and Dagenham	London	0
Barnet	London	6
Barnsley	Yorkshire and The Humber	0
Barrow-in-Furness	North West	0
Basildon	East of England	0
Basingstoke and Deane	South East	0
Bassetlaw	East Midlands	0
Bath and North East Somerset	South West	25
Bedford	East of England	5
Belfast	Northern Ireland	51
Bexley	London	0
Birmingham	West Midlands	44
Blaby	East Midlands	0
Blackburn with Darwen	North West	0
Blackpool	North West	0
Blaenau Gwent	Wales	0
Bolsover	East Midlands	0
Bolton	North West	0
Boston	East Midlands	0
Bournemouth	South West	0
Bracknell Forest	South East	0
Bradford	Yorkshire and The Humber	52
Braintree	East of England	0
Breckland	East of England	0
Brent	London	0

Local Authority	Region	Number resettled
Brentwood	East of England	0
Bridgend	Wales	0
Brighton and Hove	South East	13
Bristol	South West	14
Broadland	East of England	0
Bromley	London	0
Bromsgrove	West Midlands	0
Broxbourne	East of England	0
Broxtowe	East Midlands	0
Burnley	North West	0
Bury	North West	0
Caerphilly	Wales	7
Calderdale	Yorkshire and The Humber	9
Cambridge	East of England	14
Camden	London	14
Cannock Chase	West Midlands	0
Canterbury	South East	0
Cardiff	Wales	0
Carlisle	North West	0
Carmarthenshire	Wales	0
Castle Point	East of England	0
Causeway Coast and Glens	Northern Ireland	0
Central Bedfordshire	East of England	0
Ceredigion	Wales	10
Charnwood	East Midlands	0
Chelmsford	East of England	0
Cheltenham	South West	0
Cherwell	South East	0
Cheshire East	North West	0
Cheshire West and Chester	North West	0
Chesterfield	East Midlands	0
Chichester	South East	0
Chiltern	South East	0
Chorley	North West	0
Christchurch	South West	0
City of London	London	0
Clackmannanshire	Scotland	12
Colchester	East of England	22
Conwy	Wales	0
Copeland	North West	0
Corby	East Midlands	0
Cornwall	South West	8
Cotswold	South West	0

Local Authority	Region	Number resettled
County Durham	North East	0
Coventry	West Midlands	105
Craven	Yorkshire and The Humber	0
Crawley	South East	4
Croydon	London	0
Dacorum	East of England	0
Darlington	North East	0
Dartford	South East	0
Daventry	East Midlands	0
Denbighshire	Wales	0
Derby	East Midlands	0
Derbyshire Dales	East Midlands	0
Derry and Strabane	Northern Ireland	0
Doncaster	Yorkshire and The Humber	0
Dover	South East	0
Dudley	West Midlands	0
Dumfries and Galloway	Scotland	0
Dundee	Scotland	14
Ealing	London	0
East Ayrshire	Scotland	12
East Cambridgeshire	East of England	0
East Devon	South West	0
East Dorset	South West	0
East Dunbartonshire	Scotland	0
East Hampshire	South East	0
East Hertfordshire	East of England	0
East Lindsey	East Midlands	0
East Lothian	Scotland	9
East Northamptonshire	East Midlands	0
East Renfrewshire	Scotland	18
East Riding of Yorkshire	Yorkshire and The Humber	0
East Staffordshire	West Midlands	0
Eastbourne	South East	0
Eastleigh	South East	0
Eden	North West	0
Edinburgh	Scotland	53
Eilean Siar	Scotland	0
Elmbridge	South East	0
Enfield	London	0
Epping Forest	East of England	0
Epsom and Ewell	South East	0
Erewash	East Midlands	0
Exeter	South West	0

Local Authority	Region	Number resettled
Falkirk	Scotland	0
Fareham	South East	0
Fenland	East of England	0
Fermanagh and Omagh	Northern Ireland	0
Fife	Scotland	18
Flintshire	Wales	0
Forest Heath	East of England	0
Forest of Dean	South West	0
Fylde	North West	0
Gateshead	North East	62
Gedling	East Midlands	0
Glasgow	Scotland	51
Gloucester	South West	15
Gosport	South East	0
Gravesham	South East	0
Great Yarmouth	East of England	0
Greenwich	London	0
Guildford	South East	0
Gwynedd	Wales	0
Hackney	London	0
Halton	North West	0
Hambleton	Yorkshire and The Humber	0
Hammersmith and Fulham	London	0
Harborough	East Midlands	0
Haringey	London	0
Harlow	East of England	0
Harrogate	Yorkshire and The Humber	0
Harrow	London	0
Hart	South East	0
Hartlepool	North East	0
Hastings	South East	0
Havant	South East	0
Havering	London	0
Herefordshire	West Midlands	0
Hertsmere	East of England	0
High Peak	East Midlands	0
Highland	Scotland	0
Hillingdon	London	0
Hinckley and Bosworth	East Midlands	0
Horsham	South East	0
Hounslow	London	0
Huntingdonshire	East of England	0
Hyndburn	North West	0

Local Authority	Region	Number resettled
Inverclyde	Scotland	14
Ipswich	East of England	0
Isle of Anglesey	Wales	0
Isle of Wight	South East	0
Isles of Scilly	South West	0
Islington	London	10
Kensington and Chelsea	London	0
Kettering	East Midlands	0
King's Lynn and West Norfolk	East of England	0
Kingston upon Hull	Yorkshire and The Humber	5
Kingston upon Thames	London	3
Kirklees	Yorkshire and The Humber	11
Knowsley	North West	0
Lambeth	London	0
Lancaster	North West	0
Leeds	Yorkshire and The Humber	50
Leicester	East Midlands	15
Lewes	South East	0
Lewisham	London	0
Lichfield	West Midlands	0
Lincoln	East Midlands	0
Lisburn and Castlereagh	Northern Ireland	0
Liverpool	North West	0
Luton	East of England	0
Maidstone	South East	0
Maldon	East of England	0
Malvern Hills	West Midlands	0
Manchester	North West	0
Mansfield	East Midlands	0
Medway	South East	0
Melton	East Midlands	0
Mendip	South West	0
Merthyr Tydfil	Wales	0
Merton	London	0
Mid and East Antrim	Northern Ireland	0
Mid Devon	South West	0
Mid Suffolk	East of England	3
Mid Sussex	South East	0
Mid Ulster	Northern Ireland	0
Middlesbrough	North East	0
Midlothian	Scotland	10
Milton Keynes	South East	0
Mole Valley	South East	0

Local Authority	Region	Number resettled
Monmouthshire	Wales	0
Moray	Scotland	15
Neath Port Talbot	Wales	27
New Forest	South East	0
Newark and Sherwood	East Midlands	0
Newcastle upon Tyne	North East	54
Newcastle-under-Lyme	West Midlands	0
Newham	London	0
Newport	Wales	0
Newry, Mourne and Down	Northern Ireland	0
North Ayrshire	Scotland	23
North Devon	South West	0
North Dorset	South West	0
North Down and Ards	Northern Ireland	0
North East Derbyshire	East Midlands	0
North East Lincolnshire	Yorkshire and The Humber	0
North Hertfordshire	East of England	0
North Kesteven	East Midlands	0
North Lanarkshire	Scotland	43
North Lincolnshire	Yorkshire and The Humber	0
North Norfolk	East of England	0
North Somerset	South West	0
North Tyneside	North East	0
North Warwickshire	West Midlands	0
North West Leicestershire	East Midlands	0
Northampton	East Midlands	0
Northumberland	North East	0
Norwich	East of England	0
Nottingham	East Midlands	81
Nuneaton and Bedworth	West Midlands	0
Oadby and Wigston	East Midlands	0
Oldham	North West	0
Orkney Islands	Scotland	0
Other and Unknown	Other and Unknown	0
Oxford	South East	9
Pembrokeshire	Wales	0
Pendle	North West	0
Perth and Kinross	Scotland	25
Peterborough	East of England	0
Plymouth	South West	14
Poole	South West	0
Portsmouth	South East	5
Powys	Wales	0

Local Authority	Region	Number resettled
Preston	North West	0
Purbeck	South West	0
Reading	South East	0
Redbridge	London	0
Redcar and Cleveland	North East	0
Redditch	West Midlands	0
Reigate and Banstead	South East	0
Renfrewshire	Scotland	68
Rhondda Cynon Taf	Wales	0
Ribble Valley	North West	0
Richmond upon Thames	London	0
Richmondshire	Yorkshire and The Humber	0
Rochdale	North West	0
Rochford	East of England	0
Rossendale	North West	0
Rother	South East	0
Rotherham	Yorkshire and The Humber	0
Rugby	West Midlands	0
Runnymede	South East	0
Rushcliffe	East Midlands	0
Rushmoor	South East	0
Rutland	East Midlands	0
Ryedale	Yorkshire and The Humber	0
Salford	North West	0
Sandwell	West Midlands	0
Scarborough	Yorkshire and The Humber	0
Scottish Borders	Scotland	11
Sedgemoor	South West	0
Sefton	North West	0
Selby	Yorkshire and The Humber	0
Sevenoaks	South East	0
Sheffield	Yorkshire and The Humber	44
Shepway	South East	0
Shetland Islands	Scotland	0
Shropshire	West Midlands	0
Slough	South East	0
Solihull	West Midlands	0
South Ayrshire	Scotland	0
South Bucks	South East	0
South Cambridgeshire	East of England	0
South Derbyshire	East Midlands	0
South Gloucestershire	South West	0
South Hams	South West	0

Local Authority	Region	Number resettled
South Holland	East Midlands	0
South Kesteven	East Midlands	0
South Lakeland	North West	0
South Lanarkshire	Scotland	9
South Norfolk	East of England	0
South Northamptonshire	East Midlands	0
South Oxfordshire	South East	0
South Ribble	North West	0
South Somerset	South West	18
South Staffordshire	West Midlands	0
South Tyneside	North East	0
Southampton	South East	6
Southend-on-Sea	East of England	0
Southwark	London	0
Spelthorne	South East	0
St. Albans	East of England	0
St. Edmundsbury	East of England	0
St. Helens	North West	0
Stafford	West Midlands	10
Staffordshire Moorlands	West Midlands	0
Stevenage	East of England	5
Stirling	Scotland	8
Stockport	North West	0
Stockton-on-Tees	North East	0
Stoke-on-Trent	West Midlands	0
Stratford-on-Avon	West Midlands	0
Stroud	South West	0
Suffolk Coastal	East of England	8
Sunderland	North East	0
Surrey Heath	South East	0
Sutton	London	0
Swale	South East	0
Swansea	Wales	24
Swindon	South West	0
Tameside	North West	0
Tamworth	West Midlands	0
Tandridge	South East	0
Taunton Deane	South West	0
Teignbridge	South West	0
Telford and Wrekin	West Midlands	0
Tendring	East of England	0
Test Valley	South East	0
Tewkesbury	South West	0

Local Authority	Region	Number resettled
Thanet	South East	0
The Vale of Glamorgan	Wales	0
Three Rivers	East of England	0
Thurrock	East of England	0
Tonbridge and Malling	South East	0
Torbay	South West	0
Torfaen	Wales	10
Torridge	South West	0
Tower Hamlets	London	0
Trafford	North West	0
Tunbridge Wells	South East	9
Uttlesford	East of England	0
Vale of White Horse	South East	0
Wakefield	Yorkshire and The Humber	0
Walsall	West Midlands	0
Waltham Forest	London	0
Wandsworth	London	0
Warrington	North West	0
Warwick	West Midlands	0
Watford	East of England	0
Waveney	East of England	0
Waverley	South East	0
Wealden	South East	0
Wellingborough	East Midlands	0
Welwyn Hatfield	East of England	0
West Berkshire	South East	6
West Devon	South West	0
West Dorset	South West	0
West Dunbartonshire	Scotland	49
West Lancashire	North West	0
West Lindsey	East Midlands	0
West Lothian	Scotland	7
West Oxfordshire	South East	10
West Somerset	South West	0
Westminster	London	0
Weymouth and Portland	South West	0
Wigan	North West	0
Wiltshire	South West	27
Winchester	South East	6
Windsor and Maidenhead	South East	0
Wirral	North West	0
Woking	South East	20
Wokingham	South East	0

Local Authority	Region	Number resettled
Wolverhampton	West Midlands	0
Worcester	West Midlands	0
Worthing	South East	0
Wrexham	Wales	0
Wychavon	West Midlands	0
Wycombe	South East	0
Wyre	North West	0
Wyre Forest	West Midlands	0
York	Yorkshire and The Humber	0

Source: Home Office, [Immigration statistics, January to March 2016](#): data tables, Vol 4, Table as_20_q. Table includes data for quarters Q4 2015 and Q1 2016 only – data not available for the 252 persons resettled in quarters Q1 2014 to Q3 2015

Annex 3

Refugees (and others) resettled under the Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement scheme, including dependants, by local authority area [in descending order of number settled]

Local Authority	Region	Number resettled
Coventry	West Midlands	105
Nottingham	East Midlands	81
Renfrewshire	Scotland	68
Gateshead	North East	62
Argyll and Bute	Scotland	58
Newcastle upon Tyne	North East	54
Edinburgh	Scotland	53
Bradford	Yorkshire and The Humber	52
Belfast	Northern Ireland	51
Glasgow	Scotland	51
Leeds	Yorkshire and The Humber	50
West Dunbartonshire	Scotland	49
Birmingham	West Midlands	44
Sheffield	Yorkshire and The Humber	44
North Lanarkshire	Scotland	43
Aberdeenshire	Scotland	32
Aberdeen	Scotland	30
Neath Port Talbot	Wales	27
Wiltshire	South West	27
Bath and North East Somerset	South West	25
Perth and Kinross	Scotland	25
Swansea	Wales	24
North Ayrshire	Scotland	23
Ashford	South East	22
Colchester	East of England	22
Angus	Scotland	21
Woking	South East	20
East Renfrewshire	Scotland	18
Fife	Scotland	18
South Somerset	South West	18
Gloucester	South West	15
Leicester	East Midlands	15
Moray	Scotland	15
Bristol	South West	14
Cambridge	East of England	14
Camden	London	14
Dundee	Scotland	14
Inverclyde	Scotland	14
Plymouth	South West	14

Local Authority	Region	Number resettled
Brighton and Hove	South East	13
Clackmannanshire	Scotland	12
East Ayrshire	Scotland	12
Kirklees	Yorkshire and The Humber	11
Scottish Borders	Scotland	11
Ceredigion	Wales	10
Islington	London	10
Midlothian	Scotland	10
Stafford	West Midlands	10
Torfaen	Wales	10
West Oxfordshire	South East	10
Calderdale	Yorkshire and The Humber	9
East Lothian	Scotland	9
Oxford	South East	9
South Lanarkshire	Scotland	9
Tunbridge Wells	South East	9
Cornwall	South West	8
Stirling	Scotland	8
Suffolk Coastal	East of England	8
Caerphilly	Wales	7
West Lothian	Scotland	7
Barnet	London	6
Southampton	South East	6
West Berkshire	South East	6
Winchester	South East	6
Bedford	East of England	5
Kingston upon Hull	Yorkshire and The Humber	5
Portsmouth	South East	5
Stevenage	East of England	5
Crawley	South East	4
Kingston upon Thames	London	3
Mid Sussex	South East	3
Adur	South East	0
Allerdale	North West	0
Amber Valley	East Midlands	0
Antrim and Newtownabbey	Northern Ireland	0
Armagh, Banbridge and Craigavon	Northern Ireland	0
Arun	South East	0
Ashfield	East Midlands	0
Aylesbury Vale	South East	0
Babergh	East of England	0
Barking and Dagenham	London	0
Barnsley	Yorkshire and The Humber	0

Local Authority	Region	Number resettled
Barrow-in-Furness	North West	0
Basildon	East of England	0
Basingstoke and Deane	South East	0
Bassetlaw	East Midlands	0
Bexley	London	0
Blaby	East Midlands	0
Blackburn with Darwen	North West	0
Blackpool	North West	0
Blaenau Gwent	Wales	0
Bolsover	East Midlands	0
Bolton	North West	0
Boston	East Midlands	0
Bournemouth	South West	0
Bracknell Forest	South East	0
Braintree	East of England	0
Breckland	East of England	0
Brent	London	0
Brentwood	East of England	0
Bridgend	Wales	0
Broadland	East of England	0
Bromley	London	0
Bromsgrove	West Midlands	0
Broxbourne	East of England	0
Broxtowe	East Midlands	0
Burnley	North West	0
Bury	North West	0
Cannock Chase	West Midlands	0
Canterbury	South East	0
Cardiff	Wales	0
Carlisle	North West	0
Carmarthenshire	Wales	0
Castle Point	East of England	0
Causeway Coast and Glens	Northern Ireland	0
Central Bedfordshire	East of England	0
Charnwood	East Midlands	0
Chelmsford	East of England	0
Cheltenham	South West	0
Cherwell	South East	0
Cheshire East	North West	0
Cheshire West and Chester	North West	0
Chesterfield	East Midlands	0
Chichester	South East	0
Chiltern	South East	0

Local Authority	Region	Number resettled
Chorley	North West	0
Christchurch	South West	0
City of London	London	0
Conwy	Wales	0
Copeland	North West	0
Corby	East Midlands	0
Cotswold	South West	0
County Durham	North East	0
Craven	Yorkshire and The Humber	0
Croydon	London	0
Dacorum	East of England	0
Darlington	North East	0
Dartford	South East	0
Daventry	East Midlands	0
Denbighshire	Wales	0
Derby	East Midlands	0
Derbyshire Dales	East Midlands	0
Derry and Strabane	Northern Ireland	0
Doncaster	Yorkshire and The Humber	0
Dover	South East	0
Dudley	West Midlands	0
Dumfries and Galloway	Scotland	0
Ealing	London	0
East Cambridgeshire	East of England	0
East Devon	South West	0
East Dorset	South West	0
East Dunbartonshire	Scotland	0
East Hampshire	South East	0
East Hertfordshire	East of England	0
East Lindsey	East Midlands	0
East Northamptonshire	East Midlands	0
East Riding of Yorkshire	Yorkshire and The Humber	0
East Staffordshire	West Midlands	0
Eastbourne	South East	0
Eastleigh	South East	0
Eden	North West	0
Eilean Siar	Scotland	0
Elmbridge	South East	0
Enfield	London	0
Epping Forest	East of England	0
Epsom and Ewell	South East	0
Erewash	East Midlands	0
Exeter	South West	0

Local Authority	Region	Number resettled
Falkirk	Scotland	0
Fareham	South East	0
Fenland	East of England	0
Fermanagh and Omagh	Northern Ireland	0
Flintshire	Wales	0
Forest Heath	East of England	0
Forest of Dean	South West	0
Fylde	North West	0
Gedling	East Midlands	0
Gosport	South East	0
Gravesham	South East	0
Great Yarmouth	East of England	0
Greenwich	London	0
Guildford	South East	0
Gwynedd	Wales	0
Hackney	London	0
Halton	North West	0
Hambleton	Yorkshire and The Humber	0
Hammersmith and Fulham	London	0
Harborough	East Midlands	0
Haringey	London	0
Harlow	East of England	0
Harrogate	Yorkshire and The Humber	0
Harrow	London	0
Hart	South East	0
Hartlepool	North East	0
Hastings	South East	0
Havant	South East	0
Havering	London	0
Herefordshire	West Midlands	0
Hertsmere	East of England	0
High Peak	East Midlands	0
Highland	Scotland	0
Hillingdon	London	0
Hinckley and Bosworth	East Midlands	0
Horsham	South East	0
Hounslow	London	0
Huntingdonshire	East of England	0
Hyndburn	North West	0
Ipswich	East of England	0
Isle of Anglesey	Wales	0
Isle of Wight	South East	0
Isles of Scilly	South West	0

Local Authority	Region	Number resettled
Kensington and Chelsea	London	0
Kettering	East Midlands	0
King's Lynn and West Norfolk	East of England	0
Knowsley	North West	0
Lambeth	London	0
Lancaster	North West	0
Lewes	South East	0
Lewisham	London	0
Lichfield	West Midlands	0
Lincoln	East Midlands	0
Lisburn and Castlereagh	Northern Ireland	0
Liverpool	North West	0
Luton	East of England	0
Maidstone	South East	0
Maldon	East of England	0
Malvern Hills	West Midlands	0
Manchester	North West	0
Mansfield	East Midlands	0
Medway	South East	0
Melton	East Midlands	0
Mendip	South West	0
Merthyr Tydfil	Wales	0
Merton	London	0
Mid Devon	South West	0
Mid Suffolk	East of England	0
Mid Ulster	Northern Ireland	0
Mid and East Antrim	Northern Ireland	0
Middlesbrough	North East	0
Milton Keynes	South East	0
Mole Valley	South East	0
Monmouthshire	Wales	0
New Forest	South East	0
Newark and Sherwood	East Midlands	0
Newcastle-under-Lyme	West Midlands	0
Newham	London	0
Newport	Wales	0
Newry, Mourne and Down	Northern Ireland	0
North Devon	South West	0
North Dorset	South West	0
North Down and Ards	Northern Ireland	0
North East Derbyshire	East Midlands	0
North East Lincolnshire	Yorkshire and The Humber	0
North Hertfordshire	East of England	0

Local Authority	Region	Number resettled
North Kesteven	East Midlands	0
North Lincolnshire	Yorkshire and The Humber	0
North Norfolk	East of England	0
North Somerset	South West	0
North Tyneside	North East	0
North Warwickshire	West Midlands	0
North West Leicestershire	East Midlands	0
Northampton	East Midlands	0
Northumberland	North East	0
Norwich	East of England	0
Nuneaton and Bedworth	West Midlands	0
Oadby and Wigston	East Midlands	0
Oldham	North West	0
Orkney Islands	Scotland	0
Other and Unknown	Other and Unknown	0
Pembrokeshire	Wales	0
Pendle	North West	0
Peterborough	East of England	0
Poole	South West	0
Powys	Wales	0
Preston	North West	0
Purbeck	South West	0
Reading	South East	0
Redbridge	London	0
Redcar and Cleveland	North East	0
Redditch	West Midlands	0
Reigate and Banstead	South East	0
Rhondda Cynon Taf	Wales	0
Ribble Valley	North West	0
Richmond upon Thames	London	0
Richmondshire	Yorkshire and The Humber	0
Rochdale	North West	0
Rochford	East of England	0
Rossendale	North West	0
Rother	South East	0
Rotherham	Yorkshire and The Humber	0
Rugby	West Midlands	0
Runnymede	South East	0
Rushcliffe	East Midlands	0
Rushmoor	South East	0
Rutland	East Midlands	0
Ryedale	Yorkshire and The Humber	0
Salford	North West	0

Local Authority	Region	Number resettled
Sandwell	West Midlands	0
Scarborough	Yorkshire and The Humber	0
Sedgemoor	South West	0
Sefton	North West	0
Selby	Yorkshire and The Humber	0
Sevenoaks	South East	0
Shepway	South East	0
Shetland Islands	Scotland	0
Shropshire	West Midlands	0
Slough	South East	0
Solihull	West Midlands	0
South Ayrshire	Scotland	0
South Bucks	South East	0
South Cambridgeshire	East of England	0
South Derbyshire	East Midlands	0
South Gloucestershire	South West	0
South Hams	South West	0
South Holland	East Midlands	0
South Kesteven	East Midlands	0
South Lakeland	North West	0
South Norfolk	East of England	0
South Northamptonshire	East Midlands	0
South Oxfordshire	South East	0
South Ribble	North West	0
South Staffordshire	West Midlands	0
South Tyneside	North East	0
Southend-on-Sea	East of England	0
Southwark	London	0
Spelthorne	South East	0
St. Albans	East of England	0
St. Edmundsbury	East of England	0
St. Helens	North West	0
Staffordshire Moorlands	West Midlands	0
Stockport	North West	0
Stockton-on-Tees	North East	0
Stoke-on-Trent	West Midlands	0
Stratford-on-Avon	West Midlands	0
Stroud	South West	0
Sunderland	North East	0
Surrey Heath	South East	0
Sutton	London	0
Swale	South East	0
Swindon	South West	0

Local Authority	Region	Number resettled
Tameside	North West	0
Tamworth	West Midlands	0
Tandridge	South East	0
Taunton Deane	South West	0
Teignbridge	South West	0
Telford and Wrekin	West Midlands	0
Tendring	East of England	0
Test Valley	South East	0
Tewkesbury	South West	0
Thanet	South East	0
The Vale of Glamorgan	Wales	0
Three Rivers	East of England	0
Thurrock	East of England	0
Tonbridge and Malling	South East	0
Torbay	South West	0
Torridge	South West	0
Tower Hamlets	London	0
Trafford	North West	0
Uttlesford	East of England	0
Vale of White Horse	South East	0
Wakefield	Yorkshire and The Humber	0
Walsall	West Midlands	0
Waltham Forest	London	0
Wandsworth	London	0
Warrington	North West	0
Warwick	West Midlands	0
Watford	East of England	0
Waveney	East of England	0
Waverley	South East	0
Wealden	South East	0
Wellingborough	East Midlands	0
Welwyn Hatfield	East of England	0
West Devon	South West	0
West Dorset	South West	0
West Lancashire	North West	0
West Lindsey	East Midlands	0
West Somerset	South West	0
Westminster	London	0
Weymouth and Portland	South West	0
Wigan	North West	0
Windsor and Maidenhead	South East	0
Wirral	North West	0
Wokingham	South East	0

Local Authority	Region	Number resettled
Wolverhampton	West Midlands	0
Worcester	West Midlands	0
Worthing	South East	0
Wrexham	Wales	0
Wychavon	West Midlands	0
Wycombe	South East	0
Wyre	North West	0
Wyre Forest	West Midlands	0
York	Yorkshire and The Humber	0

Source: Home Office, [Immigration statistics, January to March 2016](#): data tables, Vol 4, Table as_20_q. Table includes data for quarters Q4 2015 and Q1 2016 only – data not available for the 252 persons resettled in quarters Q1 2014 to Q3 2015

Formal Minutes

Tuesday 19 July 2016

Members present:

Keith Vaz, in the Chair

Victoria Atkins	Tim Loughton
James Berry	Stuart C McDonald
David Burrowes	Naz Shah
Nusrat Ghani	Mr David Winnick
Mr Ranil Jayawardena	

Draft Report (*Migration Crisis*), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 64 read and agreed to.

Paragraph 65 read as follows:

“The Government has said that it will not take part in the current EU schemes to relocate or resettle refugees. This is because it does not wish to participate in any initiative that might act as a magnet for those seeking refuge and thereby encourage them to risk taking dangerous routes to try to reach the UK. We accept this approach. In these circumstances, we would ask the Government to explain whether it is considering any expansion of safe and legal routes, such as humanitarian visas, for those from conflict regions seeking protection, as advocated by the Archbishop of Canterbury and a wide range of expert NGOs and others. The Government should also make clear how its response to the migrant crisis is providing protection for refugees other than Syrians in the UK, without provision in place for them to travel to the UK to apply for asylum.”

Amendment proposed in line 4 to leave out the words “We accept this approach.”—(*Stuart C McDonald*.)

Question proposed, That the Amendment be made.

The Committee divided.

Ayes, 3	Noes, 5
Stuart C. McDonald	Victoria Atkins
Naz Shah	James Berry
Mr David Winnick	Nusrat Ghani
	Mr Ranil Jayawardena
	Tim Loughton

Amendment disagreed to.

Paragraph 65 agreed to.

Paragraphs 66 to 130 read and agreed to.

Paragraph 131 read as follows:

“We accept the Government’s concern that allowing unaccompanied children to join family members already in the UK might create a “pull factor”, resulting in more vulnerable young people making dangerous journeys to try to reach the UK. We appreciate that these are sensitive and complex matters and that proper account needs to be taken of the legal and safeguarding requirements in the countries where unaccompanied children are currently located. We also acknowledge that some progress is being made on this. However, we agree with the Bishop of Durham that the 157 unaccompanied children already in Calais who have family members in the UK “should already have arrived” in the UK. The Government should, as a one-off action, accept all of these children into the UK now.”

Amendment proposed to leave out the first sentence of the paragraph.—(*Stuart C McDonald.*)

Question proposed, That the Amendment be made.

The Committee divided.

Ayes, 3

Stuart C. McDonald

Naz Shah

Mr David Winnick

Noes, 5

Victoria Atkins

James Berry

Nusrat Ghani

Mr Ranil Jayawardena

Tim Loughton

Amendment disagreed to.

Paragraph 131 agreed to.

Paragraphs 132 to 140 read and agreed to.

Annexes agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Seventh Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

[Adjourned till Wednesday 20 July at 2.00 pm.]

Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

Tuesday 8 September 2015

Question number

Natacha Bouchart, Mayor of Calais, **Philippe Mignonet**, Deputy Mayor of Calais, and **Emmanuel Agius**, Deputy Mayor of Calais

[Q1–32](#)

Rt Hon James Brokenshire MP, Minister for Immigration, and **Sir Charles Montgomery**, Director General, Border Force

[Q33–92](#)

Tuesday 13 October 2015

Richard Harrington MP, Minister with responsibility for Syrian Refugees

[Q93–149](#)

Tuesday 24 November 2015

HE Konstantinos Bikas, Greek Ambassador

[Q150–206](#)

Tuesday 26 January 2016

Mr Khalid Chaouki, Member of the Italian Chamber of Deputies and Chair of the Culture Committee, Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean

[Q207–240](#)

Mr Gergely Gulyás, Member of the Hungarian National Assembly and Vice-Chairman, Foundation for a Civic Hungary

[Q241–268](#)

Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

MIG numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

- 1 Doctors of the World UK ([MIG0060](#))
- 2 J W Pilgrim Associates ([MIG0038](#))
- 3 Amnesty International UK ([MIG0062](#))
- 4 British Red Cross ([MIG0051](#))
- 5 Bryan Crick ([MIG0016](#))
- 6 Calais Refugee Solidarity Bristol ([MIG0046](#))
- 7 Charlbury Refugee Action Group ([MIG0045](#))
- 8 CitizensUK ([MIG0040](#))
- 9 Colin Laidler ([MIG0015](#))
- 10 Dr Thom Davies, Dr Arshad Isakjee and Dr Surindar Dhesi ([MIG0033](#))
- 11 Dr Vicki Squire et al ([MIG0050](#))
- 12 Elsie Luna ([MIG0042](#))
- 13 Freedom from Torture ([MIG0052](#))
- 14 Glenys Newton ([MIG0029](#))
- 15 Heather Luna ([MIG0043](#))
- 16 Home Office ([MIG0067](#))
- 17 Immigration Law Practitioners' Association ([MIG0047](#))
- 18 International Organization for Migration ([MIG0061](#))
- 19 International Rescue Committee UK ([MIG0064](#))
- 20 Jordan Roberts ([MIG0010](#))
- 21 Lauren Yallop ([MIG0030](#))
- 22 Lawyers' Refugee Initiative ([MIG0041](#))
- 23 Lulu Ashton ([MIG0019](#))
- 24 Mapping Immigration Controversy Research Project Team, University of Warwick ([MIG0036](#))
- 25 Migrant and Refugee Communities Forum ([MIG0053](#))
- 26 Miss Chloe le Fay ([MIG0032](#))
- 27 Miss Joanna Nicholls ([MIG0013](#))
- 28 Mr Alistair H G Allcroft ([MIG0011](#))
- 29 Mr Andrew White ([MIG0031](#))
- 30 Mr Christian Taylor ([MIG0007](#))
- 31 Mr Derek Hill ([MIG0023](#))
- 32 Mr Michael Tucker ([MIG0024](#))
- 33 Mr Nicholas Jewitt ([MIG0057](#))

- 34 Mr Randolph Martin ([MIG0014](#))
- 35 Mr Richard Smith ([MIG0025](#))
- 36 Mr Robert Oats ([MIG0006](#))
- 37 Mr Michael West ([MIG0009](#))
- 38 Mrs Anne Wroxley ([MIG0049](#))
- 39 Mrs Christine Fletcher ([MIG0017](#))
- 40 Mrs Clare Ann Moseley ([MIG0048](#))
- 41 Mrs Janice Evans ([MIG0022](#))
- 42 Mrs Joyce Mussett ([MIG0003](#))
- 43 Mrs Lynne Sawford ([MIG0021](#))
- 44 Mrs Marie Silbourne ([MIG0018](#))
- 45 Mrs Lesley Hill ([MIG0012](#))
- 46 Ms Gilly Dobson ([MIG0005](#))
- 47 Premier Christian Radio ([MIG0066](#))
- 48 Refugee Council ([MIG0058](#))
- 49 Rt Hon John Hayes MP, Minister of State for Security ([MIG0068](#))
- 50 Rt Hon Theresa May MP, Home Secretary ([MIG0026](#))
- 51 Save the Children ([MIG0059](#))
- 52 Unicef UK ([MIG0039](#))
- 53 Valerie Jenner ([MIG0027](#))

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the [publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

The reference number of the Government's response to each Report is printed in brackets after the HC printing number.

Session 2015–16

First Report	Psychoactive substances	HC 361 (HC 755)
Second Report	The work of the Immigration Directorates (Q2 2015)	HC 512 (HC 693)
Third Report	Police investigations and the role of the Crown Prosecution Service	HC 534
Fourth Report	Reform of the Police Funding Formula	HC 476
Fifth Report	Immigration: skill shortages	HC 429 (HC 857)
Sixth Report	The work of the Immigration Directorates (Q3 2015)	HC 772 (HC 213)
Seventh Report	Police and Crime Commissioners: here to stay	HC 844
First Special Report	The work of the Immigration Directorates: Calais: Government Response to the Committee's Eighteenth Report of Session 2014–15	HC 380
Second Special Report	Out-of-court Disposals: Government Response to the Committee's Fourteenth Report of Session 2014–15	HC 379
Third Special Report	The work of the Immigration Directorates (Q2 2015): Government Response to the Committee's Second Report of Session 2015–16	HC 693
Fourth Special Report	Psychoactive substances: Government Response to the Committee's First Report of Session 2015–16	HC 755
Fifth Special Report	Immigration: skill shortages: Government Response to the Committee's Fifth Report of Session 2015–16	HC 857

Session 2016–17

First Report	Police diversity	HC 27 (HC 612)
Second Report	The work of the Immigration Directorates (Q4 2015)	HC 22
Third Report	Prostitution	HC 26
Fourth Report	College of Policing: three years on	HC 23
Fifth Report	Proceeds of crime	HC 25
Sixth Report	The work of the Immigration Directorates (Q1 2016)	HC 151

First Special Report	The work of the Immigration Directorates (Q3 2015): Government Response to the Committee's Sixth Report of Session 2015–16	HC 213
Second Special Report	Police diversity: Government Response to the Committee's First Report of Session 2016–17	HC 612